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Abstract
This thesis contains three self-contained essays in development and applied economics.
Chapter 1 develops a new way to estimate the habit persistence coefficient of consump-
tion using household panel data. In contrast to the traditional approach of estimating an
approximate Euler equation, the identification comes from comparing the coevolution of in-
come and consumption. Using Spanish data from 1985 to 1995, we estimate a joint model
of habit formation and income variability. Under alternative preference specifications, we
find habit persistence plays an important role in smoothing the impact of permanent income
shocks on consumption. With our estimated parameters, we find habit persistence reduces the
variance of consumption by 40% over the life-cycle. The presence of habits in consumption
offers an explanation for the “excess smoothness of consumption” puzzle.
Chapter 2 examines the empirical link between inequality and common property resource
extraction. Using a Tunisian data, we find groundwater table falls less in villages with higher
land area inequality. We also design a choice experiment to elicit farmers’ willingness to
pay for a community-based management regime for groundwater use, and their demand
for information sharing and accountability. We find farmers are inclined to cooperation and
stabilizing water table level, and a majority demand a transparent system with independent
monitoring, which is absent from the current management scheme. We further examine the
effect of land inequality and heterogeneity on farmers’ inclination.
Chapter 3 investigates the causal effect of father’s labour migration on children’s educa-
tion in rural China. We employ two different empirical strategies which are compared and
contrasted. The first strategy uses a fixed effect instrumental variable procedure. The second
approach treats education and migration as duration processes using the multivariate dura-
tion framework developed by Abbring and van den Berg (2003). We find father’s migration
has no significant impact on child’s lifetime education attainment.
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Introduction
This thesis contains three self-contained essays in development and applied economics. While
covering a diverse range of topics, each of these three essays share an important common fea-
ture. In particular, all may be viewed as being concerned with the impacts associated with
economic development, and the institutional causes that lie behind these. Often these impacts
will be multidimensional and may include those which are economic, social, and environmen-
tal. While some of these impacts may be considered an inevitable part of the development
process, often they may be the result of stagnant institutional arrangements (either formal or
informal) which are usually characterized as “path dependency and stickiness” (North (1990)).
If these arrangements are not addressed properly, then there is a concern that they may harm
the sustainability of future development. For these reasons, this thesis is interested in study-
ing the results of a combination of economic development and stagnant institutional change
and how these interact with each other. Each self contained essay provides a quantitative
evaluation of important economic issues using an array of different empirical approaches.
The first chapter, Consumption Habit Formation and Income Variability, focuses on the impact
of income growth and uncertainty on consumption and savings behaviour. More precisely,
it examines how the introduction of consumption habit formation in an otherwise standard
life-cycle model affects household consumption and saving during periods of economic de-
velopment. While there is a well documented positive correlation between savings and eco-
nomic growth (Paxson (1996); Attanasio et al. (2000); Deaton and Paxson (2000)), we explore
the mechanism through which economic development may foster high savings. Here, we
treat habit persistence as an informal norm that is embedded in consumer’s preferences. The
precise form of habits that we consider are in the spirit of Becker (1992), who described such
habitual behaviour as being “sensitive to choices in the more distant past – including some-
times choices made by parents and others in the past – because the effects of the past decay
slowly”. Consumption habit formation introduces dynamics in decision making not merely
through intertemporal credit constraints but through the connection of past and future pref-
erences. Inspired by Carroll et al. (2000), which provided a theoretical mechanism through
which habit persistence can explain the link between high growth and high savings, I show
how consumption habit functions like an insurance mechanism against unexpected income
shocks and helps smooth consumption.
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Based on this idea, this chapter develops a novel way to identify and estimate the habit
persistence coefficient of consumption using household panel data. In contrast to the tradi-
tional approach of estimating an approximate Euler equation, the identification in this paper
comes from the idea that habit is stagnant and helps consumers to smooth consumption
against unpredictable income shocks. By comparing the co-evolution of income and con-
sumption, we show how it is possible to identify the extent of habit persistence. As the model
requires us to follow the same household for a long time period, a long panel data in both
variables is essential for identification. For this purpose, we use Spanish Household Con-
sumption and Income Panel Data from 1985–1995, in which each household is surveyed by
up to eight quarters. I start with a dynamic household optimization problem with intertem-
porally non-separable preferences, and derive the associated Euler-equation of consumption.
Instead of estimating the Euler equation directly, I connect the consumption innovation with
income innovation through the budget constraint. This allows us to write the evolution of
consumption as a function of the income innovation, which is assumed to include both per-
manent and transitory components.
I estimate a joint model of habit formation and income variability under alternative pref-
erence specifications (a baseline model with quadratic utility and additive habits, and an
extended model with CRRA utility and multiplicative habits). Under both specifications, I
find that habit persistence plays an important role in smoothing the impact of permanent
income shocks on consumption. Quantitatively, I find that habit persistence can reduce the
variance of consumption by 40% over the life-cycle. The presence of habits in consumption
therefore offers an explanation for the “excess smoothness” puzzle in literature. Moreover, the
same ideas are very relevant for understanding the experiences of fast developing economies,
such as countries in East Asia. Indeed, the methods developed in this chapter, can be applied
to data from these developing countries, giving us an opportunity to provide a quantitative
assessment of the extent to which habits may be important for explaining the observed high
savings and high growth rates in these countries.
The second chapter, Inequality, Information and Groundwater Management: A Case Study in
Rural Tunisia (joint with Mare Sarr and Tim Swanson), explores the environmental impact of
economic development. Instead of reviving the potential conflicts between economic devel-
opment and the natural environment, this chapter focuses on the institutional settings and
their impacts on common property resources management. To this end, it investigates a case
study of groundwater management within villages in the Merguellil river basin in Tunisia.
As we describe, water management in Tunisia has gone through several stages, from the
traditional collective management of irrigation water at the tribe level, to the centralization
control in 1950s, followed by the recent decentralization movement in which the Association
of Collective Interest and Group of Collective Interests were formed to be responsible for
water management at local level. Importantly, the new institution does not have the finan-
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cial, technical and organizational capabilities to adequately fulfil its mission, and as a result
farmers have little confidence in it. Water stealing and deepening wells are common, and
consequently, scarce water resources are overexploited.
With this institutional background in mind, Chapter 2 of this thesis is dedicated to un-
earth the institutional factors that deter collective management of the common property re-
sources. We first examine whether inequality (especially in land distribution) at the village
level has any impact on resource use. Using unique data that we collected on water table
levels and land distribution from 28 villages, we document an inverse relationship between
inequality and water resource exploitation, which is in line with Olson (1965)’s argument on
inequality and public goods provision. We further probe the institutional factors that are
conducive to cooperation by conducting a choice experiment, in which farmers are asked to
choose among a set of policy scenarios designed with an explicit trade-off. The quantitative
analysis shows farmers are willing to pay a significant amount for a transparent management
system with independent accountability, which is notably absent in the current institutional
arrangement. In other words, asymmetric information and heterogeneity are the factors that
hamper the formation of cooperation. At a policy level, making private water use informa-
tion public through the “name and shame” strategy is a possible way to foster cooperation.
We argue that as more government involvements try to be put in place to tackle the “com-
mon property tragedy”, it’s important to recognise that any intervention needs to remove the
obstacles which impedes cooperation at local level in the first place.
The final chapter of this thesis, The Effect of Labour Migration on Children’s Education in Rural
China, examines the social impact of large scale internal labour migration in contemporary
China. It is motivated by the concern over the welfare of those who are left behind by the
inter-migration wave and the long-term debate on migrants’ children’s education outcome.
With the unique Residence Registration System (Hukou) in China, children can only attend
public school in the county where their Hukou were registered, which is most likely where
they were born or where their parents resided before migrating. Since transferring Hukou is
extremely difficult (especially from a rural one to an urban one), most migrants undertake
migration work at cities where they don’t have Hukou and therefore are not entitled to the
local social welfare benefits or public services, such as children’s schooling opportunities and
medical insurance. As a result, it is very common to find “empty-nested” families in which
children are left behind in their original villages, to live with grandparents or on their own,
while their parents are doing year-long construction or manufacturing work in cities on east
coast.
Given this institutional background, the problem at hand becomes prominent as rural
parents on the one hand rely upon migration work for more income, while on the other hand
have to leave their children at home without parents’ supervision for schooling. The general
impact of parents’ migration on children is always in debate. The objective of this chapter is
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to investigate the causal effect of father’s internal labour migration on children’s education
attainment in rural China. I employ two different empirical strategies which are compared
and contrasted. The first approach uses a fixed effect instrumental variable procedure, in-
strumenting the migration decision by rainfall deviations. The second strategy I use treats
education and migration as duration processes using the framework developed by Abbring
and van den Berg (2003), and compares the education attainment between children whose
fathers migrate during children’s schooling years with those whose fathers who don’t. By
applying both empirical strategies to the same China Health and Nutrition Survey data, we
find that on aggregate father’s migration neither improves nor hinders the lifetime education
attainment of the left-behind children in the long run.
Chapter 1
Consumption Habit Formation and Income
Variability
A´rbol que nace torcido, jama´s su tronco endereza (A tree that is born twisted
never grows straight) — Spanish proverb.
1.1 Introduction
The past three decades have seen efforts to move away from the intertemporally separable
preference model. Common ways to introduce intertemporal nonseparability in life cycle
consumption models include habit formation (Constantinides, 1990) and the durability of
consumption (Hayashi, 1985).1 These mechanisms, in addition to the usual income and prices
channels, can influence one’s consumption in a fundamental way. In particular, with habit for-
mation, current utility does not only depend on current consumption, but on past consump-
tion in a form of habit stock. If habit plays an important role, then there can be much slower
adjustments in consumption following shocks to income. Because of this important feature,
habits have been proposed as an explanation for several apparent “puzzles” under the stan-
dard separable utility model. Examples include the excess sensitivity or excess smoothness
of aggregate consumption (Deaton, 1992), the equity premium puzzle (Abel (1990); Camp-
bell and Cochrane (1999); Constantinides (1990)), and the causal relationship between savings
and economic growth (Carroll et al., 2000). Notwithstanding the great benefits of introducing
habits into the utility function as well as the straightforward intuition it provides, the iden-
tification and estimation of the habit persistence has remained a very challenging problem.
The objective of this paper is to develop a model that allows us to identify habit persistence
in consumption, and then to empirically investigate the quantitative importance using Span-
ish Household Consumption and Income Panel (ECPF) data. By examining the coevolution
of consumption and income inequality, we find that households’ quarterly consumption dis-
plays a strong degree of habit persistence, with this persistence smoothing the impact of
income shocks on consumption.
1The importance of habits in consumption have long been recognised. See Constantinides (1990) for a review on
history of habit research.
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Most previous attempts to identify habit persistence estimate Euler equation, i.e. the first
order condition of the intertemporal maximization problem, exploring cross-sectional varia-
tions in consumption. Examples of this approach with additive habits2 include Alessie and
Lusardi (1997) and Dynan (2000). These models are then estimated using an GMM proce-
dure with variables at lagged periods as instruments. These papers rely upon the use of a
linearized Euler equation based on a Taylor series expansion, whose validity is the source of
much disagreement (see the discussion between Carroll (2001) and Attanasio and Low (2004)).
Carroll (2001), as well as Ludvigson and Paxson (2001), argues in estimating linearlized Euler
equation, instruments (usually interest rates at lagged periods) are very likely to be corre-
lated with the omitted higher-order approximation error. However, this argument has been
refuted by Attanasio and Low (2004) who argue that it is the lack of cross-sectional variability
in interest rates and lack of information on individual discount rates that contributes to the
failure of sensable estimates of system parameters such as intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution. Instead, they show that using ’large-T’ asymptotics instead of cross-sectional variation
can produce unbiased estimates in simulation exercises unless discount rate is exceedingly
and implausibly high, and hence log-linear approximation shouldn’t be taken to account for
the unreasonable estimates. This argument is joined by Yogo (2004) who particularly show
weak instruments can explain the puzzle in estimating log-linearized Euler equation. Besides
GMM-Euler equation approach, there exist other methods in literature to examine consump-
tion habit. For example, Fuhrer (2000) considers a consumer model with multiplicative habits.
He linearizes the Euler equation around steady state and estimates the model using maximum
likelihood estimation. In contrast to Dynan (2000), which doesn’t find evidence of habit per-
sistence using household food consumption data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics
(PSID), Fuhrer (2000) finds habit formation is economically important using US quarterly
aggregate consumption and income data. An alternative empirical approach is provided in
Browning and Collado (2007). Here, the difference in additivity between different consump-
tion goods is recognised, and Engel curve relationships are then estimated to test whether
last period’s budget share for a given good is correlated with this period’s share. Meghir
and Weber (1996) develop a structural model which is the first to disentangle dynamics in
preferences (i.e. habit formation) from dynamics due to borrowing constraints – both features
introduce dependence on variables in the information set of the consumer which invalidates
the standard Euler equation. Although they reject intertemporal nonseparable preference
over three types of nondurable goods using US Consumer Expenditure Survey, Carrasco et al.
(2005) do find habit persistence by applying the same model to ECPF data and taking account
of household fixed effects3. More recently, Crawford (2010) implements a nonparametric re-
vealed preference test for habits using the same data set as we use in this study, and finds
2In additive habit model, habit stock enters utility function in a additive form to the current consumption; while
in multiplicative habit model, habit stock enters utility function in a multiplicative form to the current consumption.
3They can’t reject the absence of habit in consumption if they apply the exactly same Meghir and Weber (1996)
method without household fixed effects to ECPF data.
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evidence for habits in consumption. However, constrained by the methodologies used, most of
these papers can’t produce point estimation of structural parameters such as habit persistence
coefficients.
This paper provides a new method to identify and estimate habits in consumption. It
differs from much of the existing literature in that it examines the co-evolution of both in-
come and consumption, and the identification comes from the comparison of variances and
covariance between consumption and income. When the interest rate and the rate of time
preference are similar, we demonstrate that intrinsic consumption (defined as the part of con-
sumption that directly contributes to current utility), rather than consumption itself as under
the permanent income hypothesis, should be a martingale. Moreover, the cross-sectional vari-
ance of intrinsic consumption should only reflect the variability of unexpected permanent
income shocks. Faced with both income and consumption panel data at household level, the
model allows us to identify the coefficient of habit persistence, together with the stochastic
permanent and transitory income processes. By applying the model to the extensive Spanish
Household Consumption and Income Panel data (covering the period 1985–1995), we find
evidence for the presence of consumption habits and show that it plays an important role in
smoothing out income shocks, especially the persistent permanent shocks, for Spanish House-
holds. This finding is consistent with other papers that have tested habit persistence using the
same data set (see Carrasco et al., 2005; Browning and Collado, 2007; Crawford, 2010), and
more importantly, it identifies the quantitive scale of importance.
This paper not only contributes to the literature on consumption habit estimation, but
also advances the research on the relationship between changes in income inequality and
changes in consumption inequality. Blundell and Preston (1998) document the empirical di-
vergence between consumption inequality and income inequality in the UK over 1980s, and
relate this growth in income inequality primarily to growth in transitory income shocks, with
permanent income shocks fully transmitted to changes in consumption. In a more recent
paper Blundell et al. (2008b) provide a more detailed examination of the transmission of in-
come shocks to consumption and develop a model which incorporates partial insurance (in
terms of the degree of transmission from income shocks to consumption inequality). They
provide the evidence to support partial insurance and emphasize the role of public transfers
as well as heterogeneity in the ability of agents to self-insure. However, as they themselves
say, they only provide “the ‘structured facts’ rather than a specific structural interpretation”
about this insurance mechanism. This paper proceeds in a similar vein, and argues that be-
sides precautionary saving, consumption habit persistence is also one of the mechanisms that
can be thought of as self-insuring consumption against income shocks. This has important
implication on welfare policy. As more and more researchers switch to consumption inequal-
ity from income inequality for welfare measure (for example,Cutler and Katz (1992), Deaton
and Paxson (1994),Krueger and Perri (2006)), our findings suggest consumption inequality
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alone may not be an ample indicator if much smaller consumption inequality is attributed
to habit persistence and combination of income and consumption inequality may be a more
desirable indicator. Moreover, this paper also contributes to the research in explaining the
“excess smoothness” of consumption to permanent income shocks (Campbell and Deaton
(1989)) from the specification of utility function, following Fuhrer (2000). Although Quah
(1990) shows that permanent income hypothesis can still predict excess smoothness of con-
sumption when agents distinguish permanent and transitory movements in labour income,
this paper shows that consumption can be further smoothed in the case of habit formation.
An understanding of consumers’ habit persistence also helps us to shed light on a num-
ber of important policy questions. In particular, it helps us to understand why some countries
have bigger saving rates than others. It is widely believed that being frugal is a cultural tradi-
tion in East Asian countries, and this argument has been used to explain the high saving rate
in those countries despite prolonged periods of consistently high economic growth. However,
no empirical studies have so far provided convincing evidence for this hypothesis. Carroll
et al. (2000) provided theoretical foundations for this argument and present simulation exer-
cises. Carroll’s argument starts from the observation that fast growing countries in East Asia
such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore all displayed a similar trend during their
growth period – that is, the increases in growth preceded the rise in saving rate. The main
mechanism, as he argues, is that habit formation prevents consumption from growing as fast
as income in fast growing economies, so that savings accumulate. These arguments would be
strengthened significantly if backed by robust empirical evidence. While looking at a some-
what different country from those considered by Carroll, one contribution of this paper is to
document evidence of habits in consumption.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, the baseline theoretical model is set
up with an intertemporally nonseparable quadratic utility function, and the identification
strategy for recovering the coefficient of habit persistence is discussed. Section 1.3 describes
the data set that we use and presents the empirical results. Section 1.4 then extends the model
to allow for a more general CRRA utility specification, and presents estimation results based
upon this alternative specification. Section 1.5 shows some simulation exercises based on
estimated parameters from the second model, before we conclude in section 1.6.
1.2 Model
The model in this paper builds on that developed in Blundell and Preston (1998), which under
the hypothesis of the life cycle behaviour, uses the dynamics of consumption and income
variances to identify the variances of permanent and transitory income shocks. In this section
we extend their model to include habits (i.e. intertemporal non-separable utility), to examine
how income shocks can be decomposed if consumption shows habit persistence, and more
importantly, how we may identify the habit persistence of consumption.
We begin with consumers’ intertemporal optimization problem by assuming a time-
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nonseparable utility function, with both current consumption and habit stock (defined be-
low) as arguments. Each consumer chooses consumption at each period cit to maximize the
life-time utility function:
max
{cit}
Et
[
T
∑
s=t
(
1
1+ δ
)s−t
u(cis,his)
]
,
where δ is discount rate and hit is household i’s habit stock at time t. The habit stock evolves
according to: hit = hit−1 + λ(cit−1 − hit−1) = (1− λ)hit−1 + λcit−1. For simplicity, we assume
that λ = 1, so that the habit stock is simply equal to last period’s consumption: hit = cit−14.
Consumers maximize the above life-time utility function subject to the life time budget
constraint:
T−t−1
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kcit+k = Ait +
R−t
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kyit+k,
where R is the retirement age, Ait are assets holding at time period t, and r is the risk-free
interest rate. Note that the only source of uncertainty is from stochastic labour income process
yit+k,k≥0.
As demonstrated by Carroll (2000), the Euler equation for the simple case with λ = 1 can
be written as:
Et
[
uc,t +
1
1+ δ
uh,t+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
uc,t+1 +
1
1+ δ
uh,t+2
]
, (1.1)
where uct and uht are the marginal utilities with respect to ct and ht respectively, and whose
arguments have been suppressed for notational simplicity. The above Euler equation indicates
the expected marginal utility by saving 1 unit of consumption today (LHS) should equal to the
expected discounted marginal utility of (1 + r) units of consumption tomorrow (RHS). The
second term on each side of the Euler equation is the marginal effect of current consumption
on future utility that is carried over to the next period by habit persistence.
1.2.1 Consumption Process
We begin our analysis by assuming that habits enter the utility function additively, with one
period lagged consumption as the habit stock (ht = ct−1) unchanged, so that u(ct,ht) =
u(ct − γct−1), and where γ is habit persistence coefficient. The parameter γ measures the
strength of habit formation: when larger, the consumer receives less utility from a given
amount of expenditure (Dynan, 2000). If there were positive habit persistence, γ should
be in the range of [0, 1]. If γ = 0, then the model collapses to the standard intertemporally
separable model, while γ = 1 means that only consumption growth matters for current utility.
Alternatively, in the other case of intertemporal nonseparability – durability – γ could be
less than zero, as past consumption brings satisfaction to the current time. To simplify the
subsequent notation we denote c∗it ≡ cit − γcit−1.
For simplicity, we assume that the within period utility function is quadratic in c∗it, so
4Using quarterly macro economic data, Fuhrer (2000) estimate a value of λ that is close to 1.
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that marginal utility is simply linear in this term. Thus, the Euler equation in the presence of
habits becomes:
Et
[
c∗it −
γ
1+ δ
c∗it+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
c∗it+1 −
γ
1+ δ
c∗it+2
]
(1.2)
This Euler equation schedules the evolution of expected consumption from period t on. While
as income provides the only uncertainty in this model, actual consumption will respond to
the new income shocks correspondingly. In order to track how consumption evolves under
uncertainty, we need to connect consumption to income innovations. This is done through
the budget constraint, which by simple construction, may be written as:5
T−t−1
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kc∗t+k = −γct−1 + γ(1+ r)−(T−t)cT−1
+
(
1− γ
1+ r
)[
At +
R−t
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kyt+k
]
, (1.3)
By simple rearrangement we also have:
T−t−1
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kc∗t+k+1 = −(1+ r)ct + (1+ r)−(T−t−1)cT
+ (1+ r)
(
1− γ
1+ r
)[
At +
R−t
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kyt+k
]
. (1.4)
Subtracting equation (1.4) (multiplied by γ1+δ ) from equation (1.3) gives us:
T−t−1
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−k
(
c∗t+k −
γ
1+ δ
c∗t+k+1
)
=
(
1− γ 1+ r
1+ δ
)(
1− γ
1+ r
)[
At +
R−t
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kyt+k
]
− γct−1 + γ(1+ r)−(T−t)cT−1 + γ 1+ r1+ δ ct −
γ
1+ δ
(1+ r)−(T−t−1)cT . (1.5)
Since the stock of assets evolving according to At = (1 + r)(At−1 + yt−1 − ct−1) we may
substitute this into equation (1.5) so that:
T−t−1
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−k
(
c∗t+k −
γ
1+ δ
c∗t+k+1
)
=
(
1− γ 1+ r
1+ δ
)(
1− γ
1+ r
)[
(1+ r)At−1 − (1+ r)ct−1 + (1+ r)
R−t+1
∑
k=0
(1+ r)−kyt+k−1
]
− γct−1 + γ(1+ r)−(T−t)cT−1 + γ (1+ r)1+ δ ct −
γ
1+ δ
(1+ r)−(T−t−1)cT . (1.6)
5To simplify the notation, we have omitted the household specific subscript i.
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By applying the period t expectations operator to both sides of equation (1.6), and sub-
tracting the lagged version of equation (1.5) (with period t− 1 expectations operator applied)
we may cancel out the At−1 term. Moreover, once we impose equality of the discount and in-
terest rate, we obtain an expression for the evolution of the differenced term c∗t+k − γ1+δ c∗t+k+1:
ρt
[
Et
(
c∗t −
γ
1+ δ
c∗t+1
)
−Et−1
(
c∗t−1 −
γ
1+ δ
c∗t
)]
= (1− γ)(1+ r− γ)ηit (1.7)
where ρt = 1 − (1 + r)−(T−t) is an annuitization factor, and ηt = r × (1 + r)−1 ∑R−tk=0 (1 +
r)−k(Et − Et−1)yt+k is an income innovation term, or the annualized value of the expected
difference of future income flows between the current and previous period.
The intuition for equation (1.7) is as follows: by taking into account the negative effect of
current consumption on future utility, via habit persistence, the expected consumption change
should only reflect a part of innovation to income at the current period. In other words, in
the presence of habits, consumption should respond to income innovations more slowly. For
a sufficiently small interest rate r, the multiplier on ηit– (1 − γ)(1 + r − γ)– is between 0
and 1. Stronger habit persistence (larger γ), reduces the multiplier, and therefore lowers the
response of consumption to income shocks. Thus, habits introduce a form of inertia that
prevent consumption from growing as fast when there is a positive income shock. Similarly,
when there is a negative income shock it prevents consumption from decreasing as quickly.
1.2.2 From Income Change to Consumption Change
As in Blundell and Preston (1998) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we assume a standard
stochastic process determining the evolution of incomes yit:
yit = yPit + uit
yPit = y
P
it−1 + vit
(1.8)
where yPt is permanent income, and with period t changes in permanent income given by in-
novation term vit. Similarly, transitory income shocks are given by uit so that overall income
evolves according to ∆yit = ∆uit + vit. For now, we assume that permanent and transitory
income shocks are independent from each other at all leads and lags, i.e. uit⊥vis, ∀t, s, al-
though in the much of the later analysis we will assume that transitory shocks follow a MA(1)
process. For now, we do not consider measurement error in either consumption or income.
Given the above income process, the income innovation term ηit can be decomposed into
transitory and permanent innovations to income:
ηit = ρtvit +
r
1+ r
uit. (1.9)
Substitute (1.9) into (1.7) and remove the expectation operator from the LHS of equation
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(1.7), we can rewrite this expression as:
ρt
[
(c∗t −
γ
1+ r
c∗t+1)− (c∗t−1 −
γ
1+ r
c∗t )
]
= (1− γ)(1+ r− γ)ηit + ρtξt+1 − ρtξt (1.10)
where ξt+1 = − γ1+r (ct+1 −Etct+1) is the expectation error of consumption at period t + 1,
which includes information that only arrives at t + 1, and ξt = − γ1+r (ct −Et−1ct) is simi-
larly defined. Theoretically, the expectation error at time t will be a function of the income
innovations ut+1 and vt+1 as it includes consumption shock in response to newly arrived
information on income at t + 1. For now, we treat these consumption expectation errors as
unknown variables. Equation (1.10) implies that the growth in intrinsic consumption at time
t, after removing the part which is carried over to the future period by habit persistence, can
be decomposed into two parts: the corresponding annuitized income innovation at time t,
and the difference between the expectation error of one-period forward consumption in the
current period and that of the previous period.
For notational simplicity we define composite consumption Qt = c∗t − γ1+r c∗t+1 and
Qt−1 = c∗t−1 − γ1+r c∗t . We refer to Qt as intrinsic consumption, as it is the marginal current
utility of current consumption with the effect on future utility (carried over by habit persis-
tence) removed. So Equation (1.10) actually describes the martingale property of the intrinsic
consumption. If we divide by the annuitization factor and take variances on both sides of
equation (1.10) , we can obtain the following equation:
∆var(Qit) = (1 − γ)2(1 + r − γ)2
(
var(vit) +
r2
(1+ r)2ρ2t
var(uit)
)
+ ∆var(ξit+1)
For small enough interest rate r and sufficient long time horizon T, we obtain ρt → 1 which
allows us to derive an approximate version of the above equation:
∆var(Qit) ' (1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2var(vit) + ∆var(ξit+1). (1.11)
To better understand the equation (1.11), we are comparing it with its counterpart in
Blundell and Preston (1998):
∆var(cit) ' var(vit) (1.12)
As Blundell and Preston (1998) assume a life cycle model with a quadratic intertemporal
separable utility function, equation (1.12) says the growth in consumption variance for each
cohort should reflect the variance in permanent income shocks only at one to one ratio, with
the effect of transitory income shocks being smoothed away. Similarly but differently, the
moment condition Equation (1.11) in the case of habit persistence (γ > 0) states that, after
being adjusted for the change in the variance of consumers’ expectation error, the change in
the variance of intrinsic consumption which contributes to current utility responds only to the
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permanent income innovation variance at a discounted rate. That is to say, consumers’ habits
act to passively smooth out income shocks. The permanent income hypothesis tells us how
individuals use consumption to smooth out the impact of transitory income shocks on utility.
While passively, habits provide some form of self-insurance against more persistent shocks,
so that consumption responds even more gradually to income changes. As we now discuss,
understanding this co-evolution of income and consumption is essential for empirically iden-
tifying the presence of habits.
1.2.3 Identification
Equation (1.11) suggests a method for estimating the coefficient of habit persistence γ. As in
Blundell and Preston (1998), we can derive a set of moment conditions which will then allow
us to separately identify the variance of permanent and transitory income innovations, as well
as γ. We obtain:
∆var
(
c∗t −
γ
1+ r
c∗t+1
)
'
[
(1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2
]
var(vt) + ∆var(ξt+1) (1.13)
∆var(yt)− 1
(1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2∆var
(
c∗t −
γ
1+ r
c∗t+1
)
' ∆var(ut)− 1
(1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2∆var(ξt+1) (1.14)
1
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)∆cov
(
c∗t −
γ
1+ r
c∗t+1, yt
)
' var(vt). (1.15)
With γ = 0, these three equations collapse to the three moment conditions used in Blun-
dell and Preston (1998):
∆vark(ct) ' vark(vt) (1.16)
∆vark(yt)− ∆vark(ct) ' ∆vark(ut) (1.17)
∆vark(ct, yt) ' vark(vt) (1.18)
Equation (1.13) is the first moment condition we derive in the last section. Equation
(1.14) is analogous to (1.17) in which permanent shocks that is identified from (1.13) can be
removed from change in variance of income to obtain change in transitory income shocks.
The covariance between composite consumption and income also provides information on
permanent income shocks (equation (1.15)). So far, for each period there are three parameters
to be identified: var(vt), ∆var(ut), ∆var(ξt+1), plus a time-invariant γ, while we have only
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three moment conditions for each period as listed above. To obtain full identification of the
whole model we proceed to use the income covariance conditions as presented in Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004), which are sufficient to identify the variances of permanent income shocks:
E
git
 1+q∑
j=−(1+q)
git+j
 = E(v2it) = var(vit), (1.19)
where git = ∆yit = ∆uit + vit is stochastic income growth. q denotes the degree of moving
average provess of transitory shock uit. As we assume uit is indepently distributed for the
moment, q = 0.
The model moment conditions (equations (1.13)–(1.15) and (1.19)) use information on
the relationship between income and consumption. While consumption habits can partly
smooth out permanent shock of income, the covariance of the income series itself can reveal
information about permanent income shocks. Furthermore, equation (1.15) and (1.19) allow us
to identify habit persistence γ and variances of permanent shocks together, which when used
with the other two conditions ((1.13) and (1.14)) allow us to identify the growth in variances
of transitory shocks and prediction errors.
In the above model, we assumed that both uit and vit are independent from each other
at all leads and lags. However, in reality, we may expect some form of correlation over time.
Indeed, should transitory shocks follow MA(1) process, we set q = 1 in equation (1.19) and
equation (1.15) is replaced by the following modified condition:
∆cov
(
c∗t+1 −
γ
1+ r
c∗t+2, yt
)
= (1− γ)(1+ r− γ)var(vt) (1.20)
It is important to note that, different from Blundell and Preston (1998) using repeated cross-
sectional data in estimation, identification of this model requires at least 4 waves of panel data
with both consumption and income in the presence of MA(0) transitory shocks as variance and
covariance are not linear functions. And for the model with MA(1) transitory shocks, at least
6 waves then becomes necessary. The minimum number of waves required for identification
in general is 4+ 2q.
1.3 Data and initial results
We estimate the model using a detailed Spanish household panel data set (Encuesta Continua
de Presupuestos Familiares, ECPF), 1985–1995. The ECPF has been used in several papers to test
consumption intertemporal non-separability owing to the long panel that it covers (Carrasco
et al., 2005; Browning and Collado, 2007; Crawford, 2010). Each household is surveyed for
at most eight consecutive quarters, with one-eighth of the sample being rotated each wave.
The sample size for each wave is around 3200 households. It provides detailed information
on expenditure, income and demographics at the household level (see Browning and Col-
lado, 2001, for a detailed description of the data set), with food and other non-durable goods
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consumption taken at weekly base, and durable goods consumption each quarter.
1.3.1 Sample selection and variable definition
We only consider families reporting complete information for at least 4 waves, and of couples
with or without dependent children (34253 observations excluded from the original data).
We also drop households if their household heads have changed over time (23 observations),
those with at least one permanent guest (658 observations), or having household size changed
by more than one person (2771 observations). We further drop those with age inconsistencies
(1931 observations), or spouse’s employment status changed (11,667 observations) to avoid
spousal labour supply insurance which may confound our results. Finally, we dropped house-
hold observations with zero reported food consumption (204 observations). The final sample
consists of 7,717 households (45,983 observations), with heads’ age between 25 and 60 in the
sample. For the detailed composition of sample, please see Table 1.5 in Appendix 1.A.
We define three categories of consumption and estimate our model with these alterna-
tive consumption definitions. Non-durable consumption and services is defined as the total
household expenditure on food at home (including alcohol and tobacco), all kinds of services
(including utility bills) and all the non-durable goods. We add semi-durable consumption
(semi-durable household goods and clothes etc.) to non-durable consumption and services
to form the second consumption category. The last category includes nearly all consump-
tion items (including car purchasing and education payment for example), by adding durable
goods consumption on top of the second category. Following Pijoan-Mas and Sa´nchez-Marcos
(2010), we also try four measurements of income in estimation: net labour earnings (wages
+ 2/3 self employment earnings); net labour earnings plus private transfers; net income (all
types of income, including wages, self-employed earning, capital income, and all private
transfer); total net disposable income (net income plus public transfers such as pensions and
unemployment benefit). We trim off the bottom and top 1% observations in consumption (the
third definition) and income (the fourth definition) distribution in our estimation. Table 1.6
lists the mean and the variances of income and consumption under each definition.
To understand the movement of income and consumption shocks, the predictable part
of real income and consumption (conditional on demographic characteristics) must first be
removed. Following Blundell et al. (2008b), we run a simple linear regression:
log Yit = Z′itϕt + Pit + uit,
where Pit is i’s permanent income at time t, and uit is transitory income shock as before. Zit is
a set of household’s (and head’s) characteristics observable and known by consumers at time
t. These include household demographics, head’s education, head’s job type, and seasonal
effects. We allow these effects to interact with time or cohort. We also allow for general time
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of Variance of Unpredicted Consumption and Income
trends6 and cohort effects7 in the intercept term. Both consumption and income are deflated
by a Stone Price Index (which is the weighted price index with the household specific weights
determined by each period’s expenditure shares. Linear predictions are taken following these
regressions; the distribution of residuals is presented in Figure 1.5 in the Appendix 1.A.
1.3.2 The autocovariance of consumption and income
Figure 1.1 plots the raw estimates of unexplained consumption and income variance, which
are obtained after removing the predictable parts of income and consumption. The upper left
panel is calculated using the entire estimation sample. It shows that income variance falls
rapidly in the mid 1980s and then fluctuates around a steady level thereafter before rising
again slowly in the last few quarters. Furthermore, the variance of consumption is much less
variable and is around 0.15 throughout the sample period. Not surprisingly, the variance
of total net disposable income is much lower than that of net labour income. Public and
private transfers apparently work to lower the degree of inequality across population. The
other three panels consider different (heads’) education groups and show the trend of within-
group variances over the same sample period. Households where the head has a university
degree group shows a lower-than-average variance in incomes, while the lowest education
group displays a much higher inequality, which drops by a large amount after taking account
of transfers. These patterns are consistent with the conclusion of Pijoan-Mas and Sa´nchez-
Marcos (2010) that “public transfers have played a crucial role in smoothing out the inequality
arising in the labour market” during that period.
6We have experimented with two alternative types of time trend: an annual trend (one dummy for each year) and
wave trend (one dummy for each wave). The main the empirical results are qualitatively similar for both types, and
we present only those obtained using the annual trend.
7We adopt the same cohort definition as in Albarran et al. (2009): Cohort 1 – born between 1920 and 1934; Cohort
2 – born between 1935 and 1944; Cohort 3 – born between 1945 and 1954; Cohort 4 – born between 1955 and 1964.
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Table 1.1: Estimated Habit Persistence (Quadratic preference)
Income
consumption net labour net labour earnings net income total net
earnings + private transfer disposable income
nondurable 0.499 (0.056) 0.504 (0.053) 0.489 (0.051) 0.411 (0.049)
non+semi 0.459 (0.052) 0.462 (0.054) 0.452 (0.046) 0.415 (0.042)
all 0.433 (0.079) 0.446 (0.079) 0.449 (0.076) 0.415 (0.053)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
For the auto-covariance between consumption and income, we calculate several moments
of the income and consumption processes, as shown in Table (1.7). Estimates are reported
for each wave. The table shows that there is a decrease in the variance of income growth
in the second half of 1980s, while it increases slightly in the first part of 1990s. The first-
order auto-covariances of income are of the expected sign (−) and show a slight increase over
time in absolute value. Second- and higher- order auto-covariances are informative about the
presence of serial correlation in the transitory income components (Blundell et al., 2008b).
Second order auto-covariances are small economically and only statistically significant from
zero in some time periods of the whole sample8. In the following analysis we assume the
transitory income process as MA(1).
1.3.3 Results
1.3.3.1 Habit persistence
The above model has been estimated by minimum distance estimation. In estimation we allow
the habit persistence coefficient γ to be negative. This therefore allows for both habit persis-
tence (γ > 0) and durability of consumption (γ < 0) across time. Besides positive constraints
on permanent income shock variances, no other linear nor non-linear constraints are imposed
9. To obtain greater efficiency, we weight the moment conditions using the diagonal of their
inverse variance matrix10. We also assume MA(1) structure of transitory income shocks. The
results of this diagonally optimally weighted minimum distance estimation (DWMD) are pre-
sented in Table (1.1).
The table shows that the estimated habit persistence coefficients for non-durable and
semi-durable goods consumption is positive and both economically and statistically signif-
icant (around 0.4–0.5). This means nearly half of the past consumption serves as baseline
to which only the additional part of current consumption can be brought to current satis-
8However, the third-order auto-covariances of income are not small. In practice this data shows higher order
auto-covariances are not necessarily small in size because of the quarterly data structure. To see how it works, look at
cov(∆yit,∆yit+3) = cov(yit − yit−1, yit+3 − yit+2), where yit+3is the income in the same quarter exactly one year after
when yit−1 is surveyed, which can be highly correlated, especially to seasonal job takers. This pattern exists even
after we condition our incomes and consumptions on seasonal dummies. It’s also important to notice the estimated
standard errors don’t take account of the fact that income data are the estimated residuals. Estimating the standard
errors by bootstrapping may mitigate this problem. However, this is a data issue that seems hard to be completely
resolved within the framework of this paper.
9We do not constrain cit − γcit−1 ≥ 0 during estimation. However, ex-post we can easily verify whether this
condition is violated in any t given our estimate of γ. We do not find any such violations.
10That is, the off diagonal elements are neglected. This treatment is to avoid the small sample bias of optimal
minimum distance estimator (Altonji and Segal (1996)).
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faction. The habit persistence coefficient decreases when we move from non-durable goods
consumption to durable goods consumption, which reflects the fact that the identified coef-
ficient captures both habit persistence and durability. When the degree of habit persistence
is stronger than durability (for example in the case of non-durable goods consumption), the
estimated coefficient tends to be positive and large. However, when the negative durability
effect dominates the positive habit persistence (in the case of durable goods consumption)
it is possible to obtain small or even be negative coefficients. Consistent with this intuition,
when estimating the model with durable goods we obtain an estimate of γ that is signifi-
cantly smaller than we obtained with non-durable goods (0.41–0.45), although economically
this difference is not especially large. We also note that we find that the estimated habit per-
sistence coefficient is much smaller when using total net disposable income, which is much
less volatile than the other incomes without public transfers. This is consistent with our iden-
tification idea: given the same consumption variance, larger income variance implys larger
habit persistence as habit works to smooth consumption in response to unexpected income
shocks.
1.3.3.2 Income shocks
In Figure 1.2(a) we plot the variances of permanent income shocks (the solid line) and the
change in variances of transitory shocks (the dashed line) over time to see how the income
process in Spain has changed. These variances are decomposed from total net disposable
incomes across the whole sample. The figure shows that there is much larger variation in
transitory income shocks than in permanent income shocks, with a noticeable decline in these
transitory income shock variances in the most sample periods (as the growth in this variable
is negative in most periods), especially late 1980s. This decline suggests that it was a fall
in variance of transitory income shocks that was responsible for decrease in overall income
inequality seen in late 1980s. The variances of permanent income shocks are on the contrary
quite stable and relatively small, at about 0.02 on average per quarter.
1.4 Incorporating precautionary saving
1.4.1 Habit persistence under CRRA utility
The model presented in Section 1.2 was based upon a life-cycle consumption model with
a within-period quadratic utility function. Such a specification does not incorporate any
precautionary savings motive. Precautionary saving provides another mechanism through
which consumers may only partially adjust their consumption following a change in their
permanent income. Ignoring it may confound our estimate of habit persistence coefficient.
The main distinction between habit and precautionary saving lies in the fact that habit is
formed before consumption (for example, it may be inherited from family) and therefore
consumers are more unconscious of its effect; while precautionary saving is a conscious deci-
sion made by consumers, according to the predicted future income risk. This section extends
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Figure 1.2: Variance of Income Shocks (total net disposable income)
the baseline model to allow for this property. Although we are not trying to disentangle the
effects on consumption of habit persistence and precautionary saving, the model presented
in the following does allow us to identify the coefficient of habit persistence in a framework
in which precautionary saving is possible.
To incorporate precautionary saving, a utility function with convex marginal utility curve
is necessary. We follow many papers that have incorporated habits, by using a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. The setting is otherwise the same as in the
quadratic utility case, and we continue to use last periods consumption as the habit stock.
But in contrast to the quadratic case the stock of habits now enter the utility in multiplicative
form, as in Carroll (2000). We therefore have the following within period utility function:
u(cit, hit) = u
(
cit
hγit
)
=
1
1− σ
(
cit
hγit
)1−σ
,
with γ again used to denote the coefficient of habit persistence (although its scale is not
comparable to the quadratic case). This coefficient should always be in the interval [0, 1]. A
value γ > 1 would imply that steady-state utility is falling in consumption (Fuhrer, 2000).
In contrast to the additive habit model, it is not the growth of consumption, but rather the
relative ratio between consumption and the stock of habits that now matters for current utility.
If γ = 0, this is simply the model without habits; while if γ = 1, only the ratio between current
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consumption and past consumption matters to the current utility; if it is between these values
then both the consumption level and the ratio contribute to current utility, with γ determining
the relative importance of each.
As before, we still assume expected utility framework, i.e. households choose consump-
tion to maximize the sum of expected utility over time. If we substitute expressions for
marginal utility, uc,t = ( cthγt
)−σ 1
hγt
and uh,t = −γ ctht uc,t into the generic Euler equation expres-
sion (Equation (1.1)) then we obtain:
Et
[
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
− γ
1+ δ
c−σ+1it+1
h−γσ+γ+1it+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
c−σit+1
h−γσ+γit+1
− γ
1+ δ
c−σ+1it+2
h−γσ+γ+1it+2
]
. (1.21)
This Euler equation again shows how consumption in the future should evolve over time.
Theoretically it could be estimated by the usual Euler-equation GMM estimation method, with
lagged variables as instruments. However, it is well known that estimating this non-linear
Euler equation in the presence of measurement error with GMM generates inconsistent esti-
mates (Amemiya (1985)). Therefore, log-linearization of the Euler equation is still necessary.
Specifically we can show in the following how to remove the effect of measurement errors by
log-linearization under standard assumptions of multiplicative measurement error. Follow-
ing Carroll (2000), we write the above Euler equation as a function of cit/hit and linearize it
around the steady state ratio c0/h0. As demonstrated in it, in the steady state of the model
without stochastic shocks, the ratio between consumption and habit stock is equal to a con-
stant: c0/h0 = χ. Moreover, in the special case that λ = 1, as we examine here, the value of χ
equals 111.
1.4.2 Linearization of Euler equation under CRRA utility
In a situation without uncertainty, the system reaches its steady state, in which the ratio
between consumption and habit stock is a constant. As proved by Carroll (2000), this constant
equals 1 if interest rate is the same as discount rate. We linearize the Euler equation around
the log of this steady state ratio c0/h0. After removing the expectation terms, we obtain the
following linearized Euler equation (see the Appendix 1.B for a proof):(
−γ− σ
σ− 1 (γ− 1− r)
)
4 ln cit+1 + γ(1+ r)4 ln cit
+γ(4 ln cit+2 − γ4 ln cit+1)
'
(
−γ+ σ
σ− 1 (γ− 1− r)
)
eit+1 + γ(ξit+2 − eit+1 − γeit+1) +O(Ete2it+1) +O(Etξ2it+2)
=
(
−γ+ σ
σ− 1 (γ− 1− r)− γ− γ
2
)
eit+1 + γξit+2 +O(Ete2it+1) +O(Etξ2it+2) (1.22)
where eit+1 = ln cit+1 − Et ln cit+1 and ξit+2 = ln cit+2 − Et ln cit+2 are the respective (one
period and two periods) log consumption innovation. As in Blundell et al. (2008a), O(x)
11Please refer to Carroll (2000) for derivation
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denotes a term with the property that there exists a K < ∞ such that
| O(x) |< K | x |
Based on the loglinearized budget constraint first used by Campbell (1993), Blundell et al.
(2008a) has provided a way to connect this log consumption innovation with log income inno-
vation. They show that eit = piit(vit + αtuit +Ωt), where piit is (roughly) the share of expected
future labour income in current human and financial wealth, an idiosyncratic insurance coef-
ficient against permanent income shocks, by for example precautionary saving; vit and uit are
idiosyncratic permanent and transitory log income shocks at time t; Ωt is the common income
trend and doesn’t vary across cohorts/population, and αt can be seen as an annuitisation fac-
tor for income that is close to zero under a long time horizon. Similarly, it is easy to demon-
strate that ξit+2 = piit+2(vit+2 + αt+2uit+2 +(1− αt+1)vit+1 + αt+1αt+2uit+1 +Ωt+1 +Ωt+2). As
αt is close to 0 for long T, the evolution of consumption can then be written as the following
function of the income innovation:
(
−γ+ σ
σ− 1 (γ− 1− r)
)
∆ ln cit+1 + γ(1+ r)∆ ln cit + γ(∆ ln cit+2 − γ∆ ln cit+1)
'
(
−γ+ σ
σ− 1 (γ− 1− r)− γ
2
)
piit(vit+1 +Ωt+1)+γpiit+2 (vit+2 +Ωt+2)+Op(Et||νR−1it+1 ||)
where Op(x) denotes a term with the property that for each κ > 0 there exists a K < ∞
such that
P(| Op(x) |> K | x |) < κ
For the purposes of estimation, we develop a similar set of moment conditions in the presence
of MA(1) transitory shocks. We assume piit is a constant across individuals and over time
series. Defining Xit ≡ (−γ+ σσ−1 (γ− 1− r)) ln cit + γ(1 + r) ln cit−1 + γ(ln cit+1 − γ ln cit) ,
these may be written as:
∆var(Xit+1) =
[
−γ+ σ
σ− 1 (γ− 1− r)− γ
2 + γ
]2
pi2var(vit+1) (1.23)
+γ2pi2∆var(vit+2) +O(Et‖νit+1‖3)
∆var(ln yit) = var(vit) + ∆var(uit) (1.24)
∆cov(Xit+2, ln yit+1) =
[
−γ+ σ
σ− 1 (γ− 1− r)− γ
2 + γ
]
pivar(vit+1) (1.25)
+O(Et‖νit+1‖3)
EI
[
git
(
2
∑
j=−2
git+j
)]
= var(vit) (1.26)
These moment conditions are analogous to Equations (1.13)–(1.15) and (1.19). Up to a
term which is O(Et‖νit+1‖3), the growth of the intrinsic consumption variance responds to
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variances of unexpected permanent income shocks (Eq. (1.23))12. Although in reality we
estimate the parameters all in one step, identification however can be considered as consisting
of two steps: (i) decomposing variances of income shocks into permanent and transitory parts
using (1.24) and (1.26); (ii) substituting the permanent income shock variances into (1.23) and
(1.25) to back up the habit persistence coefficient γ and the coefficient of risk aversion σ. As
6 waves are required to identify one permanent income shock variance according to Equation
(1.26), the variances of permanent income shocks are only identified starting from the fourth
period till the last third period, i.e., var(vi4),...,var(viT−2), and likewise for the change in
variance of transitory income shocks.
Measurement errors
So far we have not discussed the possible measurement errors in consumption and income. In
the case of multiplicative measurement errors (i.e., q˜t = qtε
q
t , where qt denotes the true value
of consumption or income , q˜t for the observed value, and ε
q
t as measurement error on qt), if
we make the following assumption:
Assumption Measurement errors in consumption and income are stationary and inde-
pendent of each other and other variables in the model, and also serially uncorrelated.
then the estimation of the parameters in interest (γ, σ) is robust to the presence of measure-
ment errors. We can see this point clearly from the first moment condition Eq. (1.23), as
we take the growth in variances of intrinsic consumption which is a linear function of log
consumption, as long as measurement errors in consumption are stationary and independent
from all consumptions and other parameters, the variance of measurement error in consump-
tion would disappear by taking the first difference. Estimation of permanent income shocks
is also robust to the presence of measurement error in income. In the last moment condition
Eq. (1.26), if we use the observed income data with measurement errors we can get LHS as:
EI [∆ ln y˜it · (∆ ln y˜it+2 + ∆ ln y˜it+1 + ∆ ln y˜it + ∆ ln y˜it−1 + ∆ ln y˜it−2)]
=EI [(∆ ln yit + ∆εit) (ln yit+2 + εit+2 − ln yit−3 − εit−3)]
=EI [(∆ ln yit) (ln yit+2 − ln yit−3)]
i.e., the result is the same as using the true value. Again, here we just use the assumption
that measurement error is multiplicative and serially uncorrelated. It’s also easy to see that
this robustness maintains in the other two moment conditions as long as the above assumption
holds. This feature of the model makes it superior to the Euler equation approach as estimat-
ing nonlinear Euler equation (especially in the habit model) using GMM yields inconsistent
estimates in the presence of measurement error (Amemiya (1985)).
12Blundell et al. (2008a) shows by Monte-Carlo experiment approximation omitting O(Et‖νit+1‖3) doesn’t bias
estimates.
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Table 1.2: Estimated Habit Persistence (CRRA preference)
Income
consumption net labour net labour earnings net income total net
earnings + private transfer disposable income
habit nondurable 0.761 (0.395) 0.742 (0.338) 0.752 (0.377) 0.647 (0.398)
persistence non+semi 0.835 (0.328) 0.792 (0.306) 0.832 (0.233) 0.853 (0.290)
γ all 0.708 (0.320) 0.497 (0.281) 0.656 (0.292) 0.801 (0.347)
coef risk nondurable 0.696 (0.417) 0.665 (0.381) 0.683 (0.395) 0.541 (0.408)
aversion non+semi 0.812 (0.415) 0.743 (0.419) 0.801 (0.404) 0.836 (0.424)
σ all 0.656 (0.380) 0.349 (0.357) 0.561 (0.385) 0.770 (0.420)
income nondurable 1.40E-003 3.67E-004 9.60E-004 1.08E-003
transmission non+semi 2.10E-002 3.74E-003 1.03E-002 3.03E-002
ω2 all 1.28E-002 1.59E-003 2.28E-003 1.52E-002
Sample size 4649
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
As consumption and income data are in log form, this model actually identifies growth
in variances of proportionate transitory and permanent shocks, and habit persistence as the
relative importance of consumption change to current consumption level in the current satis-
faction of consumption. Again when γ = 0, the model collapses to the basic model (with cit
replaced by lncit). In this case, the coefficient of risk aversion σ is not identified as it would be
cancelled out in log-linearization. The income transmission term ω2 =
[
σ
σ−1 (γ− 1− r)− γ2
]2
contains information of both risk aversion (and hence precautionary saving) as well as habit
persistence. If it is less than 1 in value, then the influence of current permanent income shocks
on consumption is dulled by a combination of these effects.
All (2T − 8) parameters (var(v4)...var(vT−2),∆var(u4)...∆var(uT−2),γ,σ) are estimated
jointly using DWMD with the inverse of the variance of the empirical moments as weights. pi
is set to be fixed at 0.85. The point estimate results of γ and σ are presented in Table 1.2. The
habit persistence coefficient γ is around 0.75–0.85 for non-durable or semi-durable consump-
tion, while it is generally lower for the broader consumption category. This is in line with
our earlier empirical findings, and is consistent with the hypothesis that the durability of con-
sumption goods counteracts the influence of habit persistence, resulting in a smaller estimated
γ. As the income and consumption are in log forms, the habit persistence in this model shows
the relative importance of the consumption growth ratio in utility function. Higher this coeffi-
cient, more important the consumption growth relative to the absolute size of consumption in
current satisfaction, and therefore smoother consumption change. Although the estimated co-
efficients of risk aversion are smaller than the usual range used in the literature (around 1.5),
they are not significantly different from 1, which is in line with some studies (Chetty (2006)).
The size of the coefficient of risk aversion is in general smaller for consumption measures
which include durable goods than those without, consistent with the finding that households
display a high degree of risk aversion with respect to consumption of basic goods compared
to luxury goods (AIT-SAHALIA et al. (2004)).
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We can calculate the income transmission coefficient ω using the estimated values of γ
and σ. The results are presented in the bottom panel in Table 1.2, and show that this coefficient
is well below 1, or very close to 0 in value. This suggests that the combination of both habit
persistence and precautionary saving leads to intrinsic consumption adjusting mainly to the
growth in variance of permanent income shocks in the next period (with coefficient γ2 '
0.6 for nondurable consumption), which makes consumption adjustment a much smoother
process. The identified income shocks are depicted in panel (b) in Figure 1.2. The variance of
permanent income shocks display a slight increasing trend, while the variance of transitory
shocks show a continual decline over the same period.
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results with a smaller sample by removing the seasonal
workers and employers (mainly in the agricultural sector) from the original sample to mitigate
the seasonal effect in income process. Both estimated coefficients of habit persistence and
relative risk aversion are slightly bigger than the ones in Table 1.2, and the general patterns
described above still maintain. Again, the estimated coefficients of relative risk aversion are
smaller than, but not significantly different from 1. These results are improved version of the
model estimates because of the following reasons: 1) the new sample is more homogeneous
than the original one, and therefore households are more likely to face the same income
shocks; 2) seasonal pattern is less likely to be present in the new sample data, especially the
income data.
Table 1.3: Estimated Habit Persistence (CRRA preference w/o seasonal inc earners)
Income
consumption net labour net labour earnings net income total net
earnings + private transfer disposable income
habit nondurable 0.897 (0.396) 0.896 (0.373) 0.903 (0.407) 0.902 (0.452)
persistence non+semi 0.909 (0.308) 0.915 (0.260) 0.920 (0.245) 0.919 (0.200)
γ all 0.861 (0.214) 0.861 (0.192) 0.882 (0.227) 0.885 (0.232)
coef risk nondurable 0.885 (0.447) 0.881 (0.447) 0.893 (0.444) 0.892 (0.444)
aversion non+semi 0.909 (0.432) 0.916 (0.433) 0.922 (0.422) 0.922 (0.427)
σ all 0.847 (0.425) 0.844 (0.419) 0.871 (0.421) 0.875 (0.413)
income nondurable 4.88E-002 3.65E-002 6.06E-002 6.14E-002
transmission non+semi 1.46E-001 1.74E-001 2.14E-001 2.25E-001
ω2 all 3.83E-002 3.09E-002 4.97E-002 5.58E-002
Sample size 3705
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
1.4.3 Further into the past?
In the last section, habit stock is assumed being equal to last period’s consumption, i.e. λ = 1.
A natural question follows: what if habit has longer memory? After all, habit is not built in
a day. It could be resourced back to early life, or even past generations. For this purpose, we
extend the above model to the case with more two lags in habit stock equation13.
13Theoretically, we could have extended analysis to more lags. While the empirical extension would be constrained
by the data set available as long panel data would be required for long memory.
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Habit stock evolves according to hit = (1− λ)hit−1 + λcit−1, where λ ∈ [0, 1] describing
the speed of habit catching up with consumption. As λ approaches to 1, recent consumptions
become more important in habit stock. In the extreme case with λ = 1, only last period’s
consumption is enough to represent one’s habit stock. While when 0 < λ < 1, we can
repeatedly iterate substitution and get the evolution of habit as:
hit = (1− λ)shit−s + λ
s
∑
k=1
(1− λ)k−1cit−k
If λ → 1, (1− λ)n → 0, for n > 1. Therefore we can truncate the higher orders and
approximate the habit stock as:
hit ' (1− λ)λcit−2 + λcit−1
With two lags of consumption in habit stock, we log-linearize Euler equation (1.21)
around steady state as follows (See Appendix 1.B for proof). Keep in mind that with assump-
tion that interest rate equal to the discount rate, the steady state ratio c
s
t
hst
= 1 and c
s
t
cst−1
= 1 still
hold.
Et
[
−σ∆ ln c∗it+1 + (γσ− γ)∆ ln h∗it+1 −
γ
1+ δ
∆ ln cit+2 +
γ
1+ δ
∆ ln hit+2
]
= 0
where, ln c∗it = ln cit − γ1+δ ln cit+1, ln h∗it = ln hit − γ1+δ ln hit+1.
If we define Ξit+1 = −σ ln c∗it+1 +(γσ−γ) ln h∗it+1− γ1+δ ln cit+2 + γ1+δ ln hit+2, Euler equa-
tion can be written as the following martingale form:
EtΞit+1 = EtΞit
Remove expectation, we can again write the consumption composite growth as the func-
tion of consumption innovations:
∆Ξit+1 = −σ(eit+1 − γ1+ δ ξit+2 +
γ
1+ δ
eit+1)− (γσ− γ) γ1+ δ eit+1
− γ
1+ δ
(ξit+2 − eit+1) + γ1+ δ eit+1
= (−σ− σγ
1+ δ
− γ
2(σ− 1)
1+ δ
+
2γ
1+ δ
)eit+1 + (γ
σ− 1
1+ δ
)ξit+2
Call A = −σ− σγ1+δ − γ
2(σ−1)
1+δ +
2γ
1+δ , B = γ
σ−1
1+δ , the above function can be simplified as:
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∆Ξit+1 = Aeit+1 + Bξit+2
= Apiit+1vit+1 + Bpiit+2(vit+2 + vit+1)
Substitute the consumption innovation with income innovations, we can again relate
consumption change with income innovations, and therefore form the moment conditions as
follows:
∆var(Ξit+1) = (A + 2B)2pi2var(vit+1) + B2pi2∆var(vit+2)
∆var(ln yit) = var(vit) + ∆var(uit)
∆cov(Ξit+2, ln yit+1) = (A + 2B)pivar(vit+1)
∆cov(Ξit+2, ln yit+2) = (A + 2B)pivar(vit+2)
EI
[
git
(
2
∑
j=−2
git+j
)]
= var(vit)
As the moment conditions involve {Cit−2, Cit−1, Cit, Cit+1, Cit+2, Cit+3} for each 3 ≤ t ≤
T− 3, 6 waves panel is again necessary and sufficient to identify 2T− 7 parameters, including
all the income shocks as well as γ, σ and λ.
This model is brought to nondurable goods consumption and all income categories. The
results are shown as follows:
Table 1.4: Estimated Parameters for Habits with Longer Memories
Income
net labour net labour earnings net income total net
earnings + private transfer disposable income
habit persistence 0.841 (0.098) 0.831 (0.106) 0.836 (0.099) 0.807 (0.126)
γ
coef risk aversion 0.792 (0.072) 0.780 (0.073) 0.786 (0.078) 0.757 (0.073)
σ
habit evolution rate 0.923 (0.053) 0.928 (0.055) 0.940 (0.056) 0.930 (0.055)
λ
Sample size 4649
Note: Consumption variable is nondurable goods consumption. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
1.5 Simulation
In order to give a more intuitive demonstration of the effect of habit persistence on consump-
tion, I have done two types of simulations. The first one examines the life cycle evolution of
consumption inequality, and the second one shows whether the prediction from our model
can replicate the original data set. As variances of income shocks can be identified using in-
come information alone, we generate a series of normal distributed idiosyncratic permanent
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Figure 1.3: Simulated Variance of Consumption I
income shocks using the multi-year average of the identified variance of income shock and the
assumption of mean zero of the shocks. For the first simulation, we focus on young cohorts
as it is generally believed that consumption inequality increases over life time (Deaton and
Paxson (1994)) and therefore by conditioning on cohorts we can exclude cohort effects from
the age effect. We assume all the households start with a mean nondurable consumption
(i.e. variance is zero) in the initial period(s)14, and simulate their consumption series in the
future periods given the randomly assigned idiosyncratic permanent income shocks, under
two scenarios: without habit and with habit identified in the previous section. We then plot
the variances of consumption series in Figure 1.3. As permanent income shocks have strong
persistence, it is not surprising to find that inequality in consumption increases over time
given a series of persistent shocks. Moreover, although the variances of consumption increase
under both scenarios, the one with habit persistence increases however much more slowly
than the one without habit persistence. More specifically, given the income shocks identified
from our model, the variance of nondurable consumption increases from 0 to 0.65 during
the period 1987-1995, by on average 0.08 each year, or 0.02 each quarter, which is exactly the
variance of quarterly permanent shock. As in CRRA model this variance is in proportional
term, in other words, the variance of consumption would be increasing by 8% every year in
the absence of habit persistence. However, this level is nearly halved by the presence of con-
sumption habit, i.e. by increasing around 5% each year. That is to say, consumption habit can
help smooth consumption even further compared to the one predicted by permanent income
hypothesis in response to persistence income shocks, which confirms our argument that habit
is an insurance mechanism for consumers to smooth their consumption.
The second simulation shows whether our model can replicate the original data trend.
We again focus on youngest cohort. Since the data set is an unbalanced panel data, we use the
actual data as initial values and only predict the future value under each scenario if there has
14For non-habit case, only one initial period is necessary to generate future consumption series by random walk;
while multi-periods are required in the habit model.
1.6. Conclusion 39
Figure 1.4: Simulated Variance of Consumption II
been an observation in the corresponding period for the household. The permanent shocks are
generated according to the actual variances identified from the previous section (instead of the
multi-year average as in the first simulation). We then calculate the variances of consumption
for each period and plot them along with the variance of consumption from the real data in
Figure 1.4. It is not difficult to see that the predicted trend by the habit model match the real
data more closely, with variance of consumption lower than the result predicted by the model
without habit, which leads to less volatile consumption.
In summary, the above two simulations show that habit model in general predict the data
much better than its intertemporal separable alternative, and reconciles the “excess smooth-
ness” puzzle of consumption.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a new way to estimate the habit persistence coefficient in a life-cycle
consumption model. This is achieved by examining the evolution of cross-sectional vari-
ances and covariances of consumption and income, so that we can back up the scale of habit
persistence coefficient. The identification strategy comes from the fact that with habit forma-
tion, consumers not only smooth consumption, but also the rate of consumption change, and
therefore it can introduce sluggish response of consumption to unexpected income shocks,
especially the permanent ones. This information is correspondingly reflected in variances of
consumption and income. Using an extensive Spanish household panel data set, we find ev-
idence to support the existence of habits in consumption, with our results both economically
and statistically significant. In our baseline model with quadratic utility and additive habits
we obtain habit coefficients in the range 0.4–0.5, while in our extended model with CRRA
utility with multiplicative habits we obtain consumption habit coefficient is about 0.75-0.85,
although the scale of coefficients are not comparable across specifications. The scale of habit
persistence coefficient in CRRA framework fits the size which can explain most of empiri-
cal puzzles (Deaton (1988); Carroll et al. (2000); Constantinides (1990)). We also estimate the
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coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) in the second model, as about 0.8-0.9, and not sig-
nificantly different from 1. We show in simulation exercises that habit model can reconcile
the “excess smoothness” of consumption.
By combining two important strands of literature, this paper has shown how habit persis-
tence can be identified by exploring the co-evolution of income and consumption. In doing so
it avoids estimating (log) linearized approximate Euler equation whose validity hinges upon
the ability to find suitable instruments (mainly lagged variables) which has enough variation
and does not correlate to the approximation error. Within our framework, the presence of
habits means that the consumption which contributes to the current utility is, to some extent,
insulated from permanent income shocks. Therefore, while income information alone can be
used to identify income shocks, its combination with consumption data can provide a way to
identify habit persistence as well as other parameters. As predicted by theory, our results also
suggest that consumers have stronger habit persistence when considering non-durable goods
rather than durable goods.
Our analysis is not without its limitations. First, quarterly income data displays different
patterns of auto-covariation from annual data due to seasonal correlation. This may invalidate
the assumption of an MA(1) structure of transitory shocks and therefore the identification of
permanent income shocks. This is however, a data rather than a conceptual challenge. Annual
panel data (at least 6 years panel for income and 3 years panel for consumption), or quarterly
consumption excluding seasonal goods in this sense would be more desirable. Second, in the
current paper we assume the whole population face the same uncertainty. However, estima-
tion distinguishing cohorts and education group should be implemented given a larger data
set. Different cohorts and education groups are supposed to face income shocks at different
level and persistence. Thirdly, credit constraints are not considered in the current model while
they may also have the effect of delaying consumption to later periods. Meghir and Weber
(1996) disaggreate intertemporal nonseparability from borrowing constraints by comparing
the intertemporal substitution of consumer goods with the intratemporal one, as the latter
should be immune to the borrowing constraints but still affected by intertemporal nonsep-
arability. Although Carrasco et al. (2005) apply this method to ECPF data and do find the
existence of habit persistence with consideration of borrowing constraints, this paper how-
ever can’t disentangle two effects and therefore the quantitative scale of the habit persistence
coefficient.
Nonetheless, our results have important implications for both public and macro economic
policy. In particular, understanding the quantitative importance of habits can help researchers
better understand how households smooth consumption in different economic environments,
and how they respond to redistributive policies. More broadly, the results also shed impor-
tant insight into how fast growing countries accumulate saving and design the optimal fiscal
policy.
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Chapter 1 Appendix
1.A Statistics
In Figure 1.5 we show the distribution of regression residuals of consumption and income
using data from 1985Q1, 1990Q1 and 1995Q1. In Table 1.5 we show the composition of our
sample; summary statistics are presented in Table 1.6. Finally, in Table 1.7 we show the
autocovariance matrix of total net disposable income growth. The reader should refer to the
main text for further details and discussion of these.
Figure 1.5: Residuals of (log) Consumption and Income.
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Table 1.5: Sample Definition
year quarter Born ¡1935 1935-44 1945-54 1955-1964 1965-1970
1985 1 303 338 303 90 1
1985 2 330 363 325 97 1
1985 3 341 372 340 101 1
1985 4 334 376 343 105 1
1986 1 310 348 311 117 1
1986 2 267 324 297 104 0
1986 3 256 318 297 116 2
1986 4 269 315 314 136 2
1987 1 261 333 336 138 3
1987 2 274 339 332 147 3
1987 3 280 349 333 158 4
1987 4 265 343 330 180 4
1988 1 237 340 321 188 4
1988 2 229 332 313 184 2
1988 3 221 347 312 183 3
1988 4 228 339 317 176 3
1989 1 221 343 337 187 4
1989 2 201 345 354 194 4
1989 3 185 342 340 203 5
1989 4 189 358 352 207 7
1990 1 178 353 375 204 6
1990 2 178 345 361 205 8
1990 3 171 340 350 228 8
1990 4 163 357 341 227 9
1991 1 142 361 337 242 9
1991 2 153 360 337 243 11
1991 3 140 354 352 250 13
1991 4 134 358 345 264 12
1992 1 121 332 330 264 19
1992 2 109 338 350 265 21
1992 3 102 324 344 270 24
1992 4 264 317 369 268 27
1993 1 272 299 372 265 29
1993 2 259 287 370 264 28
1993 3 245 288 356 264 31
1993 4 240 282 363 295 35
1994 1 230 311 354 303 32
1994 2 227 304 352 320 39
1994 3 223 310 350 325 37
1994 4 211 305 352 337 46
1995 1 209 301 364 327 50
1995 2 208 301 345 343 50
1995 3 194 292 340 334 54
1995 4 189 295 347 332 51
Note: Figures in bold are not included in the constructed sample. See the discussion in Section 3.1.
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1.B Proof of model
Proof of equation (1.11) in quadratic utility model
The LHS of equation 1.10 after taking variance:
var(Qt −Qt−1)
= var(Qt) + var(Qt−1)− 2cov(Qt−1, Qt)
= var(Qt) + var(Qt−1)− 2cov
(
Qt−1 +
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)
ρt
ηit + ξt+1 − ξt, Qt−1
)
= ∆var(Qt)− 2cov
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)
ρt
ηit + ξt+1 − ξt, c∗t−1 −
γ
1+ r
c∗t
)
= ∆var(Qt)− 2cov
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)
ρt
ηit + ξt+1 − ξt,− γ1+ r (ct − γct−1)
)
= ∆var(Qt)− 2cov
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)
ρt
ηit + ξt+1 − ξt,− γ1+ rEt−1ct + ξt
)
= ∆var(Qt)− 2cov
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)
ρt
ηit + ξt+1 − ξt, ξt
)
= ∆var(Qt)− 2cov
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)
(
vit +
r
(1+ r)ρt
uit
)
, ξt
)
+ 2var(ξt)
Where the second equation is achieved by applying equation (1.10). While on the RHS,
we have
var
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ) ηit
ρt
+ ξit+1 − ξit
)
=var
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ) ηit
ρt
)
+ var (ξt+1 − ξt)
+ 2cov
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ) ηit
ρt
, ξt+1 − ξt
)
=(1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2
(
var(vit) +
r2
(1+ r)2ρ2t
var(uit)
)
+ var(ξt+1) + var(ξt)
− 2cov
(
(1− γ)(1+ r− γ)(vit + r(1+ r)ρt uit), ξt
)
For small enough r and sufficently long T, the equation may be simplified as follows:
∆var(Qt) = (1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2
(
var(vit) +
r2
(1+ r)2ρ2t
var(uit)
)
+ var(ξt+1)
+var(ξt)− 2var(ξt)
= (1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2
(
var(vit) +
r2
(1+ r)2ρ2t
var(uit)
)
+ ∆var(ξt+1)
' (1− γ)2(1+ r− γ)2var(vit) + ∆var(ξt+1)
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Proof of equation (1.15) in quadratic utility model
∆cov(Qt, yt) = cov(Qt, yt)− cov(Qt−1, yt−1)
= cov(Qt−1 + ∆Qt, yt−1 + ∆yt)− cov(Qt−1, yt−1)
= cov(∆Qt,∆yt) + cov(Qt−1,∆yt)
= cov(∆Qt,∆yt) + cov(Qt−2 + ∆Qt−1,∆yt)
= cov(∆Qt + ∆Qt−1,∆yt) + cov(Qt−3 + ∆Qt−2,∆yt)
= cov(∆Qt + ∆Qt−1 + ∆Qt−2,∆yt) + cov(Qt−3,∆yt)
where cov(Qt−3,∆yt) = 0 if the transitory shock uit is i.i.d. Since we also have:
∆Qt = Rvit + R
r
(1+ r)ρt
uit + ξt+1 − ξt,
with R = (1 − γ)(1 + r − γ), and ∆yit = ∆uit + vit, the difference of the covariance then
becomes:
∆cov(Qt, yt) = cov
(
Rvit + R
r
(1+ r)ρt
uit + ξt+1 − ξt
+Rvit−1 + R
r
(1+ r)ρt−1
uit−1 + ξt − ξt−1
+Rvit−2 + R
r
(1+ r)ρt−2
uit−2 + ξt−1 − ξt−2,∆uit + vit
)
= R · var(vit) + R r1+ r∆
1
ρt
var(uit)
≈ R · var(vit)
with the approximation holding for small r and large t.
If we assume instead assume an MA(1) structure for transitory shocks, then we can derive
the following condition:
∆cov(Qt+1, yt) = cov(∆Qt+1 + ∆Qt + ∆Qt−1 + ∆Qt−2 + ∆Qt−3,∆yt) + cov(Qt−4,∆yt)
= cov(∆Qt+1 + ∆Qt + ∆Qt−1 + ∆Qt−2 + ∆Qt−3,∆yt)
= R · var(vit) + R r1+ r var(e)
(
θ
ρt+1
+
θ2 − θ + 1
ρt
+
θ − 1− θ2
ρt−1
− θ
ρt−2
)
≈ R · var(vit)
where, we assume uit = et − θet−1 , and et is i.i.d with mean 0 and constant var(e)
The same method applies for the last equation in model 3.
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∆cov(c∗t+1, yt) = cov(c∗t+1, yt)− cov(c∗t , yt−1)
= cov(c∗t + (1−
γ
1+ r
)vt+1 + (1− γ1+ r )
r
(1+ r)ρt+1
ut+1, yt−1 + ∆ut + vt)
− cov(c∗t , yt−1)
= cov(c∗t ,∆ut + vt) + (1−
γ
1+ r
)cov(vt+1 +
r
(1+ r)ρt+1
ut+1,∆ut + vt)
+ (1− γ
1+ r
)cov(vt+1 +
r
(1+ r)ρt+1
ut+1, yt−1)
= cov
(
c∗t−3 + (1−
γ
1+ r
)vt−2 + (1− γ1+ r )
r
(1+ r)ρt−2
ut−2 + (1− γ1+ r )vt−1
+ (1− γ
1+ r
)
r
(1+ r)ρt−1
ut−1 + (1− γ1+ r )vt + (1−
γ
1+ r
)
r
(1+ r)ρt
ut,∆ut + vt)
)
+
r
(1+ r)ρt+1
cov(ut+1,∆ut)
= (1− γ
1+ r
)var(vt)
+ (1− γ
1+ r
)
r
(1+ r)
cov(
1
ρt−2
ut−2 +
1
ρt−1
ut−1 +
1
ρt
ut +
1
ρt+1
ut+1,∆ut)
Again, if we assume MA(1) structure for transitory shock, i.e. uit = et − θet−1, and et is
i.i.d with mean 0 and constant var(e), we can write the above equation into
∆cov(c∗t+1, yt) = (1−
γ
1+ r
)var(vt)
+ (1− γ
1+ r
)
r
(1+ r)
cov
(
1
ρt−2
(et−2 − θet−3) + 1ρt−1 (et−1 − θet−2) +
1
ρt
(et − θet−1)
+
1
ρt+1
(et+1 − θet), (et − θet−1 − et−1 + θet−2)
)
= (1− γ
1+ r
)var(vt)
+ (1− γ
1+ r
)
r
1+ r
var(e)
[
− θ
ρt+1
+
θ
ρt−2
− 1+ θ + θ
2
ρt−1
+
θ2 + θ + 1
ρt
]
≈ (1− γ
1+ r
)var(vt)
approximation holds for small r and big T − t.
Proof of linearization equation in CRRA model
This proof borrows heavily from Carroll (2000).
Linearize the Euler equation (1.21) around steady state ratio (c0/h0):
Et
[
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
− γ
1+ δ
c−σ+1it+1
h−γσ+γ+1it+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
c−σit+1
h−γσ+γit+1
− γ
1+ δ
c−σ+1it+2
h−γσ+γ+1it+2
]
Divide both sides of the Euler equation by the first ratio on LHS:
Et
[
1− γ
1+ δ
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
h−γσ+γit+1
cit+1
hit+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
h−γσ+γit+1
− γ
1+ δ
c−σit+2
c−σit+1
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
h−γσ+γit+2
cit+2
hit+2
]
Define ψt = ct/ct−1, χt = ct/ht, and remember hit+1 = cit, the above equation can be written
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as:
Et
[
1− γ
1+ δ
ψ−σit+1χ
γ(σ−1)
it χit+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
ψ−σit+1χ
γ(σ−1)
it −
γ
1+ δ
ψ−σit+2ψ
−σ
it+1χ
γ(σ−1)
it χ
γ(σ−1)
it+1 χit+2
]
Multiply both sides by ψσit+1χ
γ(1−σ)
it
1 = Et
[
1+ δ
1+ r
(
ψσit+1χ
γ(1−σ)
it −
γ
1+ δ
χit+1
)
+
γ
1+ δ
ψ−σit+2χ
γ(σ−1)
it+1 χit+2
]
Linearize the above equation around the steady state ratio lnψ0and lnχ0:
1 = Et
[
1+ δ
1+ r
(
ψσ0χ
γ(1−σ)
0 + σψ
σ
0χ
γ(1−σ)
0 (lnψit+1 − lnψ0) + γ(1− σ)ψσ0χγ(1−σ)0 (lnχit − lnχ0) +O(n)
)
−1+ δ
1+ r
γ
1+ δ
(χ0 + χ0(lnχit+1 − lnχ0) +O(n)) + γ1+ δψ
−σ
0 χ
γ(σ−1)
0 χ0
+
γ
1+ δ
(
−σψ−σ0 χγ(σ−1)0 χ0(lnψit+2 − lnψ0) + γ(σ− 1)ψ−σ0 χγ(σ−1)0 χ0(lnχit+1 − lnχ0)
)
+
γ
1+ δ
ψ−σ0 χ
γ(σ−1)
0 χ0(lnχit+2 − lnχ0) +O(n)
]
Use the fact that χt = ψt as we assume ht = ct−1 for simplicity and assume r ' δ,therefore
ψ0 ' 1, we can simplify above linear equation into:
0 = Et
[
σlnψit+1 + γ(1− σ)lnχit − γ1+ r lnχit+1 −
γσ
1+ r
lnψit+2
+
γ
1+ r
(γ(σ− 1)lnχit+1 + lnχit+2 +O(n))
]
0 = Et
[
σlnψit+1 + γ(1− σ)lnψit − γ1+ r lnψit+1 −
γσ
1+ r
lnψit+2
+
γ
1+ r
(γ(σ− 1)lnψit+1 + lnψit+2 +O(n))
]
Substitute lnψt = ln ct − ln ct−1 and rearrange,
Et
[
(σ− γ
1+ r
)∆ ln cit+1 − γ(σ− 1)∆ ln cit − γ(σ− 1)1+ r (∆ ln cit+2 − γ∆ ln cit+1) +O(n)
]
= 0
where, O(n) includes the second and higher order term of linearization approximation error,
which is approching to zero as (lnψit − lnψ0)approaches to zero.
Multiply both sides by (1+ r) and dividing by (σ− 1), it becomes:
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Et
[(
σ
σ− 1 (1+ r)−
γ
σ− 1
)
∆ ln cit+1 − γ(1+ r)∆ ln cit − γ (∆ ln cit+2 − γ∆ ln cit+1) +O(n)
]
= 0
Remove expectation and define eit+1 = ln cit+1 − Et ln cit+1 and ξit+2 = ln cit+2 −
Et ln cit+2, we can get equation (1.22) after simple rearrangement.
Proof of linearization equation in CRRA model with two lags:
The Euler Equation with habit is:
Et
[
1− γ
1+ δ
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
h−γσ+γit+1
cit+1
hit+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
h−γσ+γit+1
− γ
1+ δ
c−σit+2
c−σit+1
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
h−γσ+γit+2
cit+2
hit+2
]
In order to linearize around the steady state ratio, we need to write it in terms of the rate
of consumption over habit:
Et
1− γ
1+ δ
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit+1
c−γσ+γit+1
h−γσ+γit+1
cit+1
hit+1
 = 1+ r
1+ δ
Et
 c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit+1
c−γσ+γit+1
h−γσ+γit+1
− γ
1+ δ
c−σit+2
c−σit+1
c−σit+1
c−σit
h−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit
c−γσ+γit+1
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
Define ψit ≡ citcit−1 and χit ≡
cit
hit
, we then have:
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]
=
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[
ψ−σit+1χ
γσ−γ
it ψ
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it+1 ψ
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−γσ+γ
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]
Or
Et
[
1− γ
1+ δ
ψ
γσ−γ−σ
it+1 χ
γσ−γ
it χ
−γσ+γ+1
it+1
]
=
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
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ψ
γσ−γ−σ
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γσ−γ
it χ
−γσ+γ
it+1
− γ
1+ δ
ψ
γσ−γ−σ
it+1 ψ
γσ−γ−σ
it+2 χ
γσ−γ
it χ
−γσ+γ+1
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]
Move the second term on LHS to RHS and linearize around steady state lnχ0, lnψ0:
1 = Et
[
γ
1+ δ
ψ
γσ−γ−σ
0 χ0 +
γ
1+ δ
(γσ− γ− σ)ψγσ−γ−σ0 (lnψit+1 − lnψ0)χ0
+
γ
1+ δ
ψ
γσ−γ−σ
0 χ0 ((γσ− γ)(lnχit − lnχ0) + (−γσ+ γ+ 1)(lnχit+1 − lnχ0))
]
+
1+ r
1+ δ
Et
[
ψ
γσ−γ−σ
0 + (γσ− γ− σ)ψγσ−γ−σ0 (lnψit+1 − lnψ0)
+ ψγσ−γ−σ0 ((γσ− γ)(lnχit − lnχ0) + (−γσ+ γ)(lnχit+1 − lnχ0))
− γ
1+ δ
ψ
2γσ−2γ−2σ
0 χ0 −
γ
1+ δ
(γσ− γ− σ)ψ2γσ−2γ−2σ0 χ0 ((lnψit+1 − lnψ0) + (lnψit+2 − lnψ0))
− γ
1+ δ
ψ
2γσ−2γ−2σ
0 χ0 ((γσ− γ)(lnχit − lnχ0) + (−γσ+ γ+ 1)(lnχit+2 − lnχ0))
]
As proved by Carroll (2000), χ0 = 1, ψ0 = 1 if r = δ. Substitute into the above equation:
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1 = Et
[
γ
1+ δ
(1+ (γσ− γ− σ) lnψit+1 + (γσ− γ) lnχit + (−γσ+ γ+ 1) lnχit+1)
]
+ Et [1+ (γσ− γ− σ) lnψit+1 + (γσ− γ) lnχit + (−γσ+ γ) lnχit+1
− γ
1+ δ
(1+ (γσ− γ− σ)(lnψit+1 + lnψit+2) + (γσ− γ) lnχit + (−γσ+ γ+ 1) lnχit+2)
]
by rearrangement,
0 = Et
[
γ
1+ δ
(−γσ+ γ+ 1) lnχit+1 + (γσ− γ− σ) lnψit+1 + (γσ− γ) lnχit + (−γσ+ γ) lnχit+1
]
− Et
[
γ
1+ δ
(γσ− γ− σ) lnψit+2 + γ1+ δ (−γσ+ γ+ 1) lnχit+2
]
Replace back the definition of χit =
cit
hit
and ψit =
cit
cit−1 ,
Et
[
− γ
1+ δ
(γσ− γ− 1)(ln cit+1 − ln hit+1) + (γσ− γ− σ)(ln cit+1 − ln cit)
+(γσ− γ)(ln cit − ln hit)− (γσ− γ)(ln cit+1 − ln hit+1)]
=Et
[
γ
1+ δ
(γσ− γ− σ)(ln cit+2 − ln cit+1)− γ1+ δ (γσ− γ− 1)(ln cit+2 − ln hit+2)
]
or it can be written as,
Et
[
(γσ− γ− σ)
(
(ln cit+1 − γ1+ δ ln cit+2)− (ln cit −
γ
1+ δ
ln cit+1)
)
+ (γσ− γ)
(
(ln cit − γ1+ δ ln cit+1)− (ln hit −
γ
1+ δ
ln hit+1)
)
− (γσ− γ)
(
(ln cit+1 − γ1+ δ ln cit+2)− (ln hit+1 −
γ
1+ δ
ln hit+2)
)
+
γ
1+ δ
(ln cit+1 − ln hit+1)− γ1+ δ (ln cit+2 − ln hit+2)
]
=0
Define ln c∗it ≡ ln cit − γ1+δ ln cit+1, ln h∗it ≡ ln hit − γ1+δ ln hit+1,
Et
[
−σ∆ ln c∗it+1 + (γσ− γ)∆ ln h∗it+1 −
γ
1+ δ
∆ ln cit+2 +
γ
1+ δ
∆ ln hit+2
]
= 0
Or if we define Ξit+1 = −σ ln c∗it+1 + (γσ − γ) ln h∗it+1 − γ1+δ ln cit+2 + γ1+δ ln hit+2, we can
simply write the above as:
EtΞit+1 = EtΞit
Chapter 2
Inequality, Information and Groundwater
Management: A Case Study in Rural
Tunisia1
2.1 Introduction
Around the globe, depletion of aquifers caused by over-extraction of groundwater has be-
come a major threat to freshwater ecosystems especially in arid and semi-arid regions. The
agricultural sector is a major culprit as farmers often rely on groundwater as a major source
of abundant renewable resource extracted at a fairly low cost. Oftentimes, groundwater con-
stitutes de facto an unregulated common property resource (CPR for abbreviation). Once a
farmer has invested in wells or boreholes, excluding him from extracting water out of the
aquifer is either impossible or highly costly. However, each farmer’s withdrawal has an im-
pact on all the farmers who share the same aquifer by affecting future levels of the water table
as well as water quality. Thus, groundwater is often exploited beyond its optimal level due
to the presence of externalities. The existence of these externalities that are hard to internal-
ize accelerates the depletion of water resource and drives the demand for collective action
at community level during last two decades. However, the widespread failure to provide
collective action in reality leads us to ask a question: what factors are more conducive to
successful collective actions and what other factors impede cooperation. To find the answer
for this question is the main objective of this paper. In the paper, we exploit the groundwa-
ter management experience in Merguellil river basin in Tunisia and identify inequality and
asymmetric information as the two main factors that prevent cooperation.
A large literature has developed attempting to identify conditions that are conducive to
collective action and sustainable management of common property resources. An important
issue relates to the manner in which the inefficiencies due to the very nature of common
property resources ought to be addressed. A number of studies have highlighted the design
of rules by local communities to manage common resources. Ostrom (2000) provides a body
1This chapter is based on conjoint work with Mare Sarr and Timothy Swanson.
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of evidence based on a number of case studies where such regulations were instrumental in
the successful management of common resources. Typically local management of commons
may succeed when 1) access is limited to a well defined group of users who abide by specific
rules set by the community; and 2) users are responsible for monitoring and enforcement,
and punish non-compliance according to the severity of the offense. However, Baland and
Platteau (2003) draw the attention to the fact that rules devised by communities to manage
local common property resources do not necessarily aim to improve the efficiency of the use
of resources unlike what a number of analyses have argued. Rather those rules often have a
distributive motive as they serve the purpose of regulating the access to the resources.
Two features of community-based management of common property resources may mat-
ter for efficiency. The first is group size and the second is group heterogeneity. While there
seems to be some consensus that small group sizes tend to help efficiency (Sandler (1992);
Baland and Platteau (1996)), the effect of group heterogeneity on the efficiency of the manage-
ment of common property resources remains an open question. In an influential contribution,
Olson (1965) argues that if a public good is productivity-enhancing and wealthier agents de-
rive a larger benefit from the public good than their less wealthy counterparts, then the richer
agents may have incentive to provide it and bear all the costs involved even if the poorer
agents may free-ride in their contributions. Thus, according to Olson, inequality may foster
the provision of a public good.
In the context of common property resource extraction, Baland and Platteau (1997) ar-
gue that increased inequality or a disequalizing transfer from a poor and constrained user
of a common resource to a rich and unconstrained user can be efficiency enhancing. In their
model, the reduction in effort (e.g. resource extraction) resulting from the poor agent domi-
nates the increase in effort induced by the rich user so that the aggregate effort level decreases
with higher inequality. However, they also recognize that the existence of exit option may also
give incentive to the rich users to accelerate the extraction of the resource. Therefore, the effect
of inequality on resource extraction becomes less clear under these two counteracting forces.
In a similar setting with inequality in the appropriation constraints, but a two-agent two-
stage fishing model, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) show that the relationship between
inequality and economic efficiency is U–shaped. Their intuition is that at perfect equality
conservation is Nash Equilibrium, while mean-preserving spreads of wealth distribution will
reduce one’s wealth to a point where his claim on the final-period resource stock provides
insufficient incentive to conserve. And as inequality becomes even more unequal, conserva-
tion becomes the dominant strategy of the wealthier resource user so that efficiency increases
with inequality when it is beyond a threshold. In a more specific setting of groundwater ex-
ploitation, Aggarwal and Narayan (2004) also demonstrate that efficiency and inequality are
likely to be related in a non-linear fashion. Similar to Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002),
Aggarwal and Narayan (2004) also consider a two-stage model of groundwater extraction. But
2.1. Introduction 56
instead of extracting at both stages, farmers invest in capacity (well depth) at the first stage
and decide the level of water extraction at the second stage. The inequality considered in their
paper is in the ability to make investment. By endogenizing investment in wells, farmers end
up competing by over-investing in capacity under open access. This fierce competition is the
main factor responsible for groundwater over-exploitation. In addition they show that there is
a U-shaped relationship between inequality and efficiency in the use of groundwater. When
inequality (in terms of access to credit to dig wells) is low, the usual Nash equilibrium under
open access obtains. However when inequality becomes moderate the stock of groundwater
drops substantially before increasing again with higher levels of inequality. Although differ-
ent in many settings, these three papers share the same feature, that is inequality in study
is in the constraints of appropriation effort (or investment) and profit is only function of the
resource in concern. However, there is another kind of inequality that is not considered in
these papers: that is, inequality in an input that is complementary to the common property
resource in production function. This type of inequality is common if the resource in study is
water while land as another important input in production is usually distributed unequally.
How is land inequality affects the efficiency in use of water is the question that we are going to
examine in this paper. Bardhan et al. (2007) has studied this problem in a general theoretical
framework, from contribution to public goods to extraction of common-property resources.
While as they focus on finding out the joint profit maximizing inequality level, we are inter-
ested in studying how the existing heterogeneity affects the use of groundwater and users’
willingness to take collective action, and more importantly how to induce resource users to
cooperate in resource use at the presence of land inequality.
In addition, all the above analysis remain at a theoretical level, and there have been very
few works studying this problem empirically. The main constraint we believe lies in the dif-
ficulty in obtaining appropriate data. Yet, some studies have addressed this problem using
experimental data collected in the laboratory (Cardenas (2003)), while others study the rela-
tionship between inequality and group participation in contributions to public or common
goods rather than exploitation of common property resources with real data collected from
the field (Molinas (1998); Bardhan (2000); Alesina and Ferrara (2000); La Ferrara (2002); Alix-
Garcia and Harris (2011)). A few exceptions include the papers by Libecap and his coauthors
(Johnson and Libecap (1982); Libecap and Wiggins (1985)) who emphasize the role of asym-
metric information and heterogeneity in common property resources exploitation.
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on CPR exploitation
using the real data collected from the field. In particular, we examine the empirical relation-
ship between inequality in land distribution within villages and the fall in groundwater level
using a unique data set collected from Tunisia. In addition, we investigate the willingness
of Tunisian farmers to engage in collective action and stabilizing the watertable level in the
face of the current over-exploitation of groundwater resources in the Merguellil Valley, where
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farmers rely on groundwater as an abundant source of low cost water and keep digging wells
and boreholes without any regard to the law restricting such investment. As a result, the
water table level keeps falling: it has decreased over the past 20 years from -42 meters in 1986
to -52 meters in 2006 and is expected to reach nearly -60 meters in the next 10 years.
This is a typical illustration of the tragedy of the commons where individual rationality
conflicts with collective rationality: each farmer seeking his own self-interest makes eventually
the community worse off. As a result, farmers have to dig deeper every year to get enough
water for their crops and therefore incur increasing pumping costs. Water policy makers are
concerned about the current unsustainable path. The question they have to address is: given
the over-exploitation of the resources and the low enforcement of the legislation on unlicensed
sources of water, how can farmers be led to internalize the externalities that they impose upon
one another and society at large (costly pumping, water quality, etc.).
The application of Folk Theorem in CPR management implies that long-term repetition
of the same game may foster cooperation. While if resource use is private information and
asymmetric among heterogeneous resource users, cooperation is susceptible to deceit or devi-
ation from cooperative rule and hard to form (Libecap and Wiggins (1984, 1985)). Since most
groundwater extraction in the study area is from private wells and water stealing is common,
how to foster cooperation becomes particularly challenging. To address this issue we design
a choice experiment to ask for the farmers’ willingness to pay to shift to a collective action
equilibrium in which water extraction will be restricted and paid for. We pay special attention
to the role of information and monitoring in farmers’ decision making, and correspondingly
include transparency and accountability as two important policy attributes. If it is hetero-
geneity and asymmetric information that deters cooperation, enhanced information sharing
and accountability would be preferred by most farmers and strengthen their preferences for
collective action. Any policy intervention that tries to induce cooperation but ignores this
point wouldn’t be able to solve the overextraction problem. Therefore, our purpose in con-
ducting the choice experiment is to elicit farmers’ preferences for information sharing and
accountability and identify the factors that restrain resource users from using water more
sustainably.
Our formal analysis begins with a theoretical model of heterogeneous farmers exploit-
ing groundwater resources in Section 2.2. We analyse the effect of enhanced inequality on
water extraction under both baseline model and an extended model where differentiated
market price is considered. We also model farmers’ decision making in choosing manage-
ment regime and examine the impact of inequality and heterogeneity. Section 2.3 introduces
the survey area and its water management institutional design. It later introduces the design
and implementation of the choice experiment. Section 2.4 displays the results of empirical
analysis, which includes two parts: empirical test of the relationship between inequality and
water extraction at village level and the analysis of choice experiment at individual level. The
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paper concludes in Section 2.5.
2.2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we develop a simple model with the view of highlighting some of the key
features we set out to investigate empirically. We build our model based on the general-
ized framework provided by Bardhan et al. (2007), which studies the effect of inequality on a
range of collective actions, from the provision of pure public goods to the extraction of com-
mon property resources, in a situation where the unequally distributed private input and the
collective good input are complements in the production function.
2.2.1 Baseline model
Although extraction of common property resources is a dynamic process, our model abstracts
from the dynamic externality 2 and simplifies the problem into a static one. Following Bard-
han et al. (2007), we assume a concave production function with one private input (land li )
and a common property resource (groundwater wi). We assume both inputs are complements,
and groundwater is shared by n resource users3. In the unregulated situation, each farmer
chooses extraction effort ei to maximize individual profit:
pii = f (li, wi)− ei
where ei is the extraction effort of groundwater, and is assumed to be linear with extrac-
tion cost.
Both static and dynamic externality are captured in the production function through
the common property input, wi = bei + cE, where b > 0 is constant production efficiency
coefficient, and E is the total extraction effort by all the resource users who share the same
aquifer, i.e., E = ∑ni=1 ei. The constant c < 0 captures the negative externality of other farmers’
extraction on the available groundwater.
Following Bardhan et al. (2007) we make the following 4 assumptions:
Assumption 1. The production function f (li, wi) is strictly increasing and concave func-
tion and twice differentiable on R2+ with respect to both inputs, f12 > 0, liml→0
f2 = 0, and f
satisfies the Inada endpoint conditions.
Assumption 2. b ≥ 0 and b + cn > 0 to ensure positive total extraction.
Assumption 3. The marginal return of the collective input h(li, wi) ≡ f2(li, wi) is quasi-
concave.
Assumption 4. The function h has property: h22 > 0 and h12 < 0.
2In literature, there are three types of externality in groundwater use: (i) stock externality: exploitation of a stock of
groundwater; (ii) pumping cost externality: increase in extraction and pumping cost due to the water table declines;
and (iii) risk externality: inherent value of groundwater as a substitute source of water in times of surface water
shortage (Provencher and Oscar (1993), Karousakis and Koundouri (2006)). We mainly focus on the first two types in
this paper.
3Theoretically groundwater is shared by the whole watershed, we assume in the empirical analysis that each
village shares certain amount of groundwater independently.
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Note that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 are all satisfied by the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion.
Farmer’s problem is to choose the level of extraction effort ei that maximizes his profit
taking the other farmers’ extraction efforts as given. i.e., the solution is noncooperative Nash
Equilibrium. By standard Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we obtain:
f2(li, bei + cE) =
1
b + c
(2.1)
Define function g(li) > 0 as the solution to f2(li, g(li)) =
1
b + c
, we can draw its property
into Lemma 1:
Lemma 1: g(li) > 0, g′(li) = −h1h2 > 0 and g
′′(li) ≤ 0 for any li > 0
Proof: See Appendix 2.B.
By Lemma 1, we establish that the response curve of common property input (water) to
private input (land) is concave if and only if the marginal return of common property input is
quasi-concave. That is, water extraction increases with land endowment at a decreasing rate.
Intuitively, the monotonicity result indicates that, with mean-spreading land distribution, big
farmers would increase their water extraction while the small farmers would decrease theirs.
However, the relative size of these two opposing effects depends on the curvature of the
above response curve. Concavity of the response curve guarantees the decreased water input
by small farmers is bigger than the increased level by big farmers.
Therefore, we can examine how land distribution affects water stock change ∆X = R−W,
where R is regeneration of groundwater (assumed exogenous), and total water extraction
W =
n
∑
i=1
wi.
Following Persson and Tabellini (1994), we measure each farmer’s land area as a distance
deviated from the mean in the whole distribution, i.e. li = a + σεi, where a is average of land
endowment, and σεi is individual-specific land endowment with zero mean. In particular, an
increase in the mean-preserving spread σ captures the idea of increase in inequality.
Proposition 1: Suppose Assumption 1-4 are satisfied, the fall in stock of groundwater
decreases with enhanced land inequality, i.e.
d | ∆X |
dσ
< 0.
Proof: Take derivative of W with respect to σ gives,
d | ∆X |
dσ
=
dW
dσ
=
n
∑
i=1
g′(li)εi
The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the weighted sum of the slope of response
curve g(li). If we sort farmers according to their land endowment from the minimum to the
maximum such that ε1 < · · · < εk−1 < 0 < εk < · · · < εn, we then have
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n
∑
i=1
g′(li)εi =
k−1
∑
i=1
g′(li)εi +
n
∑
i=k
g′(li)εi
<
k−1
∑
i=1
g′(lk)εi +
n
∑
i=k
g′(lk)εi
= g′(lk)
n
∑
i=1
εi = 0
The inequality condition follows directly from Lemma 1 that g′(li) is a decreasing func-
tion. 
This theoretical result is consistent with Olson (1965)’s argument about the positive mono-
tonic relationship between inequality and public goods provision. However, this result has
been challenged by both Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) and Aggarwal and Narayan
(2004) who show the relationship could theoretically describe an inverted U-shape in the case
of CPR extraction. While both papers consider a two-stage dynamic model, in next section
we show it is also possible to derive a non-monotonic relationship with an extension of the
above model by introducing market imperfection.
2.2.2 Differentiated market prices
In the baseline model, it is implicitly assumed that all farmers face the same price for their
produce and this price is normalized at δ = 1. In reality, there is evidence of market imper-
fection in the marketing of agricultural products in Tunisia in general and in the Merguellil
in particular4. Due to market imperfection, farmers no longer face the same unique price,
but a differentiated price according to their land endowment δ(li) . This heterogeneity in
price leads to difference in payoffs of the inside options for water users. We assume that bigger
farmers (those with larger land endowment li) have better opportunities to sell their products
at higher prices, i.e. δ′(li) > 0. Accordingly, the profit function now takes the form:
pii = δ(li) f (li, wi)− ei
Assumption 5. δ′(li) > 0, lim
li→0
δ(li) = 1 and lim
li→∞
δ(li) < ∞.
The first order condition of the above optimization problem shows marginal product of
water input is now amplified by a factor δ(li). As big farmers have bigger amplifier, they
can use water till a level where marginal product of water is well below the marginal cost,
4Albouchi (2006) in his PhD thesis mentions that due to credit constraints, small farmers (who either cannot afford
to have their own means of transport or rent vehicles) are forced to sell their products to intermediaries who collect
harvests directly from the farms. By doing so, they give up an important part of the margin to these intermediaries
who, in turn, will sell the products in wholesale markets in Kairouan and Tunis. On the other hand, big farmers often
have their own vehicles (ISUZU) or are able to rent trucks to transport their large quantities of products to the major
wholesale markets. In addition, big farmers tend to have better information about prices in the various wholesale
market and are therefore able to choose the right time to sell their products.
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according to
δ(li) f2(li, beni + cE
n) =
1
b + c
(2.2)
Lemma 2:
Define φ(li) so that δ(li) f2(li, φ(li)) =
1
b + c
. In the presence of differentiated
prices, the response curve of the collective input (water) to the private input
(land) is positive and increasing:
a) φ(li) > 0 for any li > 0
b) φ(li) > g(li) for any li > 0
c) φ′(li) = −h1h2 −
h
h2
δ′i
δi
> 0
d) The sign of φ′′(li) is ambiguous, depending on the shape of δ(li). In the follow-
ing, we consider two types of functions:
1. Concave Inside Option: If we impose the restriction that δ(li) is a concave
function, i.e., δ increases with land area at a decreasing speed, or δ′′(li) <
0, we have φ′′(li) < 0.
2. Convex Inside Option: In this case δ increases with land area at an increas-
ing speed, or δ′′(li) > 0. If the curvature is big enough, we may have
φ′′(li) > 0. Otherwise, we have φ′′(li) < 0. The sign may also change with
li. φ′′(li) could be positive at low values of li and turn negative at high
values of li.
Proof: See Appendix 2.B.
We recall from the baseline model that the effect of inequality on resource extraction
depends on the weighted sum of response curve slope. Under differentiated market, we have
dW
dσ
=
n
∑
i=1
φ′(li)εi, which sign is further determined by the curvature of φ(li). When we have
a mean-preserving spread of land distribution, big farms would increase water use but small
farms would decrease since water response curve to land is up-sloping. Then the marginal
effect depends on the relative size of the rise from the big farms versus the cut from small
farmers. If the response curve φ(li) is concave, the rise from the big farmers is smaller than the
cut from small farmers, so that the total marginal effect is negative. However, the sign would
be opposite if φ′′(li) is positive. This happens if the increasing speed of δ′(li) is bigger than
the decreasing speed of g′(li) in the case without differentiated market. In other words, when
big farmers increase water use faster than small farmers decrease their water use with a mean-
preserving spread of land distribution, the total water extraction increases with inequality. By
Lemma 2, φ′′(li) can be always negative or positive or be positive for small li but negative
with big li, depending on the curvature of the inside option. If φ(li) is concave throughout,
the sign of the weighted sum is negative, i.e., higher inequality in land distribution leads
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to lower total water extraction. This is same as in the baseline model. However, if φ′(li) is
convex at low li and concave at high li, total water extraction may increase with inequality first
and decrease later, i.e., a U-shaped relationship between water conservation and inequality in
land. In the end, a mean-preserving spread in land distribution may affect water extraction
in a non-monotonic way. We make the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Given Assumption 1-5, in the case with differentiated market where profit
function is amplified by a factor δ(li), the fall in the stock of groundwater may increase
or decrease with enhanced land inequality, where the former can only happen if there is
a nonconcave inside option.
More intuitively, the effect of inequality on water extraction with convex inside options de-
pends on two opposite effects: the negative effect of concave water response (without differ-
entiated market) versus the positive effect of convex inside option. For example, when we
move from pure equality to medium inequality at which the latter effect is so big that may
dominate the former effect, the total extraction increases with inequality. While when we
further move to higher inequality where fewer farms enjoy the high price wedge, the negative
effect of concave water response may take the dominance and total extraction falls below the
one under medium inequality. In this case, the relationship between inequality and resource
extraction is an inverted-U shape. However, if inside option is concave, or if the effect of the
convex inside option is not big enough to offset the concave water response at any land level,
resource extraction changes with inequality monotonically. In the end, this is an empirical
question that we are going to examine in the next section of the paper.
2.2.3 Participation in cooperative regime
Since the purpose of this paper is to identify the factors that deter or foster cooperation, this
section examines how land inequality affects farmers’ willingness to participate in a volun-
tary cooperation regime in a theoretical framework. Although noncooperation is the Nash
Equilibrium in unregulated situation, cooperation can benefit resource users as a whole by
internalizing all the externalities that resource users impose on each other. From the social
planner’s point of view, cooperation is no doubt the first best if there is no other social cost
such as monitoring cost to ensure the enforcement of cooperation. However, the benefit from
cooperation is not distributed evenly across resource users and the objection from certain
types of users may damage the cooperation. In this section we examine how inequality and
heterogeneity affect the users’ willingness to join in cooperation.
Under cooperation, farmers choose their extraction efforts {ei} to maximize their joint
profits:
max
{ei}≥0
∑ni=1 [δ(li) f (li, bei + cE)− ei]
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FOC for this optimization problem:
δ(li) f2(li, be∗i + cE
∗) = 1
b + nc
(2.3)
With cooperation, farmers consider the social marginal product of their extraction effort
1
b+nc , rather than the private marginal product
1
b+c . As c < 0, the former is bigger than the
latter. Define w∗i ≡ be∗i + cE∗ = (b + c)e∗i + cE∗−i and ψ(li) as the response curve of water to
land input under cooperation, we have
Lemma 3: Water input under cooperation is lower than the noncooperative equi-
librium level for any farm with positive land area. The difference is bigger for
larger land endowment:
a) wni > w
∗
i > 0, e
n
i > e
∗
i > 0 for any i with li > 0;
b) d(w
n
i −w∗i )
dli
> 0 and d(e
n
i −e∗i )
dli
> 0 for any li > 0.
Proof: see Appendix 2.B.
When deciding whether to join the cooperation in water management, a farmer has to
consider whether the net benefit from cooperation is positive:
∆pii = δ(li) [ f (li,ψ(li))− f (li, φ(li))]− e∗i + eni (2.4)
and it varies across farms according to:
d∆pii
dli
= δ′(li) [ f (li,ψ(li))− f (li, φ(li))] + δ(li) [ f1(li,ψ(li))− f1(li, φ(li))]
+ δ(li)
[
ψ′(li) f2(li,ψ(li))− φ′(li) f2(li, φ(li))
]
+
deni
dli
− de
∗
i
dli
The first two terms are negative, while the third and fourth terms are positive5. Therefore,
the sign of the derivative depends on the relative sizes of these two opposite terms.
More intuitively, we can decompose the relative benefit from cooperation into two coun-
tervailing effects: a private loss due to reduced production effort against a public gain from
reduced externality. On one hand, all farms have to suffer a private loss since all farms use
less water for production under cooperation, regardless of farm size. And by Lemma 3, the
bigger the farm sizes, the bigger the cut in water input, and therefore the bigger private profit
loss under cooperation. While on the other hand, all farmers share the same reduced exter-
nality (as externality enters production function as the total extraction efforts of all farms).
Therefore, the net benefit from cooperation is bigger for small farmers, i.e., d∆pidli < 0.
The effect of change in inequality on resource extraction can be written as:
5The third term is positive because f ∗2 − f n2 = f n2 (1−n)cb+nc > 0 increases with f n2 which further increases with li (see
the proof for Lemma 3 in Appendix 2.B).
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d4pii
dσ
=
d4pii
dli
∗ dli
dσ
+∑
j 6=i
d4pii
dlj
∗ dlj
dσ
=
d4pii
dli
εi +∑
j 6=i
d4pii
dlj
ε j (2.5)
where,
d∆pii
dlj
= δ(li)
[
dψ(li)
dlj
f2(li,ψ(li))− dφ(li)dlj f2(li, φ(li))
]
−
(
de∗i
dlj
− de
n
i
dlj
)
=
deni
dlj
− de
∗
i
dlj
= − c
b(b + cn)
[
φ′(lj)− ψ′(lj)
]
> 0
A mean-preserving spread of land distribution affects i′s net profit from cooperation
through two channels: 1) through change of one’s own land area (“decreasing returns to scale
effect”); 2) through change of externality by the change of others’ land area (“reduced negative
externality effect”). An empirically interesting question that we are examining is: for a fixed
land endowment li (for example, mean value of farm size), how does farmer’s net profit from
cooperation vary with inequality. In this case, inequality affects net profit only by changing
the negative externality (i.e., the second term in Eq. (2.5)):
d4pii
dσ
|li= −
c
b(b + cn) ∑j 6=i
[
φ′(lj)− ψ′(lj)
]
ε j |li
Therefore, the effect of inequality on one’s net profit for a fixed farm size depends on
the weighted sum of the change of response curves’ slopes of all the other farms. As c < 0,
φ′(li) > ψ′(li) for any li > 0, the sign of the weighted sum depends on the curvature of the
response curve, i.e., κ ≡ φ′′(li) − ψ′′(li). This is similar to Proposition 1 and 2. If κ < 0,
the weighted sum is negative for a fixed farm with mean land size, while it is more likely to
be positive if κ > 0. Moreover, the sign of κ may vary with li since φ′′(li) and ψ′′(li) have
also been proved to be nonconstant by Lemma 2. As a result, the sign for the sum of the
weighted slope difference is ambiguous, depending on the curvature of the difference of the
two response curves.
Proposition 3: Given Assumption 1-5, a) In a voting experiment for a collective action
on water management, bigger farm holders are less likely to vote for the collective action
as their net benefits from cooperation are smaller.
b) The effect of land distribution inequality on the net benefit of cooperation varies among
farmers. For a fixed farm size at mean value, the sign of the effect of land inequality
depends on the curvature of the difference of two response curves between NE and
cooperative equilibrium. Higher inequality leads to bigger net profit for the mean land
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value if the difference of two response curves is a convex function of land size.
So far, we have developed several theoretical predictions from the model that we can
investigate in the next empirical part, which consists of two parts: First, we will examine
the empirical relationship between inequality and groundwater stock change at village level;
Second, we will conduct analysis on the data from choice experiment to elicit farmers’ pref-
erences for cooperation in water management and examine how inequality and heterogeneity
influences farmers’ preferences. Before the formal analysis, we first provide some background
information about the survey area and describe the choice experiment that we have designed.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
Our main goal is to investigate empirically how inequality and heterogeneity affects the out-
come of common property resource extraction and the possibility of collective action in re-
source management. For the first purpose, we collect the groundwater table data and land
distribution data in Merguellil Valley of Tunisia over time periods. While for the second, we
design a choice experiment to ask for farmers’ preferences and their willingness to pay to shift
to a cooperative outcome. In the following two sections, we will first make full use of village
level data on inequality to investigate its effects on the fall in the water table. Second, we will
exploit the information from the choice experiment to shed light on the farmers’ preferences
for policy change.
2.3.1 Survey area
Geographical condition
Situated in North Africa, Tunisia has a typical Mediterranean climate in the North and a
Saharan climate in the South. Water availability varies widely across the country and over
the seasons. Since the 1970s, successive Tunisian governments have engaged in large scale
investment programmes to equip the country with an extensive water infrastructure with the
aim of mitigating the effects of the vagaries of the weather. Thus, no less than 29 large dams,
200 tanks, and 766 lake reservoirs, more than 3000 boreholes and 151,000 wells have been built
since the 1970s (Le Goulven et al. (2009)). Nearly 80% of the country’s water is consumed by
the agricultural sector, which is the largest water user and has contributed vastly to rural
development.
Our study area, the Merguellil river basin, is located in the central area of Tunisia. Its
population was 102,600 in 1994 population census and 85% residing in the gouvernorat of
Kairouan. Approximately 85% of the total population live in the remote rural area but this
proportion is decreasing steadily given the trend of rural-to-urban migration. Located in
central Tunisia, this region has not been directly impacted by the growth of tourism but it has
undergone changes through its relationship with the coastal areas: labour migration, water
transfers and emergence of new markets for agricultural produce, especially water consuming
products such as fresh fruits and vegetables.
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The large El Haouareb dam divides the river basin into two parts: a hilly region up-
stream and the Kairouan plain downstream. The mean annual rainfall is approximately 300
mm in the plain and increases up to 510 mm in the upper part. Rainfall varies widely in time
and space, and nearly 80% of annual rainfall is produced within a period of 12 days. This
occasionally causes violent floods. The sporadic and unpredictably violent surface runoff led
to the construction of the El Haouareb dam in 1989. However, the dam hardly serves the
main function of storage because nearly two-thirds of the outflow of the El Haouareb reser-
voir infiltrates into the karst aquifer while another quarter disappears through evaporation
(Le Goulven et al. (2009)). Therefore groundwater becomes the major water source in the
Kairouan plain. Due to the limited recharge of water released from the dam, changes in the
water table levels are largely driven by pumping for irrigation purpose. Economic develop-
ment, intensification of agriculture combined with a population growth have led to excessive
water withdrawals from aquifers. Furthermore, the export of water from the hinterland to the
coastal cities for tourism purpose, has exacerbated the problem of over-exploitation of water
resources. Like in many parts of the country, the subsidization of private wells has resulted
in their dramatic increase from 100 in 1960s to about 5000 in 2008 (Le Goulven et al. (2009)).
As a result, the water table level has been falling relentlessly over from -42 meters in 1986 to
-52 meters in 2006. It is expected to reach nearly -60 meters in the next 10 years by 2015.
Institutional evolution
Collective management of irrigation water at the tribe level was common in the region dur-
ing 18th and 19th century, and dates back from the 13th century in oases (Al Atiri (2006)).
Water was considered as a right by farmers and was shared equitably between the irrigation
perimeters according to rules enforced initially by communities and later on from the early
20th century, enforced more formally by associations of stakeholders.6 However, changes in
social structure together with technology change introduced by French colonization imposed
pressure on resource use and weakened the traditional collective management system. After
independence in 1956, the Tunisian government took over the management right from the
tribes and implemented policies that encouraged rural development by centralizing water
management. These include building large hydraulic infrastructure and transferring water
spatially from the hinterland to coastal areas, subsidizing intensive irrigation technologies
and setting up water management institution from top to down. These policies have played
a very important role in economic growth in Tunisia, but meanwhile intensified the pressure
on water demand. This has resulted in the fall of the groundwater table as well as other
ecosystem degradation such as soil erosion have become major environmental problems in
the region.
Since the 1970s, the development and management of public irrigation schemes was en-
6For instance, the associations of oasis owners created between 1912 and 1920, and the associations of special interest in
hydraulics instituted in 1933 whose functions are similar to the modern Association of Collective Interest (AIC) and
Group of Collective Interests (GIC) (Al Atiri (2006)).
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sured by a centralized agency (Office de Mise Valeur or OMV) represented in each gouvernorat.
In 1989, the OMVs were replaced by regional offices of the Department of Agriculture in
charge of agricultural development in each (Commissariats Re´gionaux de De´veloppement Agri-
cole, CRDA). Towards the end of the 1980s, the willingness of the State to disengage from
the management of the schemes was reaffirmed by the decentralization of the management
of the irrigation schemes. Thus water users’ associations—Association of Collective Interest
(AIC) which were later in 1999 turned into Group of Collective Interests (GIC)—were created
to be part of local collective management schemes. Their number increased rapidly from 100
AIC in 1987 to over 2700 GIC at the end of 2002. Among these 1100 were involved in the
management of irrigation water. Thus, by late 2001 nearly 60% of irrigated public land was
transferred from the CRDA to GICs (Albouchi (2006)). Over time the ambit of the GICs has
extended from the maintenance and management of irrigation schemes to rural development.
The evolution of these institutional arrangements reflects the state’s commitment to decen-
tralization and empowerment of water user associations. However, these associations do not
seem to have the financial, technical and organizational capabilities to adequately fulfill their
mission. Thus, farmers have little confidence in these institutions which are confronted with
internal conflicts and tensions. Many farmers complain about the unreliable supply of the
water in irrigation schemes under the management of GICs and resort to private wells when-
ever there is water shortage. The wells are deepened using a local manual technique (forage
a` bras) as the water table drops, without intervention of the CRDA water police because the
authorties prefer to turn a blind eye to these practices and to encourage regional agricultural
development. As Le Goulven et al. (2009) put it, “The Merguellil basin provides an ideal case study
to analyse the effect of the progressive establishment of water infrastructure, ...., [it] also provides the
opportunity to examine the modes of governance, as well as the economic and regulatory tools which
might assist in the control of access to water resources”.
2.3.2 Choice experiment: Design and Implementation
Design of the experiment
We design a choice experiment to elicit farmers’ preferences for collective action towards
achieving the stabilization of the water table level and management of the common resource
in a sustainable manner. Our aim is to determine the farmers’ willingness to pay to switch
to a cooperative outcome that would upset the status quo. To do so, the choice experiment
will focus on some of the main constraints faced by the farmers that explain their current
non-cooperative behaviour. Relaxing those constraints may induce a shift in the farmers’ be-
haviour. The extent to which current actions remain private information is clearly a major
contributing factor to the current lack of coordination among farmers even within the GICs.
For instance, the constant use of unlicensed wells and boreholes, and sabotage of the mon-
itoring system through the destruction of meters are commonplace and prevent water user
associations from functioning efficiently. Thus, transparency and information revelation re-
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garding farmers’ water use and defrauding behaviour, by reducing information imperfection,
may be an effective pathway to foster cooperation. Measures to improve the transparency
and enforcement of the system are therefore critical in any policy change. Finally, since water
consumption is proportional to the total irrigated areas, imposing a constraint of irrigated
lands might be useful in conserving water. After consulting Tunisian local researchers (Insti-
tut National Agronomique de Tunisie, INAT and Institut de recherche pour le de´veloppement,
IRD) and local stakeholders (Ministry of the Agriculture, and the Regional Commission for
Agricultural Development, CRDA of Kairouan), we selected policy attributes of interest to the
farmers in Merguellil as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Choice Experiment Attributes
Attributes Description
Restriction on irrigated land
area
Extent of land restriction in irrigation: 0%,
10%, 20%, 30%
Meter reading
Institution responsible for reading the
meters:
1. Water management unit organized by
Department of Agriculture
2. Local Authority
Transparency Publicize water use, damage to meters:1=Yes, 0=No
Installation fee How much fee would you pay (in TunisianDinars per year): 0, 10, 20, 30
The first attribute pertains to the restriction on irrigated land area. It constitutes a straight-
forward and transparent method for reducing water usage. It has the advantage of being
easily monitored by the neighboring farmers, and therefore a desirable attribute to control
water extraction. In the empirical analysis, we will treat this variable as an ordinal categorical
variable, with four dummies to denote each of the four levels: 0, 10, 20 or 30% land restriction
(in real empirical framework, only three dummies will appear to achieve full-rank of variable
matrix). The second attribute, meter reading indicates the institution the farmers would trust
to be responsible for monitoring the meters and is a proxy variable for accountability. Be-
cause corruption may occur, it is important that the water users believe in the fairness of the
monitoring system. This attribute is captured by a binary variable that denotes two different
regimes: a new water management unit organized by department of Agriculture, and local
authority. The third attribute relates to transparency. This attribute aims at making informa-
tion regarding individual water use, fraud and sabotage public so that the system can be
trusted and be less prone to free riding. It is captured by a simple binary variable, indicating
whether water use information for every water user is published on a blackboard in the vil-
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lage every month. The fourth attribute included in the choice experiment, the installation fee,
asks farmers how much they would be willing pay to install a water meter on the wells. This
attribute allows us to estimate welfare changes in monetary term.
In combining the levels of the attributes into choice sets, orthogonality design has been
used to avoid strict dominance of one alternative over the others. Careful arrangement en-
sures balanced distribution of attribute levels and balanced utility across alternatives. These
combinations generate 64 possible choice sets. In this choice experiment, 16 out of the 64
possible choice sets were selected and separated into two groups with each consisting of eight
choice sets. Table 2.2 shows the example of a choice set 7.
Implementation of the survey
A trial survey was carried out in a small sample of farmers in the Kairouan plain to assess the
relevance of the questions and the reaction of the farmers. In May and June 2007, the actual
survey of 250 farmers was conducted. The survey was carried out mainly in the downstream
catchment where much of the over-exploitation of the groundwater takes place, with a few
surveyed villages located upstream. Each farmer has to fill 8 choice sets. During the imple-
mentation of the survey, the enumerator carefully explained the policy attributes and how
to make choices: this was done to avoid any misunderstanding given the low literacy levels
among farmers.
In addition, the enumerators provided the respondents with information on the current
state of the water table and its likely future negative evolution should the current rate of
water extraction continue. The government’s intentions were explained in the following para-
graph:‘In order to stabilize the groundwater table at the current level, the government is designing a
policy to encourage people to reduce water use. In order to do this, the government plans to charge
groundwater use by metering. The Department of Agriculture will institute a water management
unit throughout the Merguellil Valley. It will install water meters for all the wells in the the gouver-
norat of Kairouan (Merguellil Valley) and will charge groundwater use based on the volume used. The
volumetric price will be the same as in the public irrigation scheme.’ To prevent strategic voting,
respondents are informed that “the majority rule would be applied on the final voting outcome.
i.e., if more than half of the people in the village vote for policy change, the new water management
association will be formed and collective action will be taken.”
In addition to the choice experiment, the survey also includes sections on 1) socio-
economic and demographic characteristics; 2) cultivation and irrigation information; and 3)
information about the farmers’ attitudes towards the environment and the use of water in the
region, to gain an understanding of how personal beliefs shape users’ attitudes towards pol-
icy. The information collected in these sections is required to control for heterogeneity among
farmers and investigate the effect of such heterogeneity on preferences.
A supplementary village survey was conducted in all the sample villages in December
7The full version of the questionnaires is attached in appendix 2.D.
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2010 and January 2011 in order to better capture the heterogeneous circumstances faced by
farmers in the Merguellil. Village level data pertaining to the water table change since 1990
was collected. We also collected information on the distribution of farm land and the distri-
bution of well depths for the year 2007. This information allows us to examine the effect of
inequality within each village on the farmers’ behaviour. A map of the sampled villages is at-
tached in Figure 2.4 in appendix 2.A. The villages in the West and North West of El Haouareb
Dam are located in the upstream part of the aquifer. These include villages in the town of
Hafouz and some villages in the town of Chebika. The distance of each village to the dam is
also collected.
2.3.3 Choice experiment: Model specification
We specify three different choice models: multinomial logit, conditional logit and mixed logit.
While multinomial logit model is a standard limited dependent variable model, conditional
logit model is used to control for individual’s fixed effects as each respondent completes 8
choice sets. However, both multinomial logit and conditional logit are subject to the assump-
tion of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which may be violated either due to
nested choices or unobserved variables. The IIA assumption postulates that the odds between
two alternatives is independent of the change in an third alternative. Put differently, this as-
sumption predicts “that a change in the attributes of one alternative changes the probabilities
of the other alternatives proportionately” (Train (1998)). Moreover, it is reasonable to believe
that different individuals may have different preferences on those attributes. Mixed logit is a
highly flexible model that obviates these limitations of standard logit models by allowing for
unrestricted substitution patterns, correlation in unobserved factors and random taste varia-
tion (Train (2003)). Instead of constant coefficients in utility function, it assumes coefficients
vary randomly over individuals representing each individual’s tastes.
Unj = αZn + β′nXnj + enj (2.6)
where, Zn are observed individual n’s characteristics, Xnj are choice j’s attributes, βn is a
vector of unobserved coefficients assumed to vary across individuals according to some dis-
tribution; enj is an unobserved random term that is identically and independently distributed
extreme value, independent of α, β, X, and Z.
In this model, the probability of individual n chooses choice j is:
Pnj =
∫ ( eβ′nxnj
∑k eβ
′
nxnk
)
f (β)dβ
In words, the mixed logit probability is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated
at different values of β, with the weights given by the density f (β) (Train (2003)). We will
estimate the mixed logit model assuming the variables coefficients have normal distribution.
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We will first analyse how policy attributes alone affect farmers’ choice. Then, we will
control for farmers’ individual characteristics, i.e. variables Zn in equation (2.6). As the logit
model identifies only through within-group (choice set) variation, it is necessary to interact Zn
with alternative specific constant (ASC) in the model to account for preference heterogeneity
that can be explained by observed factors.
2.4 Empirical results
2.4.1 Data description and inequality measurement
Our final data consists of a sample of 246 households living in 28 villages in the Merguellil Val-
ley. We focus mostly on farmers outside the public irrigation perimeters located in Chebika,
Kairouan and El Batan since they rely almost exclusively on private wells as their source of
water supply. The mean age of the farmers in our sample is 40 years. All respondents except
one are men. Most respondents (nearly 75%) did not study beyond primary school.
Regarding farm characteristics, the average farmer cultivates seven hectares equipped
with one private well or borehole. It is interesting to note that the average well is 45 meters
deep (with a standard deviation of 9m) which is still below the authorized depth of wells.8
If this figure is reliable then it may imply that the regulation limiting the depth of wells is
too liberal and is not suitable to address the current over-exploitation even if it was enforced.
The water table level decreased by 18m on average between 1990 and 2007. However, the
fall in the water table between 2007 and 2011 is captured by a categorical variable. Indeed,
although our question asked specifically the levels of the water in 2007 and the current level,
the respondents’ (here the village leaders) answers were very vague such that the fall in the
water table appears in only three levels: 5m, 10m, 15m.9 We therefore recode the continuous
water table fall data into three categories and treat it as a three-level ordered categorical
variable: 1 denotes expected reasonable decrease in the water table (5m); 2 denotes fast decrease in
the water table (10m); and 3 represents very fast decrease in the water table (15m). Irrigation
technologies are also fairly widely spread in the regions: for instance 75% of farmers use drip
irrigation and 40% use sprinklers. The summary statistics of the survey data is listed in Table
2.6 in Appendix 2.A.
The information collected on land distribution within each village allows us to measure
inequality within village. We also measure a similar inequality indicator based on well depth.
As the data on land distribution are grouped observations10, we measure land distribution
inequality based on the method proposed by Kakwani and Podder (1976). In particular, we
estimate parametrically the Lorenz curve using the grouped observations by assuming the
8Tunisian law regulates groundwater extraction by restricting the depth of private wells. Wells with less than 50
meters can be dug without authorization, while wells with depth beyond 50 meters require authorization from the
Minister of Agriculture who sets a limit on the the depth and speed of the flow. Sometimes payment is required if
the use of such well is not considered as being in the public interest.
9Note that the mean water table fall is 6.5m between 2007 and 2011.
10More specifically, the data show the number of farms in a village with farm land in each of following categories:
0-2 hectares; 2-4 hectares; 4-6 hectares; 6-10 hectares; 10-20 hectares; 20-50 hectares and over 50 hectares.
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following specification η = apiα(
√
2− pi)β, and calculate the Gini concentration ratio as:
CR = 2
∫ √2
0
f (pi)dpi
= 2a(
√
2)1+α+βB(1+ α, 1+ β) (2.7)
where, B(1 + α, 1 + β) is the Beta function. For the purpose of comparison, we also
estimate the relative mean deviation which is defined as:
T =
1
2µ
1
N
N
∑
i=1
|xi − µ|
= (
√
2)1+α+β
aααββ
(α+ β)α+β
(2.8)
where, the second equation represents the empirical estimated Lorenz curve above11.
The inequality measurements are shown in Figure 2.1. The left panel shows the distribu-
tion of the Gini concentration ratio while the right panel shows the distribution of the relative
mean deviation. Both measurements show a large variation of land inequality level across
villages.
(a) Gini coefficients (b) Relative Mean Deviation
Figure 2.1: Inequality of Land Distribution Within Village
We also measure the inequality of well depths for each village based on individual well’s
depth (Figure 2.2). Except for an outlier, the distribution of relative mean deviation of well
depths across villages is more homogenous than land distribution and is mostly centered
around 0.1-0.2.
2.4.2 The effect of inequality in land distribution on water resource ex-
ploitation
As discussed earlier, there are disagreements in the theoretical literature regarding the effect
of inequality on common property resource conservation. The paper does not attempt to
settle the disagreement, but rather attempts to contribute to the discussion by providing an
empirical analysis using evidence from Tunisia. We are interested in investigating the extent
11A brief introduction of this method is included in Appendix 2.C. Please refer to Kakwani and Podder (1976) for
details of this method.
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Figure 2.2: Inequality of Well Depths Distribution Within Village
to which inequality in land distribution and in well depth determines the variation in the
water table across villages. Given a very small sample size for village level inequality data (28
villages), the empirical analysis in this section is more of the nature of a ”stylised fact” than
an econometric analysis. For this purpose, we first show the graphical relationship between
water table fall and land inequality in Figure 2.3.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Water Table Fall and Land Inequality
Panel (a) depicts the scatterplot of water table fall during 1990-2007 against Gini coef-
ficient of land inequality, and a fractional polynomial fitted curve, which shows water table
fall during 1990-2007 has an inverted U-shaped relationship with Gini coefficient. This pat-
tern echoes the theoretical inverted U-shaped relationship between resource exploitation and
inequality (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002); Aggarwal and Narayan (2004)), i.e. extreme
equality or extreme inequality is good for groundwater conservation, while median inequality
accelerates groundwater extraction. Similarly, Panel (b) shows the stacked histogram of water
table fall categories during 2007-2011 by Gini coefficient groups: as Gini coefficient increases,
it’s more likely that water table falls less. Different from (a), the relationship is monotonic
rather than an inverted U-shape.
To complement with the nonparametric analysis, we also run a parametric regression of
water use against land inequality according to the following specification:
ln(∆WaterTable)v = β1CRv + β2CR2v + β3T
well
v + αXv + ev (2.9)
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where, the dependent variable measures the fall in the water table level (log) at village
v. The right hand side variables include the inequality measurements of land (CRv)and well
depths (Twellv ), as well as other observable (Xv) and unobservable (ev) village characteristics.
The first seven columns in Table 2.3 show the OLS estimation of the effect of the determi-
nants on the fall in water table levels from 1990 to 2007. The coefficient of Gini concentration
ratio is consistently positive and statistically significant (at the 5% or 10% level depending
on the specification) while its square term is negative and significant. The turning point of
land inequality is around 0.44-0.47, just below the median point at 0.50. The result remains
qualitatively identical when inequality is measured by relative mean deviation (column 2).
Moreover, there is no evidence that inequality in well depths contributes to water table fall
in a similar manner as land inequality (column 3 - 4) unless we control for inequality in land
distribution as well (column 5-6). The effect is more significant especially after we remove
the outlier in the distribution of relative mean deviation of well depths (column 6). However,
as mean deviation of well depth is mostly distributed around 0.1-0.2, the turning point for
the U-shape of well depth inequality (around 2.8) is too far on the right of the distribution to
be plausible. Therefore we remove the quadratic term in regression and find land inequality
remains significant inverted U-shape relationship with watertable fall from 1990 to 2007 (col-
umn 7). To our surprise, neither the number of farms nor the total area of farmland has effect
on the fall of groundwater table, after controlling for the land inequality measures.
Notwithstanding these appealing results, the above regressions may suffer from simul-
taneity because our inequality measures (land and well depth) are based on 2007 data while
the data on the change in the water table level pertains to the period 1990-2007. As docu-
mented early, local farmers usually respond to the fall in the water table by digging deeper
wells. As a result, inequality in well depth may be affected by the fall in the water table.
On the other hand, the critical situation of the water resources in general and the water table
level in particular may also have impact upon the land inequality. For instance, although land
is usually transferred through inheritance, there are also a number of cases where farms are
sold to relatively wealthy outsiders (especially civil servants and executives) who are able and
willing to invest in agriculture12. This recent dynamic is made more salient by the critical wa-
ter situation. However, we can hardly find any instruments for the endogenous variables. To
circumvent the endogeneity problem, we estimate equation (2.9) using the change in the water
table level between 2007 and 2011 as the dependent variable. We estimate this model using an
ordered logit model because the responses provided have only three levels which we recoded
into a categorical variable. To avoid multicollinearity, we do not include the quadratic term
of Gini coefficient. The results are shown in column (8)-(14). We find that higher inequality
in land distribution is associated with a diminished decrease in the water table after attempt-
ing to circumvent endogeneity. These results again suggest that inequality seems to facilitate
12Personal correspondence with Tunisia environmental department officer.
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water conservation. More specifically, we calculate the odds-ratio using the coefficients in the
table, and find that if a village’s Gini concentration ratio of land distribution decreases by
0.01, the odds of a fast decrease in the water table versus an expected reasonable decrease is 1.25,
holding everything constant. Likewise, the odds of a very fast decrease in the water table ver-
sus a fast decrease is 1.25, ceteris paribus. The coefficient of well depth remains insignificant in
most specifications. As downstream is highly correlated with limited dependent variable, we
remove it from the regressions. The distance downstream shows significantly positive impact
on groundwater table fall, i.e., villages located further downstream experienced more serious
fall in groundwater table, indicating the externality across villages.
The evidence in this section shows that village level inequality in land distribution has
a positive effect on groundwater resource conservation in our sample villages, although we
are not quite sure about the U-shaped relationship due to small sample size (hence poor
inference). Inequality in well depth, however, may accelerate water extraction, probably due to
fierce competition among water users. The particular geological condition in Merguellil plain
facilitates this possibility. Villages further downstream from the dam also face higher water
table fall, as the dam and upper stream users reduce the overflow of water from upstream.
2.4.3 Choice experiment: Estimation results
We have analyzed the effect of land inequality on common property resource conservation
in previous section. While from a policy perspective, land redistribution is an unlikely pol-
icy tool for water conservation. Instead, to avoid the tragedy of the commons, the removal
of hurdles that impede cooperation among water users appears to be a more practical and
appealing alternative. For this purpose, we design a choice experiment to find out whether
farmers have preferences for collective water conservation and if yes, what other institutional
design has impeded them from engaging in collective action. This section shows the results
of choice experiment.
Table 2.4 presents the results of the various choice models controlling only for the choice
sets attributes: That is, we estimate the probability of choosing a particular management
policy as a function of the attributes of the policy and the alternative specific constant (ASC)
alone, ignoring the heterogeneity of respondents. The ASC takes value 1 for either of the
policy options A and B, and equals 0 for the ‘status quo’ option. The first two columns are
the results from multinomial logit and conditional logit regressions separately, while column
(3)-(5) present the mixed logit results where some policy attributes coefficients are treated
as random coefficients. Furthermore correlation between random coefficients are allowed
in Column (6). We summarize the main results from Table 2.4 as follows: (i) The positive
ASC coefficients in all columns indicate that on average farmers have positive willingness
to pay for the watermeter, henceforth are willing to engage in collective action to achieve
groundwater conservation. (ii) Farmers are indifferent to restrictions on irrigated land that
do not exceed 10%. They are weakly against a 20% land restriction but strongly oppose
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restrictions of 30% and above. As a matter of fact, fallowing is a common practice in the
Merguellil valley, and irrigated land restriction of less than 20% does not affect the agriculture
production much. Beyond this level, however, such restriction becomes a binding constraint.
Although, from the perspective of water management, land restriction is a straightforward
policy instrument with low monitoring cost, it may face strong opposition from farmers. (iii)
Throughout all specifications, farmers express a inclination for a transparent regime which
makes private information on individual water use public to all users. As mentioned in the
last section, “water stealing” by digging well deeper or damaging water meter is common
under current water management scheme. Demand for information and transparency reveals
that hidden action leads to exploitation competition among farmers and damages the potential
of cooperative use of groundwater. (iv) Moreover, the positive and significant coefficient of the
meterreading variable shows that farmers prefer the new arrangement to be monitored (reading
water meter and collecting fees) by local government to the elected GIC leader. This result
is consistent with the story that farmers mistrust the current existing structures of the GICs
which are often seen as accomplices with some vested interests, by indulging themselves in
private dealing with some farmers to the detriment of the general interests. Although during
the survey we emphasized the fact that our experiment intends to design a a new regime
organized by the central department of agriculture, the similarity of the denomination of
institution used in the survey (Water user association and GIC) seem no different to farmers
who draw inference from past experience. Thus, outsiders tend to be considered as more
neutral and therefore preferred by many farmers13.
Considering the possibility that different farmers may have different degree of prefer-
ences over transparency and accountability, we estimate the model in mixed logit specifica-
tions and results are presented in Column (3)-(6), where the coefficients for these two variables
are assumed random and normally distributed. Farmers’ preferences for land restriction are
assumed to be homogeneous across farmers as fallowing is a common practice in the whole
region. In other words land restriction is not characterized by random coefficients in our anal-
ysis. In Column (3) and (4), we allow only one random parameter for either transparency or
meterreading separately in each specification. The average coefficient for each variable remains
the same sign as in the multinomial or conditional logit model. In Column (3), the average
coefficient for variable transparency is 0.307, slightly higher than the one if assumed constant.
The standard deviation of this coefficient is statistically significant, implying a large varia-
tion of this coefficient across the population. By normal distribution, we can calculate that
56.3% of farmers have positive coefficients for this variable. That is to say, a weak majority
of farmers prefer transparent management. Likewise, Column (4) presents result of mixed
logit model assuming the coefficient for meterreading is a random parameter. The average
coefficient of this variable becomes statistically insignificant when heterogeneity is allowed.
13This point is also confirmed by the Tunisian environment officials.
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The standard deviation is large and significant indicating wide variation in water users’ will-
ingness to pay for this policy attribute. This result is preserved when both meterreading and
transparency are treated as random but uncorrelated coefficients in Column (5). Nevertheless,
if we allow both coefficients be correlated (Column (6)), the average coefficient on meterreading
turns bigger and significant at 10%, with 56% of respondents indicating preference for local
authority. Moreover, the positive correlation between two coefficients suggests that those who
prefer transparency also prefer outsiders (in this case local authority instead of GIC leader) to
monitor the new system. This result again reconciles our former discussion about the current
GIC management.
Based on results in column (6) in Table 2.4, we can calculate farmers’ willingness to pay
for the new transparent although more restrictive system in terms of water consumption. On
average, farmers are willing to pay 172 Tunisian Dinar (TD) to shift to the new regime, which
aims to enforce cooperative use of water and stabilize groundwater table. They are also going
to reduce their contribution by TD 89 if more than 30% of land is prohibited from irrigation
relative to the non-restrictive scenario. Farmers are on average willing to pay additional TD
38 for a transparent regime, although there are about 40% of respondents who prefer not
publishing water user’s information and not knowing other users’ use. Moreover, on average
farmers are willing to pay TD 20.5 for local authority to take accountability, ceteris paribus.
So far we have known farmers’ preferences for policy change. Nevertheless, the above
discussion doesn’t take account of the heterogeneity across villages and farmers. This concern
takes us to Table 2.5, in which we include all the other observed and unobserved heterogeneity
at village and individual level in the choice models. The specifications are similar to Table 2.4,
including a multinomial logit model (Column (1)) and various mixed logit model specifica-
tions (Column (2)-(5)) . Column (2)-(4) have similar specifications except the variables that are
assumed to have random coefficients. As both standard deviations and correlation between
random coefficients are significant, we consider the specification presented in Column (4) as a
better fit than the former two and henceforth only discuss its result here. Besides the finding
that the policy attributes have qualitatively the same effects on farmers’ choice as in Table 2.4,
we also observe the following interesting results:
First, although the number of farms within village has little effect, land inequality does
have impact on farmers’ preferences. According to Proposition 3, we assume a nonlinear
effect which also interacts with land value. We find farmers from villages with higher land
inequality are more willing to engage in collective action and pay for a water conservation
regime. According to the results in Column (4), the marginal effect of land Gini coefficient at
mean (log) land value and mean Gini-coefficient on willingness to pay for the policy change
is 4.6114 , meaning as land Gini coefficient increases by 0.1 unit (mean preserving) from the
14The marginal effect in logit model is calculated as f (βX)β = exp(βX)1+exp(βX) β =
exp((−156.894+2∗122.444∗0.4900227+4.114∗10.18511)∗0.4900227)
1+exp((−156.894+2∗122.444∗0.4900227+4.114∗10.18511)∗0.4900227) ∗ (−156.894+ 2 ∗ 122.444 ∗ 0.4900227+ 4.114 ∗ 10.18511) = 4.61.
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mean value, i.e., from 0.49 to 0.59, the probability of mean land value holder to opt for the
new policy increases by 46.1%.
Second, rich farmers (with greater proportion of irrigated land and higher land value)15
tend to be more reluctant to a policy change. This can be seen from the negative marginal
coefficient on log(landvalue), which is -0.628 at mean value of land Gini coefficient (since the
marginal effect has the same sign as the marginal coefficient). In addition, the negative coeffi-
cient of the interaction term between transparency and log(landvalue) reveals that richer farmers
dislike transparency, although on average farmers prefer transparency. This finding confirms
the usual assumption that rich farmers are the beneficiaries of the current water management
scheme.
Third, education has a positive effect on farmers’ willingness to pay for water conserva-
tion action. Compared to the illiterate counterparts, farmers with primary school education
qualification are more willing to vote for the policy change, although even higher educa-
tion doesn’t show higher effect. Interestingly, farmers’ environmental awareness and concern
show positive impact 16. However, only the concern of water scarcity in the aquifer (indicated
by Factor 1) is not enough for one to make change, but the awareness of externality makes
difference. We find those who are more aware of the externality of own’s action on other
people are more likely to opt for the new policy which may improve water management.
Fourth, as expected, farmers living in villages downstream are more keen to stabilize
groundwater table as they tend to be particularly harmed by the water use of farmers liv-
ing upstream, although further downstream does not necessarily mean higher demand for a
groundwater conservation policy17.
Finally, we also find farmers who have experienced a greater fall in the water table fall
since 1990 are more likely to vote for a cooperative management of the resource.
By now, we should point out that the specifications through Column (2)-(4) may suf-
fer from endogeneity bias caused by the fact that water table fall from 1990-2007 is also an
outcome variable that may be determined by unobserved village level characteristics. These
village characteristics may for example reflect the coordination tradition in the village, or
other social connection among villagers, which could also affect villagers’ preferences for pol-
icy change. To account for these possible unobserved characteristics, we include two new
15Usually those growing olive trees and other water demanding crops such as water melon, tomatoes, etc.
16We asked ten questions in the farmer survey about their environmental concern. The questions start from general
attitudes towards global water scarcity to more specific local scarcity and awareness of externality, in the form of score
of importance. As most people don’t have idea about the more general questions, we only ask the last five questions
which focus on local region. The scores from these five questions are then integrated into two factors using factor
analysis.Factor 1 shows one’s awareness of water scarcity in the local aquifer, factor 2 indicates one’s awareness of
externality of self’s water use on the others. Lower scores indicate a higher degree of environmental awareness.
17This result seems puzzling. While it may not be if we realize that the degree of land inequality is positively
correlated with the distance to the dam downstream. In a regression of land inequality level (not included in the
current paper) on binary variable downstream and interaction term downstream ∗ distancetothedam, we find both
coefficients are significantly positive. This fact may be resulted from the local landscape and its unique geological
environment. As land inequality has positive effect on villagers’ inclination to water conservation, downstream
distance may work through the same mechanism. Here, we treat land inequality as an exogenous variable which
is formed by geology and in history, we don’t assume it be correlated with other unobservables which also affect
people’s inclination to collective action.
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Table 2.5: Choice Experiment Results With Individual Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
multinomial logit mixed logit mixed logit mixed logit mixed logit
Attributes and interactions
ASC 1.547 *** 40.560 *** 48.366 *** 50.585 *** 11.441 **
(0.279) (10.708) (11.553) (11.815) (9.490)
Irrigated land restriction 10% -0.001 -0.069 -0.132 -0.096 -0.097
(0.125) (0.093) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101)
Irrigated land restriction 20% -0.036 -0.205 * -0.267 ** -0.260 ** -0.260 **
(0.140) (0.110) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
Irrigated land restriction 30% -0.469 *** -0.698 *** -0.794 *** -0.825 *** -0.824 ***
(0.181) (0.112) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
meter reading by local authority 0.193 ** 0.240 *** 0.140 0.110 0.120
(0.088) (0.077) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119)
transparency 0.308 *** 0.326 ** 2.946 ** 2.765 ** 2.800 **
(0.105) (0.149) (1.322) (1.201) (1.195)
transparency*log(landvalue) -0.250 ** -0.241 ** -0.243 **
(0.128) (0.117) (0.117)
fee -0.003 -0.007 -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.008 *
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Inividual Characteristics
Number of farms in the village -3.86E-005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 ***
(0.00004) (0.00039) (0.00044) (0.00046) (0.00074)
Land Gini Concentration ratio -4.776 *** -123.158 *** -151.030 *** -156.894 *** -35.590 **
(1.565) (37.266) (40.358) (41.268) (17.625)
Land Gini Concentration ratio (sq) 1.729 96.164 *** 119.690 *** 122.444 ***
(2.634) (36.507) (39.391) (40.306)
Relative Mean Deviation of well depth dist’n -0.157 -1.148 -1.547 -1.697 0.041
(0.107) (1.594) (1.705) (1.736) (1.562)
% irrigated land 0.036 -0.754 -0.898 * -0.910 -0.770
(0.048) (0.512) (0.558) (0.590) (0.603)
land value (log) -0.137 *** -2.232 *** -2.475 *** -2.645 *** -2.388 ***
(0.044) (0.729) (0.774) (0.798) (0.790)
Land Gini concentration ratio.*(log)landvalue 0.283 *** 3.229 ** 3.769 ** 4.114 ** 3.590 **
(0.097) (1.486) (1.570) (1.618) (1.608)
factor 1 of environment concern score -0.033 -0.147 -0.218 -0.248 -0.290 *
(0.092) (0.159) (0.168) (0.177) (0.180)
factor 2 of environment concern score -0.181 ** -0.477 ** -0.433 *** -0.423 *** -0.503 ***
(0.078) (0.116) (0.123) (0.131) (0.134)
Education-primary school -0.036 1.033 *** 1.161 *** 1.154 *** 1.144 ***
(0.035) (0.230) (0.245) (0.254) (0.251)
Education-secondary school and above -0.024 0.274 0.428 0.394 0.371
(0.037) (0.246) (0.270) (0.279) (0.288)
downstream 0.030 2.612 *** 2.660 *** 2.732 *** 2.190 ***
(0.053) (0.493) (0.534) (0.547) (0.544)
downstream*distance to the dam 0.001 -0.019 * -0.014 -0.015 0.006
(0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
(log) watertable fall 1990-2007 (m) 0.005 1.228 *** 1.262 *** 1.292 *** 2.475 ***
(0.035) (0.369) (0.400) (0.416) (0.575)
coordination degree in village ceremony 3.078 ***
(0.631)
coordination degree in mosque maintanance 0.095 **
(0.352)
Standard Deviation of Random Coefficient
meter reading by local authority 1.257 *** 1.233 *** 1.246 ***
(0.139) (0.135) (0.136)
transparency 1.872 *** 1.967 *** 1.608 *** 1.601 ***
(0.159) (0.171) (0.241) (0.240)
Correlation between coefficients
cov(meterreading-local,transparency) 1.185 *** 1.173 ***
(0.252) (0.260)
N 5,424 5,424 5,424 5,424 5,424
LR χ2 247.54 315.33 342.9 343.28
Log likelihood (pseudo in mlogit) -3143.814 -1520.28 -1485.33 -1471.54 -1454.92
Note: Factor 1 and 2 of environmental concern scores are constructed from factor analysis with the scores from last
five questions in Environmental Concern in farmer’s questionnaire. Factor 1 shows one’s awareness of water scarcity
in the local aquifer, and factor 2 indicates one’s awareness of externality of self’s water use on the others. Lower
scores indicate a higher degree of environmental awareness.
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variables “villagers’ coordination in village ceremony” and “villagers’ coordination in maintenance of
mosque” in the last column. These two variables reflect the coordination degree in traditional
or religious activities and are evaluated by the village leader. They are included as an effort to
proxy for omitted variable in the previous regressions. The coefficients on both variables are
surprisingly highly significant and positive, implying that these two variables have at least
partly captured the omitted villages’ fixed effect that have influenced villagers’ policy prefer-
ence. Under this new specification, the impact of land Gini coefficient turns less significant.
To avoid multi-collinearity, we remove its quadratic term in the regression. As a result, the
marginal effect of Gini coefficient on the probability of a farmer who has mean level of land
value and is in a village with mean Gini coefficient to vote for policy change reduces to 0.60
18, i.e. for 0.1 unit increase in land Gini coefficient from the mean value (0.49), the probability
of voting for policy change for a farmer with mean land value increases by merely 6%. More-
over, the demand for transparency keeps consistently high. The average willingness to pay for
a regime especially with transparency varies from TD -40 for the highest land value holder to
TD 112.5 for the lowest land value holder, with the medium land value holder’s willingness
to pay at TD 33.6.
In summary, the result from choice experiment shows majority of farmers are willing to
pay a significant amount of money for a transparent collective water management system with
neutral agent accountable for the management. This result on the other hand reveals the main
obstacles that impede the formation of cooperation under current institution are asymmetric
information and lack of monitoring. Although such information problems arise from high
transaction costs of collecting and conveying data regarding the status of the resource being
exploited (Libecap (2008)), our experiment shows, on average farmers are willing to pay for
the transaction cost in order to implement a cooperative water management regime. Moreover,
installing water meter and a ”name and shame” policy by publishing water use information
once a month offers a practical policy alternative at a reasonable low cost.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
A major priority for Tunisian water managers in the Merguellil Valley is to find ways to stop
the continuous decline of the water table. This issue is important because of the economic and
environmental consequences of such decline. The main cause of this depletion of the ground-
water, the over-exploitation of the aquifer due to the multiplication of unlicensed wells and
boreholes, is well known. Despite the existence of a legislation regulating drilling of bore-
holes and wells, the authorities are reluctant to enforce the law for both economic and social
reasons. Nonetheless, managing the groundwater has become imperative if irreversible dam-
ages are to be prevented. To provide a better understanding of the farmers’ likely attitudes
towards policy changes designed to stabilize the water table level, a policy choice experiment
18The marginal effect is calculated as: f (βX)β = exp(βX)1+exp(βX) β =
exp((−35.590+3.590∗10.18511)∗.4900227)
1+exp((−35.590+3.590∗10.18511)∗.4900227) ∗ (−35.590 +
3.590 ∗ 10.18511) = .60145887
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has been used. The present experiment seeks to elicit farmers’ willingness to pay to shift from
the current status quo regime where the groundwater is being over-exploited to a regime that
ensures a sustainable management of the groundwater.
Undoubtedly, this new regime will be costly to the farmers because that under the new
policy 1) groundwater will be no longer free; 2) meters will be installed in each farm and
institutions monitoring closely water use as well as potential defrauding behavior will be
implemented; 3) restriction to irrigated areas might be imposed in cases of serious water
scarcity. The main benefit to the farmers is that a stabilization of the water table, in addition
to ensuring a good quality of water, guarantees the reliability of the water supply and a
relatively low extraction cost.
Our analysis suggests that, assuming that the respondents are representative of the farm-
ing community of the Merguellil Valley, farmers seem ready for a policy change to manage
the groundwater, even if this means they have to pay substantial short term costs (pricing of
groundwater, metering and quantity restriction) to reap long term benefits. The condition for
such acceptance however, is that farmers require transparency and independent monitoring.
These requirements, they believe, should guarantee them equal and fair treatment. Hetero-
geneity among farmers is key in explaining the willingness to shift to an alternative regime
or to remain with the status quo. As land distribution becomes more unequal, farmers seem
to be more willing to engage in collective action to achieve a more sustainable management
of the aquifer. On the other hand, we also find evidence to support that heterogeneity is
good for local property resource preservation, in particular, greater land inequality also re-
sults in the milder fall of the water table. However this fact is not perceived by villagers,
who usually have higher demand for equality in water use under more unequal land distri-
bution. This seemingly contradictory finding reconciles the prediction by Baland and Platteau
(1999) : In voluntary provision problems, inequality may contribute to the efficient outcome
while “in regulated settings, inequality tends to reduce the acceptability of available regula-
tory schemes”. Finally, the opposition of policy change may very likely come from wealthier
farmers, as they are the beneficiaries from the current region and they may oppose to any
new policy that could threaten their current position.
Our findings have very strong policy implications. As more government involvements
try to be put in place to tackle the “common property tragedy”, it is important to notice
any intervention needs to remove the obstacles which impedes cooperation at local level in
the first place, as it might be “partly determined by the same factors that make collective
actions unsuccessful” (Bandiera et al. (2005)). Except changing wealth distribution, building
a transparent system and make private information public among all users may be a more
practical policy option.
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Figure 2.4: Location of Survey Area. Cited from Albouchi (2006)
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Table 2.6: Tunisia Data: Summary Statistics
mean s.d.
Individual level (sample size=246)
Gender (1=male) 1.004
Age 40.615 14.77
Education
Illiterate 0.18 0.39
Primary school 0.54 0.5
Secondary school 0.22 0.41
college 0.02 0.14
university 0.04 0.19
Cultivated land area(ha) 7.39 6.71
% of land irrigated 0.92 0.202
currently in GIC 0.03
number of private wells 1.05 0.24
Use dripping technology 0.75 0.44
Use sprinkling technology 0.39 0.49
Village level (sample size=28)
number of households 472.36 523.1
number of farms 355.75 319.76
0-2 ha 50.04 44.07
2-4 ha 64.36 52.92
4-6 ha 70.14 90.42
6-10 ha 84.5 88.99
10-20 ha 49.43 50.03
20-50 ha 29.36 39.69
50 ha and above 7.93 8.88
Downstream to the dam 0.86 0.36
Fall of watertable from 1990 to 2007(meter) 18.36 6.78
Mean of welldepth (meter) 45.55 9.36
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2.B Proof of Lemma
Proof for Lemma 1.
The proof follows entirely from Bardhan et al. (2007). By the definition of g(li),
f2(li, g(li)) = h(li, g(li)) =
1
b + c
. By the implicit functions theorem, we determine:
g′(li) = −h1h2 (2.10)
It is obvious from Assumption 1 with h1 = f12 > 0 (i.e. the two inputs are complemen-
tary) and h2 = f22 < 0 that g′(li) > 0. It implies the response curve of collective input to the
private input (wi = g(li)) is upward sloping and always above zero for any positive private
(land) input. This result is derived directly from the setting of constant marginal extraction
cost which is the same for everyone and the assumption of complementarity relationship of
both inputs.
By differentiating expression (2.10) with respect to land, we get:
g′′(li) = −
h11h22 − 2h1h2h12 + h22h21
h32
(2.11)
The condition g′′(li) ≤ 0 is equivalent to the determinant
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 h1 h2
h1 h11 h12
h2 h12 h22
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣being ≤ 0
which in turn is equivalent to h(li, wi) being quasi-concave (Theorem 21.20 in Simon and
Blume (1994)).
Proof for Lemma 2.
Under differentiated price, most farmers produce under an amplified marginal product of
water and thus would extract more water than in the baseline model. In another word,
φ(li) > g(li). This effect of product price on resource use is also discussed in the Clark model
of fisheries under open access: resource users may accelerate their extraction in the presence of
higher resource prices all things being equal (Clark (1973)). By the implicit functions theorem,
we determine the slope of the response curve of water to land as
φ′(li) = −h1h2 −
h
h2
δ′i
δi
(2.12)
where δi and δ′i are abbreviations for δ(li) and δ
′(li) separately. By Assumption 3-5 and
Lemma 1, φ′(li) > g′(li) > 0, i.e. the response curve of water under differentiated market is
upward sloping and has a steeper slope, not only because water is complement to land, but
also because the price wedge gives farmers the incentive to accelerate extraction. Same as in
the baseline model, the effect of mean-preserving spread in land distribution depends on the
curvature of the response curve, which is
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φ′′(li) = g′′(li)− h
2h22
h32
(
δ′i
δi
)2
+
2h (h2h12 − h1h22)
h32
δ′i
δi
+
h
h2
2δ′2i − δ′′i δi
δ2i
= g′′(li)− h
2h22
h32
(
δ′i
δi
)2
+
2h
h22
(
h12 + g′(li)h22
) δ′i
δi
+
h
h2
2δ′2i − δ′′i δi
δ2i
(2.13)
However, the sign of expression (2.13) is ambiguous. We establish earlier that g′′(li) ≤ 0.
By Assumption 3-4, we are certain that the second term is positive and the third term is
negative if 0 ≤ g′(li) ≤ −h12h22 and positive if g
′(li) ≥ −h12h22 . Finally, the sign of the last term
depends on the sign of 2δ′2i − δ′′i δi.
As the function itself displays, the curvature of φ(li) depends on the shape of δ(li). We
can demonstrate this with a simple exercise. Assume δ(li) is convex at lower part of the land
distribution and concave at higher end. Define l˜ as the inflection point of the price function
δ(.), i.e. the point at which the second derivative δ′′(li) changes from being positive (for any
li < l˜ ) to negative (for any li > l˜ ). For intermediate values of land endowment lk, i.e. around
the inflection point l˜, δ′k is relatively larger than the slopes for small or large endowments. The
sign of 2δ′2i − δ′′i δi in equation (2.13) is unambiguously positive for li → l˜+ since then δ′′i < 0,
implying that the fourth term in Eq. (2.13) is negative together with the first and the third
term. Then the sign of φ′′(li) depends on the magnitude of the positive effect (second term)
relative to the negative effects (the other three terms). For li → l˜−, the sign of 2δ′2i − δ′′i δi is
ambiguous without further structure imposed on the shape of the price function δ(.). In any
event, whatever its sign, the overall sign of φ′′(li) remains undetermined.
As land endowment moves away from l˜, δ′i decreases and becomes negligible when li is
small enough or big enough. Neglecting all terms with δ′i we then have φ
′′(li) ≈ g′′(li)− hh2
δ′′i
δi
.
For large land endowment where δ′′i < 0, we are certain that φ
′′(li) < 0. While for small land
endowment where δ′′i > 0, then φ
′′(li) ≶ 0 again depending on the relative magnitude of the
two terms. 
Proof for Lemma 3.
By Eq. (2.2) and (2.3) we have: f ∗2 · (b + nc) = f n2 · (b + c), so that f ∗2 > f n2 , where f ∗2 and f n2
represent marginal product of water input under cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium
separately. Since f2 is a decreasing function of water input wi, we then easily get wni > w
∗
i > 0
for any i. And because ei =
wi− cb+cn ∑j 6=i wj
b , a fall in all wi (and any other wj) also leads to a fall
in ei, i.e., eni > e
∗
i > 0.
Moreover, f ∗2 − f n2 = f n2 (1−n)cb+nc > 0, that is f ∗2 − f n2 increases with f n2 , which by assumption
further increases with land endowment, then the difference between marginal product of
water under two optimum is bigger for larger land holder. Since marginal product of water
decreases with water input, for a bigger rise in marginal product of water, larger farmer has to
suffer a bigger cut in water input under cooperation. In other words, the difference wni − w∗i
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becomes larger for big farmers, or equivalently φ′(li) > ψ′(li), i.e. water response curve to
land has a bigger slope under the Nash Equilibrium. Given that both functions φ(li) and
ψ(li) are increasing and greater than 0 for li > 0, it has to be the case that farmers’ water
extraction is consistently lower should they agree to engage in cooperation: i.e. φ(li) > ψ(li)
for any li > 0. The difference in water input is also reflected in difference in water extraction
effort, and d(e
n
i −e∗i )
dli
> 0. In other words, bigger farmers have to bear more of the brunt of the
conservation effort should they join cooperation.
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2.C Method to measure inequality from grouped observation
This appendix introduces briefly the method of using grouped observation to calculate in-
equality measurement first developed by Kakwani and Podder (1976).
Suppose a positive variable X of a family is a random variable with probability distri-
bution function F(x), and density function g(x), and mean µ. The first moment distribution
function of X is given by
F1(x) =
1
µ
∫ x
0
Xg(X)dX
The Lorenz curve is the relationship between F(x) and F1(x). The curve is shown in
Figure 2.5. The equation of the line F1 = F is called egalitarian line.
Figure 2.5: Lorenz Curve
Let P be any point on the curve with co-ordinates (F, F1), and
pi = 1√
2
(F + F1) and η = 1√2 (F− F1);
then η will be the length of the ordinate from P on the egalitarian line and piwill be the
distance of the ordinate from the origin along the egalitarian line. Since the Lorenz curves lie
below the egalitarian line, F1 ≤ F which implies η ≥ 0. Further, if X is always positive, the
above equation implies η to be less than or equal to pi.
The equation of the Lorenz curve in terms of pi and η can now be written as:
η = f (pi)
where pivaries from zero to
√
2.
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We can write the Lorenz curve functional form as:
η = apiα(
√
2− pi)β, a > 0, α > 0, β > 0 (2.14)
when α = β the Lorenz curve has a symmetric shape, with the value of η at piand
(
√
2− pi) be equal for all values of pi.
In the empirical application, we estimate F and F1 using the grouped observations of land
distribution, calculate pˆiand ηˆ, and regress log(ηˆ) on log(pˆi) and log(
√
2− pˆi) according to eq.
(2.14) to obtain the estimates aˆ, αˆ and βˆ, which can be substituted into eq. (2.7) and (2.8) for
Gini Concentration Ratio and Relative Mean Deviation of land distribution.
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2.D Questionnaires
The data were collected from two separate surveys: the first survey was conducted in
April 2007 with farmers’ questionnaire; the second survey (follow-up) was conducted in
Dec.20010-Jan.2011 with village level questionnaire in villages where the first survey was
conducted.
Department of Economics
University College London
Drayton House, Gordon Street
London, WC1H OAX
2007 AquaStress Irrigation
Survey Questionnaire∗
  Code: _________________________________
Street: _________________________________
Village: ________________________________
Town: _________________________________
Post code: ______________________________
Phone number: __________________________
Enumerator: ____________________________
Date: ____dd____/____mm____/_____yy____
* The questionnaire should be asked by the enumerator,  rather than filled by the respondent. The enumerator should 
explain the attributes of the choice sets and how to make choices carefully to the respondent.  All the questions, if not 
mentioned specifically, are referred to the facts based on the year of 2006.
This survey is only used for the purpose of academic analysis. 
Your information will be kept confidential.
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Hello, my name is _____________ and I work for AquaStress project funded by the European Union.  We are  
conducting a research on the usage of water for  agricultural  purposes in  the Merguellil  valley.   We would 
appreciate it if you could respond to some questions that will help us ensure that any policy changes regarding  
agricultural water usage will address the actual needs of the farmers in the area.  The process will not take more  
than 30 minutes.
First of all, we would like to ask you something about your farm, so that we can see if we have interviewed a 
broad range of farms.  This information will remain strictly anonymous and confidential and will be used for  
statistical analysis only.
 Part I: Background Information
Q1 Your gender
      1  Male           2 Female 
Q2 Your age _________
Q3 Your family size [Q3a]______ (household size, include all the people who share the same budget)
   How many children at 16 or below [Q3b]____________
Q4 How  many  people  work  on  your  farm,  including  permanent  and  temporary  workers?  (both  include 
family labor and hired labor) 
     Permanent [Q4a]_________        Temporary [Q4b]___________
Q5 Which of these educational levels have you completed?
 1  Illiterate
 2  Able to write and read, but no schooling before
 3  Primary School
      4  Secondary School
       5  Upper Secondary School
       6  Professional qualification
 7  University degree
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Q6 Please indicate which income (profit) group best approximates your farm income before tax.
1  0 - 1 999 TD                           7  12 000 - 14 999 TD
2  2 000 - 3 999 TD                   8  15 000 - 17 999 TD
3  4 000 - 5 999 TD                   9  18 000 - 19 999 TD
4  6 000 - 7 999 TD                   10  20 000 - 24 999 TD
5  8 000 - 9 999 TD                   11  25 000 - 29 999 TD
6  10 000 - 11 999 TD               12  over 30 000 TD
Q7 How much land you own?  [Q7a]________ (ha)
      How did you get your land? [Q7b]  1 Inherited    2 Purchased
      And how long you have owned the land? [Q7c]________ (years)
      What is the present value of your land? [Q7d]________ (TD)
Q8  Have you rented land from someone else?    [Q8a]    Yes           No  
       (If YES, ask) How much land you have rented?  [Q8b]________ (ha)
                             How long have you rented the land? [Q8c]________ (years)
                             How much do you pay for the rent each year? [Q8d] __________ (TD/ha)
       Have you let out land to someone else?   [Q8e]   Yes          No
       (If YES, ask)  How much land you have let out? [Q8f]  __________ (ha)
                               How much do you charge for the rent each year? [Q8g]_________ (TD/ha)
Q9    How many residential and non-residential buildings do you have?
         [Residential][Q9a]__________ [Non-residential] [Q9b] ________
 Present Value for each of them
 [Q9c]________+[Q9d]__________+[Q9e]________+[Q9f]_______=  TOTAL[Q9g]___________
Q10   How many livestock you have?
Sheep     [Under 6 months] [Q10a]________     [Over 6 months][Q10b]_________
Goats     [Under 6 months] [Q10c]________     [Over 6 months] [Q10d]__________
Cattle     [Under 1 year]  [Q10e]_________       [Over 1 year] [Q10f] ____________
Chicken   [Under 3 months] [Q10g]________   [Over 3 months] [Q10h]__________
Q11 Number and value of other assets:
Tractors               [number] [Q11a]__________ [value] [Q11b]__________
Greenhouse          [number] [Q11c]__________ [value] [Q11d]__________
Seeding-machine [number] [Q11e]__________ [value] [Q11f]__________
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Harvesting-machine                     [number] [Q11g]__________ [value] [Q11h]__________
Other 1 (specify) [Q11i]_______ [number] [Q11j]__________ [value] [Q11k]__________
Other 2 (specify)_[Q11l]______  [number] [Q11m]__________[value] [Q11n]__________
Q12 What are the main products of your farm? [Multiple choices are applicable.]
              1 Cereals         2 Olive        3 Vegetables       4 Gardening        5 Other Fruit trees
 6 Fodder (for sheep or goats or cow)
Q13 Other incomes (TD/year)
       Number of people in the household doing off-farm work [Q13a]_______
       Annual off-farm income for each member 
 [Q13b]_______ + [Q13c]_______ + [Q13d]_________ + [Q13e]_________
       Annual remittances from the emigrants from the outside family members [Q13f]____________
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 Part II: Irrigation Information
Q14 What is the main irrigation technology you use?
  1 Flooding          2 Furrowing          3 Sprinkling        4 Drip
   5 Others_________________
Q15 What is the source of water you use for irrigation? (If multiple choices, please specify the percentage of  
water from each selected source)
       1 Water from the public irrigation scheme                        [Q151a] ____________%
       2 Surface water from the artificial lakes                            [Q152a] ____________%
        3 Ground water from the well of your own farm               [Q153a]______________%
        4 Ground water from the well of the other villagers            [Q154a] _______________%
        5 Ground water from the collective well                                 [Q155a]_______________%
   6 Others (please specify) _____________________          [Q156a]_______________%
Q16 [Ask  if  the  farm uses  groundwater]  How many wells  do  you  have  on  your  farm?  When  were  they 
constructed?    What was the installation  cost for each?   What is the  depth,  capacity and  pump rate for 
each?
Infrastructure No.
Date
(mm/yy)
Investment 
cost 
(TD)
Depth
(m)
Capacity
(m3)
Head 
requirement 
(m)
Pump 
Rate
(l/hr)
Energy?
(Diesel  / 
Electricity)
Private well
A1
A2
Collective well
C1
C2
Q17 What is the area of the land you cultivated ? ______________ (ha)
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Q18  What is the area of the irrigated land? __________________(ha)
How is the land allocated across different crops?
Crop name
Cultivated area (ha)
Irrigated area (ha)
Source of water*
How many days each 
week? 
How many months?
How many hours per 
irrigation (day)?
Number of hours did 
you irrigate last year 
in total?
(hrs/day *  days/week 
* 
4.5  weeks/month * 
months)
Harvested Product
Sold quantity
Sale price 
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 Part III: Water Management
Q21  Are you provided with water by a GIC?    1 Yes   2 No   (If yes, finish Q22-Q24)
Q22  How and how much do you pay for the water provided by the GIC?
      1 By volume [Q22a]__________TD/m3
2 By acreage and crop type [Q22b]
[crop 1: [Q22b1]_____ ] [Q22b1’]______TD/ha    [crop 2: [Q22b2]______ ] [Q22b2’]_____TD/ha
[crop 3: [Q22b3]_____ ] [Q22b3’] _____TD/ha     [crop 4: [Q22b4] _____ ]  [Q22b4’]_____TD/ha
3 By acreage [Q22c]__________ TD/ha
4 Other (please specify) [Q22d]______________
Apart from water cost, do you pay additional fees to the GIC, for example, administration cost?
        [Q22e]1 Yes ___________ TD     2 No
Q23  How was the leader of the GIC elected?
    1 Voted for by villagers   2 Selected by the government  3 Other (Please specify) _______
Q24  Do you participate in the management of water resource in the village?
     1 Yes      2 No
     [If yes, please explain how] ________________________________
Q25   Are you satisfied with the management by GIC? 
 1 Yes     2 No    3 Can’t tell.
Q26 Which factor do you think the management of GIC should improve? (Please rank the first three important  
factors using 1, 2, 3, with‘1’ for the most important.)
1 Irrigation efficiency                                                              Rank _______[Q26a]
2 Equality (For example, equal policy for different sizes of farms; 
Or same price for all the farmers)                       Rank _______[Q26b]
3 Transparency (For example, how often the farmers should meet 
together with the committee of the GIC; or the water use 
information should be made public to all the farmers)         Rank _______[Q26c]
4 Price level                                                                              Rank _______[Q26d]
2.D. Questionnaires 99
 Part IV: Credit constraints
Q25  Have you ever received any subsidy for use of some irrigation technology?  Yes   No
 [If  yes,  answer the following question] What and  how much  is  this  subsidy?  How did you use this 
subsidy, for example use on digging wells or improve irrigation technology?
No Subsidy name How much? How did you use this subsidy?
1 [S1a] [S1b] [S1c]
2 [S2a] [S2b] [S2c]
3 [S3a] [S3b] [S3c]
Q26 In the past 5 years, on average how much could you borrow from the bank for agriculture production each  
year? [Q26a]___________
       How much can you borrow from friends or relatives each time? [Q26b]_______________
       Are these enough? [Q26c]________
How much do you want to borrow for your production each year if possible? [Q26d]__________
      How are you going to use this money? [Q26e]
      1 Investment in irrigation infrastructure        2 Investment in machinery
      3 Planting more cash crops                             4 Others [Please specify] ________________
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 Part V: Environmental concerns
Q27  Please indicate your strength or agreement or disagreement for each of the following statements from 1-5,  
where 1 means strongly agree and 5 means strongly disagree. If you don’t know (or can’t tell, please leave 
it blank.)
The Earth has very limited resources for human beings.
   Strongly agree                      Strongly disagree
                1        2       3        4       5
   The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.
                 1        2       3        4       5
   Water is as important for nature as for humans.
                 1        2       3        4       5
   There will be serious water scarcity in the future if current water usage doesn’t change.
                1        2       3        4       5
   Groundwater and surface water are connected.
                1        2       3        4       5
   The water resource in the Merguellil valley has been very scarce.
                1        2       3        4       5
   I should be concerned how my water usage affects the availability of water for others.
                1        2       3        4       5
   I should pay for water by the exact amount I have used.
                1        2       3        4       5
       I will reduce using water if other people in my village do the same.
                1        2       3        4       5
       I will reduce using water if other people in the whole Merguellil valley do the same.
               1        2       3        4       5
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 Part VI: Choice Experiment
Thank you for your patience to reply to all of these questions.  We would like to ask you about your opinion 
on the water policy design.  As you may know, the Merguellil valley is facing a more and more serious 
water scarcity problem. The groundwater table has decreased from 42 meters below ground in 1986 to 52 
meters below ground in 2006. If the water table keeps decreasing at this speed, the water table will be 
nearly 60 meters in 20 years. In order to stabilize the groundwater table at the current level, the government 
is designing a policy to encourage people to reduce water use. In order to do this, the government plans to  
charge groundwater use by metering. 
The Department of Agriculture will institute a water management unit throughout the Merguiellil valley.  It  
will install water meters for all the wells in the  gouvernorat of Kairaouan (Merguellil valley) and will  
charge groundwater use based on the volume used. The volumetric price will be the same as  in the public 
irrigation scheme. 
In order to improve water management efficiency and equality, the farmers’ opinion on meter reading and 
information release will be taken into account when designing the policy. The installation fee has to be 
required from the farmers. You have the right to choose which level of installation fee you are willing to pay 
in terms of the corresponding policy design (for example, which restriction will be imposed.). And you have 
the right to opt out this policy and keep your current situation, with water table deteriorating at the current  
pace. 
       No matter which policy you choose, majority rules will be applied on the final voting outcome, i.e., if more  
than half of the people in the village vote for policy change, the new water management association will be  
formed and collective action will be taken.  
The proposed policy will be changed in the following way:
1. Restriction on irrigation area:  This indicator restricts the percentage of the farm area that are not 
allowed to be irrigated.  There are four  levels of  this  indicator:  No restriction,  10% of land are not  
allowed, 20% of land are not allowed, 30% of land are not allowed.
2. Meter reading: It refers to who is responsible for reading water meters that you would like to choose.  
There are two alternatives: local government authority, or newly formed water management unit.
3. Transparency:   This indicator refers whether the waer use quantity and the deliberate damage of water 
meter will be made public to all the farmers in the village. If yes, you can observe how much water used 
by other farmers in your village, and whose water meter has been broken deliberately.
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4. Installation fee: It refers to how much each year you are willing to pay for meter installation on your  
farm corresponding to each different  possible policy.  The meter generally cost  30 TD. But you can  
choose to pay less in some policies, and the difference will be covered by the government. There are four  
possible levels for you too choose: Free (0 TD), 10 TD, 20 TD, 30 TD.
       In order to design policy which is best for the farmers, we need your help to make sure the plan suits the 
       needs of the farming population and for this reason we ask for your opinion on a number of  different 
       scenarios that can be applied.
In the following cards we present a number of different scenarios that can emerge from the application of 
this plan. In each card there are  3 scenarios. Among those 3 scenarios we  ask you to choose  the one you  
prefer most. The third scenario in each card corresponds to the case that you choose to keep your current  
situation,  with the groundwater table level  decreasing at  the current  speed.  There is  no right  or  wrong  
answer and whatever you say will be treated  as strictly confidential. 
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Note: The 16 choice sets are divided into 2 groups (Choice Set 1-8  and Choice Set 9-16). Each respondent  
anwers only 1 group of choice sets. 
Choice Set 1
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
20% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 20 
Policy 
B No restriction
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
30 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 2
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
Government Not public 0 
Policy 
B No restriction
Local 
Government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
0 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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Choice Set 3
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
Government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
20 
Policy 
B No restriction
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 10 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 4
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A No restriction
Local 
Government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
30 
Policy 
B
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
20 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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Choice Set 5
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
10 
Policy 
B
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 0 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 6
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 30 
Policy 
B
20% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
30 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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Choice Set 7
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A No restriction
Local 
government Not public 10 
Policy 
B
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 0 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 8
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
20% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
30 
Policy 
B
20% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 10 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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Choice Set 9
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
20% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
government Not public 10 
Policy 
B No restriction
Local 
government Not public 20 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 10
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 30 
Policy 
B
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
government Not public 30 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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Choice Set 11
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
10 
Policy 
B
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
government Not public 30 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 12
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A No restriction
Local 
Government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
30 
Policy 
B
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
20 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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Choice Set 13
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A No restriction
Water 
Management 
Unit
Not public 20 
Policy 
B
20% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
Government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
0 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 14
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
Government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
20 
Policy 
B
20% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
Government Not public 20 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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Choice Set 15
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A
10% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
Government Not public 0 
Policy 
B
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
20 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
Choice Set 16
Restriction on land 
area to be irrigated  
Who reads 
water meter
Transparency
Installation fee 
(TD/year)
Tick the 
policy you 
prefer
Policy 
A No restriction
Water 
Management 
Unit
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
0 
Policy 
B
30% of land is not 
allowed to be 
irrigated
Local 
Government
Water use and 
damage of meter 
public to all the 
farmers
10 
Policy 
C 
I would like to keep the current status quo and don’t vote for the pricing 
policy. 
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AquaStress Irrigation
Survey Questionnaire
For Village Leader ONLY
(follow-up survey)
Village: ________________________________
Town: _________________________________
Oct-30- 2010
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Hello, my name is _____________ and I work for AquaStress project funded by the European Union. 
This is a complementary survey to a survey we conducted in 2007 in Merguellil valley, on the usage of 
water for agricultural purposes in your village.  For research purpose, we need some additional 
information about your village. We would appreciate it if you could respond to some questions about 
your village.  The process will not take more than 30 minutes.
This information should all be pertained to the level in year 2007.  If you can’t remember exactly 
about that year, you should give us the information in the time period which is close to 2007. 
1.   How many households ____________  and farms  _____________were there in your  village in 
2007?
Among them, how many __________ farms were operated by individuals / companies from outside of 
the village (including companies from cities)? 
2. How many religion / clan groups in your village?  ___________
    What’s the percentage of population for each group ?
Group name (or code) % of population of the whole village
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Note: If there are more than one type of classification, please use the one mainly 
used (or recognized). Please add more rows if necessary at the back of questionnaire.
3. What is the total area of farm land in your village ?  _____________
    How are the farm lands distributed1?
     
Area of each farm (in hectare) Number of farms in this category
0-2
2-4
4-6
6-10
10-20
20-50
>50
1 The original questionnaire asks the respondent to list the farm land area for each farm in the village. But in the 
real survey, only the distribution of the farm land area is obtained.
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 4.    What's the soil quality of land in your village, compared to other villages in Merguellil 
valley? Please circle the one level within the following scale: ____________________
a. Very good         b. Good           c. Average            d. Bad                  e.  Very bad
5. How much does the farm land worth in your village? (in other words, if some farmer wants to sell his  
land, what price can he possibly get for each acre of the land? )  You can give a range if different land 
value differently.  And please give the value in terms of 2007 year level. 
____________________________________ dinar/acre
6. How many boreholes were there in your village in year 2007? Could you please give a list of the 
depth of all the wells in your village at that time? 2
Category Well depth Number of wells in this category
1
2
3
4
5
6
Note: add more rows if necessary.
7.  Could you please tell me how much has water table level in your village changed during the last 20 
years? 
 What’s the level in 1990 ________________ meter under ground
and what’s the level in 2007, _____________ meter under ground
and what’s the current level? ______________ meter under ground
8.  How many people in your village were working outside as migrants in 2007?  If not available, please 
give the number in the year which is closest to 2007. ____________________________
9. Could you please recall the prices of the following items in 2007? 
item unit price
diesel dinar/litre
electricity dinar/kwh
sheep (under 6 months) dinar/each
sheep (over 6 months) dinar/each
goats (under 6 months) dinar/each
goats (under 6 months) dinar/each
cattle (under 6 months) dinar/each
cattle (over 6 months) dinar/each
chicken (little) dinar/each
chicken (adult) dinar/each
2    The original questionnaire asks the respondent to list the well depth  for each well/borehole in the village. 
But in the real survey, only the distribution of the depths is obtained.
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10. What score (1-5, from lowest to highest) would you put for the coordination level in the following 
village level activities:
1) Construction and maintainance of village road
1           2           3             4                   5
2) Village ceremony
       1           2           3             4                   5
3) Maintanance of village mosque
1            2           3              4                  5
4) Maintainance of irrigation ditch and other irrigation facilities
1            2           3              4                  5
11.   How is village leader selected in your village? 
1) Voted by villagers
2) Appointed by local government
3) Appointed by Akhond 
4) Appointed by the local elders
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Chapter 3
The effect of migration on children’s
education attainment in rural China
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the education of children in rural China, and how it has
been affected by the overwhelming trend of internal labour migration within the country. It
contributes to the existing economic and socio-economic research on the impact of migration
by examining the causal effect of parental migration on the educational attainment of children
in rural China. In particular, we compare long-run education outcomes of children whose
parents engaged in long-distance migration work during their children’s schooling period, to
the outcome of those whose parents didn’t migrate during their schooling age. In order to do
this, we employ two different empirical strategies that we detail below.
The importance of education in contemporary China has long been recognized. Since the
decentralization policy in education was initiated following the Chinese economic reforms
of the 1980s, education inequality has continued to increase due to the unbalanced market
economic development across regions (Postiglione (2006)). This situation is compounded by
the fact that an increasingly larger population of working age adults are participating in
inter-provincial migration activities, which in turn are affecting more and more school-aged
children. Since the late 1990s, there have been around 100 million people on the move each
year. For the main part, temporary labour migrants relocate from inner rural areas to east
coast cities, which has often been attributed as an important factor in explaining the recent
economic growth in China. The most significant expansion took place during 1990s, when
cross-county temporary migration flows nearly quadrupled from slightly over 20 million in
1990 to 78 million in 2000, according to the 1990 and 2000 census. Given the huge scale, the
impact of this migration trend on society is far-reaching and multifold. While it is only one
of many outcomes of interest, a quantitative assessment of the relationship between parental
migration and child schooling outcomes remains of key policy interest.
The impact of temporary migration on child outcomes has been the focus of sociological
research (e.g. Biao (2007); Zhou et al. (2005); Gao et al. (2010)). As Gao et al. (2010) note,
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“parental migration is a risk factor for unhealthy behaviours amongst adolescent school chil-
dren in rural China”. Amongst their sample of school children with parents away from home,
they document a positive association in the incidence of smoking, watching more television,
and even contemplation of suicide. de Brauw and Mu (2011) examine how parents’ migration
affect children’s health and nutritional development in rural China using another data set
and find that children (aged 7–12) who are left behind are more likely to be underweight and
take up more household chores. However, there have been few studies which have examined
the effects of migration on education outcomes. For the main part, this literature focuses on
descriptive comparisons of schooling performance in a relatively short time span (e.g. Liang
and Chen (2007); Chen et al. (2009)), and does not claim to identify causal relationships.
This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature by looking at the impact of parental
migration on children’s lifetime education attainment in rural China. The sociological liter-
ature discusses three main mechanisms through which migrants will affect child education
attainment: first, remittances sent back by migrants may ease credit constraints and lead to a
higher schooling enrollment rate (Glewwe and Jacoby (2004)), and reduce their need to rely
on paid or unpaid child labour; second, the migration of the primary wage earners (espe-
cially parents) may place greater demands on children to assist in supporting the household
through both paid and unpaid labour, especially when migrants fail to remit sufficient earn-
ings; third, the disruption of family life and the loss of parental attention and discipline may
hinder the performance of children in school and may impose a large psychological cost on
them (Lu and Trieman (2007)). Since these mechanisms often work in competing directions,
the combined effect of these channels is ambiguous and may vary across different child age
groups1.
This paper will not attempt to separate the various mechanisms. Rather, it has the more
limited objective of identifying the aggregate causal effect of migration on migrants’ children’s
education during 1990s and 2000s in rural China. In order to quantitatively evaluate the
impact, we employ two different empirical methodologies. The first approach uses a fixed
effect instrumental variable approach to examine the effect of the incidence of father migration
on the odds of children exiting school. The second strategy we use treats children’s education
and parents’ migration as two correlated duration processes using the framework developed
by Abbring and van den Berg (2003). By applying both strategies to the same China Health
and Nutrition Survey data, we find that on aggregate father’s migration doesn’t improve nor
hinder the lifetime education attainment of the left-behind children in the long run. Of course,
this result does not preclude the existence of considerable heterogeneity in responses.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide background information
on education policy and development constraints in China. In Section 3.3 we introduce a
1Another potentially important mechanism which has received considerably little attention in the literature (ex-
ceptions include Antman (2007)) is the fact that migrant parents often bring back information about work opportu-
nities in the cities. The information may change their valuation of education (or local education) relative to other
non-migrant parents. This value may be formed based on their working experience in the cities.
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simple theoretical model which describes how rural families make child education investment
decisions, and how migration can affect left-behind children’s education attainment. Section
3.4 describes the data and Section 3.5 introduces empirical strategies that we use for our
analysis, discusses the relative advantages and disadvantages of the alternative approaches,
and presents our main results. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Policy Background
China Education System and separate job markets
China implements a popular public school system. Thanks to the nine-year-compulsory
schooling policy, the basic education enrollment and attainment in China is kept at a steady
high level, both in rural and urban areas, which is a feature that is not very common in other
developing countries. Generally, the Chinese education system include 6 years primary school
(5 years are applied in some area), 3 years secondary school, 3 years high school or 3 years
vocational training school, and 2-4 years of college or university. Figure 3.1 plots the officially
recorded school enrollment rates at different educational levels in China since 1978. We can
see that the enrollment rate for primary schooling is nearly 100% and the one for secondary
school are increasing fast since 1990 till it reaches a very high level after 2000. While high
school and college/university enrollment rates are much lower, they have been increasing
steadily during the last two decades. In particular, the university enrollment rate increased by
nearly two folds due to the enrollment expansion policy implemented since 1999, which si-
multaneously encourages university to expand enrollment and changes from previous heavy
subsidization system to market based fees pricing policy.
Figure 3.1: Enrollment Rate of Schools by Different Groups. Data source: National Bureau of
Statistics of China (1991-2007).
Due to the limited supply of higher education opportunities, China has a system of ed-
ucational rationing based on a meritocratic criteria, especially for levels beyond compulsory
schooling. For rural people, education has more values than merely to improve one’s ability.
This is because of the separate job markets policy that traditionally implemented in China.
The strict hukou registration system distinguishes rural residents from urban ones and dis-
criminates the rural people from working in the cities and constrains population migration to
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a large extent. This is especially true during the pre-reform period, when going to university
was once the only way for the rural people to get a job in cities, apart from joining the army.2
However, in recent decades, along with the huge flow of labour migration from countryside
to cities, the barrier between city and countryside has become less strict and rural people can
easily get a job in city without any university degree, even though most jobs are limited to less
well remunerated occupations, such as manufacturing and construction work or low skilled
service sector work. Since the education requirement is usually low for these types of work,
many high school aged children in fact gave up the chance for education and join in this big
migration flow. This trend is also reflected in our sample. As we can see from Figure 3.2, the
median age of migrants is decreasing over time, partly driven by the large majority of teenage
young adults.
Figure 3.2: The Change of Migrants Composition in Age. Data source: constructed from
CHNS data set by the author.
Education fiscal policy and regional inequality in education
Since the promulgation of education law in 1986, the Chinese education fiscal policy has
switched from centralization during the pre-reform period to decentralization. This shift al-
lows the local governments to make their own education plan according to local demand and
leads to an easing of pressure on the central government over the responsibility to ensure
access and equity. Local governments, especially for the small town and rural area, have
to rely on local taxes to fund schools. However, due to the unbalanced development of the
Chinese economy, educational inequalities continue to widen, not only between inner west
and east coast areas, but also between rural and urban. Fees on books and other teaching
materials such as chalk and paper had to be collected from households who sent their chil-
dren to school. Many villages went into debt when they tried to universalize nine years of
compulsory education. As a result, free compulsory education became unaffordable to many
households, and high dropout rate is common in rural area, especially for girls (Postiglione
(2006)). This discrepancy is even worsened by the new decentralization reform of the fis-
2Refer to Zhao (1997) for a general review of hukou system and its effect on migration and education.
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cal policy implemented in 1994, since when the central government receives a much bigger
share of the tax revenue than the local government, who is however responsible for financing
compulsory education3. A recent paper by Yi et al. (2012) confirms this concern. Using a
survey data specifically targeted at secondary school students from two provinces in North
and Northwest China, Yi et al. (2012) find among the total number of students attending sec-
ondary school during the first month of the first term of grade 7, 14.2% had left school by
the first month of grade 9. They argue poverty, poor academic performance and outside job
opportunities are three main contributing factors.
The inequality situation meets a new challenge when 100 million people try to move from
countryside to the cities, most of whom are young adults with children. Nearly 20 million
children go to the cities with their parents (group of LanZhou University (2007)), while many
others have to be left behind with grandparents. The hukou system, however, has prevented
the young rural migrants from sharing this educational experience with their age cohort in the
city. According to the 1986 Education Law, local governments are held responsible only for the
education of children with local residential registration, irrespective of the large population
movement since 1990. Consequently, no rural migrant child is automatically entitled to public
education and their enrollment rate is only at 90.7% 4, much lower than 99.5% in the corre-
sponding counterpart in sixteen provinces in eastern China (National Bureau of Statistics of
China (2002)). All these restrictions explain why most migrants choose to leave their children
at hometown, either by themselves, or under supervision of the children’s grandparents.
3.3 Theoretical model
The conceptual framework we adopt here adapts the “fairly general human capital investment
model” as presented in Glewwe and Jacoby (2004), but arguments it by explicitly modeling the
choice of performing migration work. The probability of migration will depend upon the non-
farm labour market and the reservation wage. The purpose of this model is to demonstrate
different mechanisms that parent’s migration may affect the child’s education.
We assume each household has only one single child and one parent who makes deci-
sions about how many years of education should be invested. In the rural family’s context,
household adult allocates time among three activities: child’s supervision (La1t ), agricultural
production (La2t ), and off-farm work (L
a3
t ); while child allocates time between study (L
c1
t ) and
agricultural production (Lc2t ). Each has time endowment 1. The household makes decisions
3This effect of the fiscal decentralization on education lasts until the promulgation of the new education law in
2006 which guarantees the enforcement of compulsory education in poor area (especially the rural area and the
underdeveloped western China) by providing subsidies from the central government. Since our data covers the time
period from 1989 to 2006, we are not able to study the effect of this policy change in 2006 on the enforcement level of
compulsory schooling.
4Some other data may be even less optimistic. In 2001, the China News Agency reported that only 12.5% of
migrant children in Beijing were in school, and only 60% of the migrant children were receiving some form of
education according to a survey carried out by Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (The Integration of Migrant
Children in Beijing Schools, in Postiglione (2006)). Nevertheless, most migrant children are enrolled in the informal
“Min gong” schools (i.e.,migrant children school), which is set up in the city by migrants themselves, and often faces
the risk of shut down due to the poor conditions and dangerous infrastructure.
3.3. Theoretical model 121
on investing in human capital (Ht), and physical capital (Kt), for agriculture production in
each time period. Human capital is accumulated by making investment in child’s education
level (et) and time inputs from parents’ supervision (L
a1
t ) and child’s study (L
c1
t ), at a price (pt)
for the education cost, such as tuition and book fees. The human capital transition equation
is as follows:
Ht+1 = Ht + ψ(Xt)G(et, L
a1
t , L
c1
t ), (3.1)
where G(·) is the human capital production function, and ψ(·) is the productivity parameter
reflecting the school quality, child ability and motivation, which are all included in variable
set Xt.
The household also makes decisions on investment in physical capital, which is an input
for agricultural production, in addition to labour (both child and adult). The agricultural pro-
duction function can be described as a standard production function: yat = θtF(Kt, L
a2
t , L
c2
t ),
where θt is the agriculture productivity parameter at time t, and Kt is the physical capital stock
accumulated at time t, Li2t is i’s labour input in agriculture production, with i = a, c for adult
and child respectively. Households earn income from agriculture production and migration
wage revenue, which is simply ymt = wL
a3
t , with wage depending on the human capital of the
parent (Hat ). The adult chooses to migrate if and only if w ≥ wr, that is, when the expected
wage from migration is high enough to compensate for the reservation wage(wr), with the
latter being determined by the state variables such as household characteristics and trans-
portation cost of migration. Therefore, a household accumulates physical capital according
to
Kt+1 = Kt + θtF(Kt, L
a2
t , L
c2
t ) + w(H
a
t )L
a3
t ∗Mt − ct − ptet, (3.2)
i.e., the change in physical capital comes from the agricultural income and migration income,
after subtracting current consumption (ct) and education costs (ptet). In Eq. (3.2), Mt =
I(w ≥ wr), where I(·) is the indicator function. Credit constraint can be imposed by the
requirement that Kt+1 ≥ 0, that is, the household is constrained by borrowing ability in
current consumption and education investment. As equation (3.2) shows, migration can relax
the budget constraint for households on education investment. In this sense, the child from the
migrant family should have higher education attainment conditional on all the other factors.
Assume that the child is eligible for education up to period T − 1. The family starts to
receive income from the child from period T onwards, when child works exclusively. During
0 ≤ t < T, the child may only help in agriculture production and so the household faces the
choice of consumption, labour supply and investment in education. We assume current utility
is an additively separable concave function of consumption (ct), and education investment (et)
since education is partly treated as a consumption good. At period T, the parent retires and
then receives a return on their investment through a transfer from the child, who finishes
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education and enters the labour market. The continuation value may then be written as
rΦ(KT , HT), where Φ is the utility enjoyed by the child with inherited physical capital (KT)
and accumulated human capital (HT), with r ∈ [0, 1] being the fraction transferred to the
parents. In this paper, we assume r is exogenous. The household has no other endowment
except time. Therefore, the household’s objective function is to maximize
E0
[
T−1
∑
t=0
δtU(ct, et) + rΦ(KT , HT)
]
, (3.3)
subject to time constraints:
1 = La1t + L
a2
t + L
a3
t (3.4)
1 = Lc1t + L
c2
t , (3.5)
as well as equation (3.1) and (3.2) and the credit constraint. The maximand is the expected
discounted utility flow valuated at the initial time period.
The first order conditions for an interior solution are:
U′(ct) = λt (3.6)
µtψG′(La1t ) = λtθtF
′(La2t ) (3.7)
µtψG′(Lc1t ) = λtθtF
′(Lc2t ) (3.8)
µtψG′(La1t ) = λtw ∗Mt (3.9)
U′(et) + µtψG′(et) = λt pt, (3.10)
where µt and λt are time-varying shadow values of human and physical capital that will be
scaled by the discount factor δt. The system of equations can be solved to yield the education
demand function:
e∗t = e∗
(
λt, µt,ψ(Xt), G′(et), G′(La1t ), G
′(Lc1t ), θtF
′(La2t ), θtF
′(Lc2t ), wt ∗Mt, pt
)
. (3.11)
From first order conditions (3.6)–(3.10), we can see clearly that parent has to face the
trade-off between the short-term benefit and the long-term return benefit. On the one hand,
the higher income from parent’s migration relaxes budget constraint, which is equivalent to
the lower shadow value of physical capital λt. Therefore it may facilitate high education
investment as seen directly from equation (3.10). On the other hand, the parent has to face
the limited time constraint on child’s development if he does labour migration work, which
may require him working far away from home so that little time is left for supervising child’s
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education and may forgo the long-term benefit from returns to human capital accumulation.
Moreover, the parent’s migration decision may also induce other family members to work
more and have cross-effect on child’s labour, which further decreases the child’s time devoted
to education (Eq.3.8). As a result, the net effect of parent’s migration on child’s education
attainment is a combination of all these effects and the sign of the net effect is ambiguous.
If we write the determinants of education decision into deep parameters and shadow
prices, we can find that child’s education is a function of household endowments, agricul-
ture productivity, other household characteristics, macro economic conditions, tuition fee and
other cost on schooling, conditional on migration decision (further determined by household’s
characteristics and migration cost). Based on these, we can write down the reduced form for
empirical models as follows:
e∗it = e
∗(λit, µit, θt, r, Xit, pt, wt | Mit) (3.12)
And in the next section we are going to test how these variables affect children’s education
attainment, especially how fathers’ migration has an impact.
3.4 Data
Data are drawn from the longitudinal China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data, which
includes about 4,400 households with a total of 19,000 individuals in nine provinces that vary
substantially in geography, economic development and public resources. Households were
first surveyed in 1989, with follow-up surveys in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006.
The timing of the survey is well-suited for the study of migration, as the 1990s experienced
the most rapid growth in intra-national labour migration in China. Since follow-ups are
only possible if the household didn’t move out of the village, households that permanently
moved to cities wouldn’t be followed.5 The attrition rate of the whole survey is 5%. Detailed
demographic, economic, time use, labor force participation, asset ownership, and expenditure
data were obtained, as well as health and nutrition status of children and elders. Local social
and economic information at community/village level is also included.
Children’s school enrollment is asked in each wave, together with total years of schooling,
and what level of education has been obtained. As migration activity is not asked specifically
in the survey till the wave 1997, we can’t identify migrants straightforwardly in data before
1997. Therefore, we define migrants as individuals living away from home for at least six full
months in the past year. The sample of interest in this paper consists of 2,554 rural children
born after 1978, with both parents currently in the same household and with information on
household assets, and village facilities. These children were born after cultural revolution and
their education will have been affected by the promulgation of education law of 1986. As
5Given the strict implementation of Hukou registration system, the attrition due to selection is not a serious matter
in this paper.
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female’s participation in migration labour market was low until the recent years6, we don’t
include the children whose mothers did migration work during their schooling years in our
subsample. Descriptive statistics of the subsample are presented in Table 3.1. The subsample
is slightly overrepresented by boys, with the average number of years of schooling at 9 years,
i.e., finishing schooling after graduating from secondary school. The difference between 5-
year and 6-year primary school plans across regions is taken care of by adjusting all primary
school graduates to finishing 6 years of schooling, no matter what plan of primary school is
performed in that region7. The average household size is 4.69 people, and the average number
of children within a family is a little over 28. There is a big variation in the assets value and
cultivated land area, with mean at 5630.56 (yuan) and 6.41 (mu) separately. Over half of the
villages in the sample have a local public primary school, while high schools (and other higher
levels) have to be reached in the nearest town. Electricity is available in most villages during
our sample period while train stations are only rare. The information on the distance to the
nearest train station is not available to many villages and therefore is not controlled in our
empirical analysis. The sample distribution across provinces is not absolutely even, with the
sample size reflecting the population weight in each province.
3.5 Empirical Strategies
This section describes the empirical strategies for estimating the causal effect of father’s mi-
gration on children’s education attainment. Two different empirical strategies are employed:
i) fixed effect IV methodology (FE-IV), and ii) multivariate mixed proportional hazard model
(MMPH). We discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of each method in what fol-
lows.
The objective of the empirical analysis is to identify the causal relationship of parents’
migration on children’s education attainment. Given the panel data structure of child’s en-
rollment history, a natural empirical approach is to examine how the change in incidence of
parents’ migration has impact on the odds of dropout of child. The first empirical approach
we adopt is to exploit the panel data structure by removing the unobserved fixed effect of
a child which may also affect his/her education attainment (such as ability). However, this
approach treats school enrollment and migration only as two binary incidence choice vari-
ables, ignoring the natural process of schooling and migration which have their own dynamic
durations and whose effects may persist over time. Due to these considerations, we adopt a
second empirical approach that treats education and migration as bivariate duration processes
during which one variable may have impact on the other. Both approaches will be presented
6In our sample, by our definition of migration, there are 19 out of 2840 rural children whose mother is the only
parent who ever did migration work during their schooling time, compared to 241 children with only fathers once
did migration work. Moreover, there are 42 children who have both parents once did migration work.
7As introduced in Section 3.2, although most regions implement 6-year primary schooling policy, some regions
have only 5-year primary schools. The difference is due to discretion of each region according to their fiscal condi-
tions.
8Although the one-child policy has been implemented since 1978, the enforcement was not very strict until the
early 1980s and the restriction could be waived if the first child of the family is a girl for rural residents.
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Table 3.1: CHNS Data: Summary Statistics
variable min max mean s.d.
a. Individual level
birthyear 1978 2000 1984.59 4.74
gender 0 1 0.47 0.5
number of years of schooling when dropout 1 17 9.02 2.1
father’s education 0 5 1.8 0.88
mother’s education 0 5 1.28 0.98
father’s first observed migration wave 1989 2006 1997.91 6.77
household size 3 11 4.69 1.28
number of children 1 6 2.04 0.89
value of assets(yuan) 18 506900 5630.56 16648.82
cultivated land(mu) 0 359 6.41 10.88
b. Community level
public primary school in village 0 1 0.66 0.47
public secondary school in village 0 1 0.21 0.41
public high school in village 0 1 0.07 0.25
vocational school in village 0 1 0.04 0.2
electricity in village 0 1 0.97 0.17
train station in village 0 1 0.14 0.35
number of clinics in village 0 7 0.22 0.62
minority village 0 1 0.03 0.16
c. Province
Liaoning 219
Heilongjiang 215
Jiangsu 218
Shandong 215
Henan 368
Hubei 352
Hunan 224
Guangxi 383
Guizhou 350
N 2554
Note: gender=0 for boy,=1 for girl. Parents’ education levels have 5 categories: illiterate (0), primary school gradu-
ates(1),secondary school graduates(2),high school graduates(3),vocational school graduates(4),collage and above(5).
minority village=1 for village mainly consisting of minority ethics people,=0 otherwise.
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in this section separately and will be compared and contrasted.
3.5.1 Fixed effect IV approach
Empirical model
From the education (enrollment) demand function in equation (3.11), a reduced form model
of the discrete decision of household h in village j to enroll child i in school at time t can be
written as:
Eiht = β0 + β1DadMiht + β2Wiht + βXXit + βZZht + βVVjt + Pi ∗ Tt + ui + eijt (3.13)
where Eiht is a binary variable with 1 indicating that child i in household h is enrolled
in school in year t. DadMiht is also a binary variable indicating whether child i’s father is
currently participating in labour migration at time t. Wiht is the household wealth at year t, so
that β2 captures the wealth effect of education. Xit includes individual level covariates which
may affect child’s enrollment decision, including age, gender, and dummies for how many
years of schooling have been finished, in order to account for the effect of natural process of
schooling. Household characteristics Zht, are introduced in the models to control for family
preferences for education, factors affecting lifetime household wealth, and the likelihood that
the household faces credit constraints, such as parents’ education level, number of children.
Village characteristics, Vjt, are also included to control for the education facility in the village.
For example, whether there is a primary school or middle school in the village, as well as the
distance to the closest corresponding school. Macroeconomic shocks and trends, education
resources and policies may also affect child’s education attainment, cost of education, and
the demand for migrant labor, and we control for these effects using province-wave dummy
variables, Pi ∗Tt. Moreover, shadow prices of physical capitals and return to education are also
assumed constant within region at certain period and can be captured by Pi ∗ Tt. Apart from
all these, there are still some individual fixed effects (ui) which we generally can’t observe,
such as innate ability, but can affect education attainment through education productivity
parameter ψt. Idiosyncratic shocks are included in the error term eijt.
Identification
As discussed in the model, the explanatory variable migration DadMiht is itself a binary
choice variable which depends on whether the potential migration wage is bigger than the
reservation wage plus migration fixed cost, which further depends on individuals’ observed
characteristics, such as education, age, household demographics, fixed cost involved with
migration, and unobservables such as motivation, ability (as shown in Section 3.3). It is very
likely that the unobservables that affect adult parents’ migration decision may be correlated
with the one that affects children’s education attainment. For example, father’s genetic ability
is an important unobservable which may affect the probability of his migration. And there
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is enough evidence to believe that father’s genetic ability is correlated with child’s learning
ability, which further affects child’s education attainment. Migration is therefore likely an
endogenous covariate in child’s education equation. Ignoring this endogeneity may generate
spurious effect from parent’s migration to child’s school performance. In order to identify
the causal effect of dad’s migration on child’s education attainment, we need to remove the
fixed effect in child enrollment equation that is correlated with DadMit by making use of
panel data structure. However, this is not enough to deal with endogeneity of migration
variable. Another source of endogeneity may come from the fact that dad migration and
child’s education are simultaneously determined. Some parents leave home to do the labour
migration work mainly to collect enough money for funding children’s further education, if
they predict it is very likely according to child’s current schooling performance. If this is the
case, removing fixed effect will not be enough to solve the endogeneity problem. To account
for this, an IV approach needs to be implemented.
Therefore a fixed effect IV approach is applied when estimating equation (3.13). The
causal inference is achieved by instrumenting variation of father’s migration with the exoge-
nous variation in rainfall shocks during the previous growing season to identify the local aver-
age treatment effect (LATE) of father’s migration behavior on child’s current school enrollment
decision. Instrument variables we use are the cubic multinomial combinations of deviation of
rainfall from multi-year average in the growing season of last year and the area of cultivated
land for the household. Rainfall data has been used widely as an instrument or proxy for rural
household income in developing countries where income relies heavily on agriculture. The
justification comes from the fact that agriculture productivity depends heavily on weather,
especially in developing countries where the irrigation infrastructure is under developed. For
example, Bjorkman (2006) uses the transitory rainfall variable, i.e., the difference between ac-
tual rainfall at time t− 1 and historical rainfall in that district, to proxy for household income
in Uganda. It is also true that nonfarm job taking usually takes place if farmers can not get
enough income from agriculture production due to the undesirable weather. Based on this
fact, Giles and Yoo (2007) use rainfall shocks from the distant past during the growing season
for typical Chinese agriculture production (July–November9) as instruments for the share of
village laborers working in migrant destinations. This paper adopts the same strategy and
use the rainfall shock during the last growing season as an instrument for father’s migration
probability in this year10. The area of land for cultivation is also used to instrument father’s
migration decision, and it has a wide variation across regions.
Although both outcome variable and endogenous independent variable are binary, An-
9See Giles and Yoo (2007) for detailed discussion about how to choose the most relevant seasons for rainfall
information based on crop cycle knowledge in China. Although the sample area covered in their paper is much
smaller than the one in our study, there exists a large overlapping and the July-November season is still applicable.
10Ideally, we should use rainfall shock for each county in order to get enough variations. Regrettably, we couldn’t
get county-specific weather data. We constructed average rainfall shock at province level instead, based on multi-year
monthly rainfall records from several international-standard weather observation sites within provinces. As a result,
we have 7 rainfall shock data (one for each wave) for each of 9 provinces.
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grist (2001) proposes a simple two-stage least square estimation that is sufficient to infer causal
effect of treatment. However, we emphasize that this approach is not the main and final ap-
proach in this paper. As we will discuss later, this fixed effects IV approach suffers a number
of drawbacks which are inherent in the data structure and is therefore limited in providing
definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, we still present its estimation results here for further
discussion and comparison.
Results
The results are shown in the second and third column in Table 3.2. For comparison, we show
the coefficients from a random effect probit model estimation in the first column. From the
first result, we find most variables show reasonable signs on children’s dropout. For example,
girls and children from poorer families are generally more likely to drop out from school;
and parents’ education, especially mothers’ education are important indicators of children’s
education (i.e., children with higher educated mothers generally stay in school for longer);
the presence of primary schools in the village can increase local children’s enrollment. This
effect may reflect the better education quality or lower transportation cost for the students.
Nevertheless, father’s migration doesn’t have significant effect on child’s school enrollment.
The fixed effect IV approach, on the other hand, by addressing the endogeneity of inde-
pendent variable, may produce consistent estimates. However, probably due to the limited
variation of the rainfall shock across regions 11, the first stage regression (column 2) shows
rainfall shocks are not effective instruments, nor the cultivated land area, except the avail-
ability of electricity and existence of high school may reduce father’s migration probability.
The probability of joint significance of these instruments is too low to validate excluded re-
striction for the IV approach. While the second stage regression gives a negative effect of
migration on child’s dropout, i.e., if a father is currently doing migration work, his child is
45.5% more likely to be enrolled in school compared to a counterpart whose father is not
migrating. However, the effect is not significant from zero.
Advantages and disadvantages
Theoretically, the fixed effect IV estimation procedure should remove the fixed effects in the
child enrollment choice equation, and at the same time solve the simultaneity problem be-
tween the outcome variable and the endogenous variable. However, the application of this
approach in our study suffers from two practical drawbacks. First is the problem of weak
instruments as we discuss earlier. Second, this approach cannot capture the natural dynamic
process of schooling and migration. And more importantly, the nonconsecutive time series of
this survey doesn’t allow us to tell the exact time when the child dropped out12, therefore, it’s
possible that father’s migration took place after the child dropped out. For example, if a child
was enrolled in school in 1993, but recorded as dropout at the wave of 1997, and as such it is
11Rainfall information is only available at province average level.
12Variable dropout is defined if a child didn’t enroll in school this year and “the years of schooling finished” didn’t
change in the later years.
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Table 3.2: Panel Data Regressions
Outcome: dropout random effects Fixed effects IV
probit model 1st stage IV 2nd stage
father is doing migration work 0.026 (0.132) -0.455 (1.156)
rain fall shock -0.082 (0.520)
rain fall shock (square term) -0.009 (0.038)
rain fall shock (cubic term) 0.014 (0.092)
father’s age 0.575 (0.550)
father’s age (square term) 0.000 (0.000)
child’s gender 0.136 (0.053) ***
chid’s age 0.735 (0.079) *** -0.566 (0.549) -0.078 (0.006) ***
child’s age (square term) -0.012 (0.002) *** 0.000 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) ***
father’s education
primary school -0.083 (0.100)
secondary school -0.100 (0.100)
high school -0.189 (0.112) *
technical school -0.410 (0.354)
college and above 0.062 (0.484)
mother’s education
primary school 0.011 (0.071)
secondary school -0.175 (0.076) **
high school -0.313 (0.108) ***
vocational school -0.155 (0.402)
child’s finished education
primary school -0.343 (0.122) *** -0.009 (0.007) -0.100 (0.016) ***
secondary school -0.321 (0.136) ** -0.017 (0.010) -0.102 (0.026) ***
high school -1.362 (0.173) *** -0.020 (0.019) -0.433 (0.041) ***
vocational school -1.127 (0.186) *** -0.049 (0.023) ** -0.413 (0.070) ***
college/university -1.641 (0.276) *** -0.031 (0.063) -0.779 (0.118) ***
household size 0.002 (0.030) 0.004 (0.004) * 0.012 (0.009)
number of children in the household -0.036 (0.042) 0.007 (0.010) -0.019 (0.020)
value of assets (log) -0.038 (0.021) * -0.001 (0.003) -0.006 (0.005)
area of cultivated land (log) -0.002 (0.005)
village facilities
primary school in village -0.126 (0.073) * -0.003 (0.008) -0.027 (0.014)
secondary school in village -0.104 (0.072) -0.012 (0.008) -0.002 (0.020)
high school in village 0.035 (0.113) -0.031 (0.013) ** 0.014 (0.044)
vocational school in village -0.187 (0.129) 0.024 (0.016) -0.025 (0.040)
electricity available 0.136 (0.209) -0.039 (0.018) ** 0.026 (0.055)
constant term -8.370 (0.688) *** -16.004 (15.381) 0.263 (0.103) ***
province specific time trend
√ √ √
F test (1-probability of joint significance of rainfall shocks from zero) 0.913
F test (1- probability of joint significance of all instruments) 0.8832
Number of observations 6444
Number of groups 2354
Note: The baseline for parents’ education is illiteracy. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** denote
significance level at 10%,5%,1% separately.
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likely that he dropped out during 1994-1997, but not clear about which exact year. If it was
before 1997, when the dad was recorded as migrating, the coefficient we get from above prac-
tice doesn’t identify the “causal effect” of migration on dropout. In this case, the timing effect
should be explicitly modeled. This consideration leads us to pursue an alternative empirical
strategy, that we present in the next section.
3.5.2 Bivariate Hazard duration model
Empirical model and selectivity
There is a large literature that treats schooling as a duration process, among which propor-
tional hazard (PH thereafter) model is the most widely applied for modeling school attain-
ment levels (Brown and Park (2002), Edwards and Ureta (2003), Glewwe and Jacoby (2004)).
As recognized in Edwards and Ureta (2003), there are several advantages of PH model which
makes it an attractive statistical framework: first, instead of being treated as a discrete choice
in the static fixed effect model, the natural schooling process is properly covered by dynamic
duration process; second, the PH model has an obvious advantage that it exploits all the
available information in observations that are right censored, that is, observations for children
who are still enrolled at the time of last survey (around 64% of sample cases). Third, another
desirable feature of the proportional hazard model is that it readily yields an estimate of the
underlying baseline hazard function, enabling us to identify the grade levels where dropout
rates are concentrated, net of the effect of measured determinants of school completion.
Since Lancaster (1992) introduced heterogeneity into duration analysis, the mixed pro-
portional hazard model has widely been used in economics, especially in the context of job
search models (Abbring et al. (2005), Hujer et al. (2004)). In this model, the distribution of
duration (T) may vary across individuals. Moreover, it assumes that all individual variation
in the hazard function can be characterized by a finite-dimensional vector of observed ex-
planatory variables Xi and unobserved heterogeneity term vi, which can be interpreted as a
function of unobserved explanatory variables. Xi can be time-invariant or time-variant. While
the interpretation is most straightforward when Xi is time-invariant, in practice, many ex-
planatory variables are often time-varying, and the hazard function is more likely affected by
the current value of the explanatory variable (instead of, e.g. its value at the beginning of the
spell). Van den Berg (2001) notes that the values of the time-varying explanatory variables
at t may in some sense be endogenous because the subject under study may have inside in-
formation at t on the future realization of the random variable T, and this information may
affect the values of his observed explanatory variables at t and his hazard rate at t. It may
be erroneously concluded that the observed explanatory variables have a causal effect on the
duration.
As emphasized in Abbring and van den Berg (2003), the empirical analysis of the treat-
ment effect is hampered by selection problem: individuals who obtain a treatment may have
systematically different outcomes than those who do not. If we apply this idea to our mi-
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gration context, we find that child with dad doing migration work may have systematically
different education attainment than those whose dad hasn’t migrated. To be more specific,
the children with dad migrating would have got less schooling even if their dads didn’t mi-
grate, if we found a positive effect of migration on the hazard of dropping out. This spurious
dependence from related unobserved determinants makes the estimate of the effect of the
previous duration biased.
To deal with these potential endogeneity issues in duration model, multivariate mixed
proportional hazard (MMPH) model provides a useful framework by assuming that the dura-
tions of the time-varying explanatory variable, and the dependent variable, are all outcomes
of stochastic processes. The values of the explanatory variables at t are influenced only by
events that have occurred up to time t, and these events are observable. The information on
the values at time t does not help in predicting a transition at t. Therefore, one may condition
on the moment of treatment and compare what happens before and after this moment. In
our context, the moment of treatment is defined as the first time since year 1985 when the
father is observed to do migration work. The year 1985 is the year when individual identity
card was issued, the use of which makes traveling much easier and reduces the fixed cost
for migrants to some extent13. Although we may expect some regional variation in terms
of the issuing time of ID cards, this information is absent from our data set and therefore
the uniform starting point is applied in our analysis. The basic idea of defining migration
as a duration process is as follows: since doing migration work away from home is a big
decision to make, the ones who make the first moves usually face a large uncertainties and
fixed cost such as searching and traveling cost. Therefore the duration time from year 1985
to the first time of migration may reflect households’ demand and individual ability as well
as migration cost. The unobserved heterogeneity of fathers (Vm) is assumed to be correlated
with that affecting child’s education duration (Vd). To proceed, we assume that, conditional
on the multiplicative heterogeneity V, the realization of tm (first migration) affects the shape
of the hazard of td (dropout) from tm onwards, in a deterministic way. It implies that the
causal effect is captured by the effect of tm on θd(t | tm, V) for t > tm. Note that it is ruled out
that tm affects θd(t | tm, V) on t ∈ [0, tm]. That is, it excludes anticipation effects.
Since these two durations are parallel, the model specification reads:
θm(tm | xm, vm) = ψm(tm) · θ01(xm) ·Vm (3.14)
θd(td | tm, xd, vd) = ψd(td) · θ02(xd) · eδI(tm<td) ·Vd, (3.15)
where subscripts m and d denote dad’s migration and child’s dropout separately, and I(.)
is the indicator function, which is 1 if father migrates before child drops out from school
or always stays in school during our sample period (i.e., right censored education duration).
Therefore, exp(δ) identifies the treatment effect, i.e., the causal effect of dad’s first migration
13A letter of introduction would be necessary for traveling before the ID card was issued.
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on child’s schooling if dad migrates before child drops out of school. As discussed above, Vm
and Vd are potentially correlated.
The density distribution of t can be directly inferred from the hazard density:
fm(tm | xm, vm) = θm(tm | xm, vm)Sm(tm | xm, vm)
= θm(tm | xm, vm) exp
[
−
∫ tm
0
θm(s | xm, vm)ds
]
fd(td | tm, xd, vd) = θd(td | tm, xd, vd)Sd(td | tm, xd, vd)
= θd(td | tm, xd, vd) exp
[
−
∫ td
0
θd(s | tm, xd, vd)ds
]
Since some children (fathers) are never observed to leave school (do migration work) dur-
ing our sample period, right censoring of the durations is common. We define the censoring
indicators κm and κd, with κm = 1 (respectivelyκd = 1) if tm(respectively td) is right censored,
in which case the hazard density is just the same as the cumulative probability of survival till
the last observation. The individual likelihood contributions are given by:
lm(tm | xm, vm) = fm(t | xm, vm)1−κm
{
exp
[
−
∫ tm
0
θm(s | xm, vm)ds
]}κm
(3.16)
ld(td | tm, xd, vd) = fd(t | tm, xm, vm)1−κd
{
exp
[
−
∫ td
0
θd(s | tm, xd, vd)ds
]}κd
(3.17)
Maximum likelihood function needs to integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity and
obtain the joint probability given observed characteristics.
lm,d(tm, td, X) =
∫
m
∫
d
lm(tm | xm, vm)ld(td | tm, xd, vd)dG(vm, vd) (3.18)
To proceed, further assumptions about joint distribution of vm and vd are required. How-
ever, as Heckman and Singer (1984) note, the estimates obtained from duration models is very
sensitive to the assumptions of the distribution of unobservables. Non-parametric procedures
is therefore undertaken for estimation of the above empirical model. We assume G(vm, vd)
has two points of support for each argument vm and vd with the associated probabilities
pi1 = P(vm1 , vd1),pi2 = P(vm1 , vd2),pi3 = P(vm2 , vd1),pi4 = P(vm2 , vd2). And the integrated
hazard function in (3.16) and (3.17) are estimated as the sum of piecewise constants. The
individual likelihood contribution can then be written as
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lm,d(tm, td, X) = pi1 · ld(td | tm, xd, vd1) · lm(tm | xm, vm1)
+ pi2 · ld(td | tm, xd, vd2) · lm(tm | xm, vm1)
+ pi3 · ld(td | tm, xd, vd1) · lm(tm | xm, vm2)
+ pi4 · ld(td | tm, xd, vd2) · lm(tm | xm, vm2) (3.19)
Estimation is accomplished with maximum likelihood, where the probabilities of the
mixing distribution are specified as logistic probabilities:
pi1 =
1
1+ exp(q1) + exp(q2) + exp(q3)
,
pi2 =
exp(q1)
1+ exp(q1) + exp(q2) + exp(q3)
,
pi3 =
exp(q2)
1+ exp(q1) + exp(q2) + exp(q3)
,
pi4 =
exp(q3)
1+ exp(q1) + exp(q2) + exp(q3)
,
where q1,q2,q3 are parameters to be estimated.
Estimation and Results
Before we present full estimation results, in Figure 3.3 we present descriptive evidence in the
form of non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival curves of schooling for school-aged children
in our sample, grouped by gender, or father’s migration history, or both. The big drops of
survival step function in the schooling cut-off points14 reflect the natural schooling process.
Moreover, the difference between boys and girls are trivial in our sample, with girls generally
face slightly higher hazard of dropout before finishing 9-years compulsory schools, but may
obtain more education than boys once surviving the high school. The difference between
children with different fathers’ migration history is however more significant. Those whose
fathers have ever done migration work stay at school longer in general than the others, as
the former’s survival curve weakly dominates the latter’s in graph 3.3b, especially during
secondary school (6-9 years of schooling) and high school (9-12 years of schooling) period.
The third graph describes the gender difference of the effect of father’s migration history on
children’s education attainment. Fathers’ migration increase survival rate of schooling for
both boys and girls by a significant margin, especially for girls during secondary school. This
difference to some extent reflects the gender preference of households’ education investment
in rural China. The boys have the much higher priority than girls in the allocation of limited
household resources. But with the extra income from fathers’ migration, girls may be able to
obtain more resource and education.
14These points are at 6th year for primary school, 9th year for secondary school, and 12th year for high school.
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(a) by gender (b) by migration
(c) by gender and migration
Figure 3.3: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves of Schooling for Rural Children
The estimation results of duration models are shown in Table 3.3 and 3.4 . Table 3.3
shows the results from single variable duration model of child’s schooling (equation (3.15)),
treating father’s migration as a time varying exogenous variable. Different strata (where strata
is defined so that all the observations in the same strata have the same baseline hazards) is
used and the fit is in general improved if more detailed strata is defined, as shown in the
change in likelihood values. As we can see, if we don’t take account of the endogeneity of
father’s migration decision, the hazard ratios of child’s schooling with fathers’ migration are
always below 1, indicating the history of father’s migration lowers the child’s hazard rate of
dropout, no matter how strata are defined. However, all the coefficients are not significant
from 1 at the probability of 10% level. Similar as in fixed effects estimation, parents’ education
levels determine child’s schooling process to a great extent, i.e., children with higher educated
parents usually have lower hazards of dropping out. The difference between girls and boys is
not significant here. The more children at home, the more likely for a child to stop education
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early. However, school aged children from larger family (after controlling for the number
of non-adults) stay longer in schools, possibly due to the insurance rule provided by the
big families. Access to electricity is an important indicator of regional economic development,
and found to improve children’s enrollment by 30% on average. If we don’t control for cohort,
we can also see that younger cohorts in general get more education than the older ones, as
in column (1). Again, the village-specific school availabilities, especially secondary school in
village can also improve children’s education attainment by a significant amount, as shown
in column (1).
MMPH model is estimated with the joint distribution of heterogeneity by 4 points of
support nonparametrically. Although we suspect selection may take a role, another advantage
of this method in application is that no exclusion restriction is necessary, i.e., we don’t need to
model father’s migration with instruments that are exclusive to schooling duration process15.
The baseline hazard for each duration is estimated as a piecewise constant step function. For
the duration of schooling, we break the natural schooling process into 7 groups: 0-5th, 5-6th,
7-8th, 9th, 10-11th, 12th, 12thabove, where each group s has its specific baseline hazard ψsd(td)
16.
We make this distinction to accommodate the natural schooling process, in which survival
in different school types has its own time course, especially for the final year at each level.
Similarly, the baseline hazard for the natural duration of migration is also broken down into
6 piecewise constants, with the cut-off points same as the observational waves in the panel
data, i.e., 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 200617. By estimating these piecewise constant hazards
nonparametrically, we are able to model the time trend of the macro economic development
in China and the accompanied labour migration, and therefore separate the effect of macro
time trend from individual variates.
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results of the bivariate duration model setting the treat-
ment effect constant, i.e., the treatment effect is assumed to be constant throughout the whole
treatment period. Column (1) shows the results from the same sample as we used in sin-
gle duration model, while the second column uses a smaller sample in which all the fathers
appeared in the survey since 1989. The coefficients under each column shows the estimated
coefficient for each covariate, while the hazard ratios are the exponent of the coefficients, and
are compared against 1. Similar to the earlier results, the average treatment effect δ in this
model is very close to zero, indicating that on average father’s migration doesn’t improve a
child’s lifetime education attainment. The duration estimation of child schooling shows the
similar results as in Table 3.3. On the other hand, the duration estimation of father’s first
migration shows younger and more educated father (especially college graduates) is more
likely to migrate earlier, while family demands (e.g. the needs to look after young children)
15Nevertheless, in empirical analysis we still include rainfall variations as independent variables that are exclusive
to child’s schooling duration in migration function.
16The first baseline hazard is normalized to 1 to avoid multicollinearity in estimation.
17We assume the baseline hazard is the same between sectors from 2000 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2006, to avoid
small sector sizes and inefficient inference. Similarly, the first baseline hazard is normalized to be 1.
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Table 3.3: Single Duration Regressions
Haz. Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
no stratification stratified by stratified by stratified by
(birthyear) (birthyear, province) (birthyr, region)
dad has ever done migration
work before child’s dropout 0.920 (0.115) 0.914 (0.115) 0.887 (0.122) 0.863 (0.121)
gender (1=girl) 0.909 (0.061) 0.902 (0.061) * 0.945 (0.069) 0.998 (0.075)
birthyear (mean removed) 0.945 (0.011) *** 0.946 (0.011) ***
household size 0.943 (0.042) 0.938 (0.043) 0.937 (0.045) 0.922 (0.045) *
children 1.163 (0.065) *** 1.170 (0.067) *** 1.166 (0.072) *** 1.130 (0.072) *
household assets value (log) 0.964 (0.025) 0.962 (0.026) 0.959 (0.028) 0.982 (0.030)
father’s education
primary school 0.757 (0.093) ** 0.758 (0.094) ** 0.764 (0.103) ** 0.780 (0.108) *
secondary school 0.715 (0.088) *** 0.709 (0.088) *** 0.693 (0.093) *** 0.689 (0.095) ***
high school 0.609 (0.086) *** 0.598 (0.086) *** 0.579 (0.089) *** 0.571 (0.090) ***
technical school 0.439 (0.228) * 0.415 (0.219) * 0.300 (0.170) ** 0.382 (0.222) *
College and above 0.938 (0.577) 1.078 (0.666) 1.349 (0.873) 1.520 (1.107)
mother’s education
primary school 0.948 (0.084) 0.958 (0.085) 0.941 (0.090) 0.928 (0.093)
secondary school 0.790 (0.078) ** 0.790 (0.079) *** 0.790 (0.084) *** 0.768 (0.084) ***
high school 0.573 (0.083) *** 0.565 (0.084) *** 0.581 (0.091) *** 0.598 (0.096) ***
technical school or above 0.291 (0.212) * 0.311 (0.228) * 0.247 (0.191) * 0.264 (0.211) *
village facilities
primary school in village 0.897 (0.084) 0.903 (0.087) 0.883 (0.094) 0.935 (0.104)
secondary school in village 0.873 (0.071) * 0.883 (0.073) * 0.900 (0.081) 0.893 (0.085)
high school in village 0.854 (0.115) 0.852 (0.116) 0.839 (0.127) 0.842 (0.134)
vocational school in village 1.081 (0.172) 1.096 (0.177) 1.157 (0.204) 1.144 (0.207)
electricity in village 0.739 (0.144) * 0.770 (0.153) 0.709 (0.152) * 0.711 (0.158) *
province dummy
Heilongjiang 0.944 (0.174) 0.944 (0.177)
Jiangsu 0.705 (0.124) ** 0.698 (0.124) **
Shandong 0.843 (0.137) 0.842 (0.138)
Henan 0.985 (0.149) 0.975 (0.149)
Hubei 0.893 (0.135) 0.905 (0.138)
Hunan 0.838 (0.132) 0.814 (0.130)
Guangxi 1.019 (0.154) 1.002 (0.153)
Guizhou 0.877 (0.140) 0.881 (0.142)
No. of subjects 2544
No. of failures 935
Number of observations 13019
Log likelihood -6192.110 -4047.441 -2158.912 -1876.287
Note: Strata is defined by category variables and sample within the same category having the same baseline hazard.
The baseline for parents’ education dummies are illiterate. The baseline for province dummies is Liaoning. The
numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***,**,* show the statistic significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level separately.
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may also keep the male adult staying at home. The limited cultivated land area, big varia-
tion of rainfall in previous year and the lack to electricity also pushes farmers to seek more
off-farm job opportunities and income outside the village. This result is different from FEIV
regressions, where instruments are too weak to have impact on migration probability. The
difference may reflect the fact that migrants’ first migration is driven by the low agricultural
production from last year. While once they are out for the first time, they can build up con-
tacts and gain more experience which make future migration much easier. Although being
close to train station may reduce the transportation costs for migrating, it may also provide
more local off-farm job opportunities so that farmers do not need to migrate. The piecewise
constant baseline hazards show the general pattern of natural schooling process, with higher
dropout rate at higher levels, and especially higher dropout rate at the last year of secondary
school (λ4 ) and high school (λ6). The baseline hazards for father’s migration also show the
general macro economic trend, i.e., in general there is an increasing migration population over
years, especially since mid 1990s. The efforts to search for heterogeneity however have been
proved to be fruitless. The estimation with heterogeneity always goes to the mass point with
probability nearly one, while others with probability nearly zero. The results shown here are
from the estimation by imposing probability equal to 1 for one mass point. This implies that
there is no selection in this context, i.e., for the fathers who are more likely to take migration
jobs away from home, the children do not necessarily perform better in schools systematically.
The reasons could be multifold. One possible reason is that migration selection does not (or
at least not mainly) depend on individual ability, but rather, on networks and information
(Zhao (2003)), which is however not available in this data set .
Considering that the data has an unbalanced panel structure, and some households are
not surveyed in the first wave 1989, we can’t observe whether the school-aged children’s
fathers went to do migration work in 1989 for those who entered the data in later waves. Any
kind of assumption may bias the estimates. For this reason, we estimate the model using a
smaller subsample which only consists of 2076 households that are first observed in 1989. The
results are shown in Column 2 in 3.4. The results are generally similar to the first Column,
and we again find the average treatment effect is nearly zero.
Although on average father’s migration has negligible impact on child’s lifetime edu-
cation attainment, it is possible that the treatment effect differs across different schooling
periods. For example, the treatment effect may focus on secondary school and high school
participation, as depicted in Figure 3.3, in which the survival curve of the treated children
dominates the one of the nontreated children during secondary and high school period. Based
on this observation, we distinguish the treatment effect on compulsory schooling from the
one beyond compulsory schooling. The results of the period specific treatment coefficients
are shown in Table 3.5.
The results show the treatment effect coefficients vary a little across different school-
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Table 3.4: Multivariate Duration Model(constant treatment effect)
(1) (2)
Variables coefficient hazard ratio coefficient hazard ratio
δ -0.036 (0.174) 0.96 -0.036 (0.181) 0.96
duration of child’s schooling
gender -0.119 (0.080) 0.89 -0.076 (0.086) 0.93
birthyear -0.075 (0.014) *** 0.93 -0.085 (0.015) *** 0.92
number of children in household 0.234 (0.064) *** 1.26 0.218 (0.067) *** 1.24
household size -0.266 (0.049) *** 0.77 -0.178 (0.052) *** 0.84
household assets value (log) -0.126 (0.028) *** 0.88 -0.063 (0.031) ** 0.94
father’s education
primary school -0.500 (0.133) *** 0.61 -0.441 (0.154) *** 0.64
secondary school -0.582 (0.136) *** 0.56 -0.550 (0.156) *** 0.58
high school -0.687 (0.158) *** 0.5 -0.647 (0.174) *** 0.52
vocational school -1.529 (0.630) ** 0.22 -1.527 (0.557) *** 0.22
college or university -0.332 (0.880) 0.72 -0.233 (2.806) 0.79
mother’s education
primary school -0.141 (0.106) 0.87 -0.129 (0.120) 0.88
secondary school -0.290 (0.114) ** 0.75 -0.224 (0.130) * 0.8
high school -0.595 (0.165) *** 0.55 -0.501 (0.183) *** 0.61
vocational school -1.655 (0.846) ** 0.19 -0.809 (1.444) 0.45
village facilities
primary school -0.025 (0.105) 0.98 0.061 (0.126) 1.06
secondary school -0.227 (0.098) ** 0.8 -0.144 (0.106) 0.87
high school -0.100 (0.173) 0.9 -0.186 (0.187) 0.83
vocational school -0.022 (0.203) 0.98 -0.104 (0.207) 0.9
electricity -0.966 (0.161) *** 0.38 -0.840 (0.187) *** 0.43
number of clinics -0.044 (0.045) 0.96 0.003 (0.050) 1
province dummies
√ √
baseline hazard
λ2 (4th-6th school year) 1.413 (0.222) *** 4.11 1.690 (0.234) *** 5.42
λ3 (6th-8th school year) 1.460 (0.190) *** 4.31 1.561 (0.200) *** 4.76
λ4 (8th-9th school year) 3.906 (0.177) *** 49.7 3.977 (0.186) *** 53.33
λ5 (9th-11th school year) 2.735 (0.215) *** 15.42 2.817 (0.227) *** 16.73
λ6 (11th-12th school year) 4.022 (0.220) *** 55.78 4.095 (0.235) *** 60.06
λ7 (12th and above) 4.039 (0.340) *** 56.76 4.033 (0.355) *** 56.42
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Table 3.4: Multivariate Duration Model(constant treatment effect, continued)
(1) (2)
Variables coefficient hazard ratio coefficient hazard ratio
duration of father’s migration
father’s birthyear 0.036 (0.013) *** 1.04 0.032 (0.014) ** 1.03
number of elderly (over 70) in household -0.329 (0.302) 0.72 -0.289 (0.325) 0.75
number of children(6-16) in household -0.103 (0.094) 0.9 -0.153 (0.105) 0.86
number of babies(0-6) in household -0.218 (0.108) ** 0.8 -0.289 (0.129) ** 0.75
area of farm land (log) -0.374 (0.083) *** 0.69 -0.364 (0.096) *** 0.69
father’s education
primary school 0.289 (0.329) 1.34 0.275 (0.335) 1.32
secondary school 0.221 (0.321) 1.25 0.107 (0.333) 1.11
high school 0.258 (0.346) 1.29 0.237 (0.366) 1.27
vocational school 0.111 (0.798) 1.12 0.106 (0.843) 1.11
college or university 2.511 (0.564) *** 12.32 1.654 (1.713) 5.23
rainfall shock in previous year -0.152 (0.131) 0.86 -0.187 (0.151) 0.83
rainfall shock (square) in previous year -0.162 (0.054) *** 0.85 -0.236 (0.069) *** 0.79
rainfall shock (triple) in previous year -0.027 (0.027) 0.97 -0.036 (0.030) 0.96
village facilities
primary school -0.262 (0.222) 0.77 -0.344 (0.235) 0.71
seconary school -0.115 (0.248) 0.89 -0.022 (0.277) 0.98
high school -0.238 (0.371) 0.79 -0.129 (0.422) 0.88
vocational school 0.468 (0.444) 0.351 (0.475)
electricity -0.807 (0.328) ** 0.45 -0.872 (0.347) ** 0.42
train station in village -0.618 (0.294) ** 0.54 -0.628 (0.334) * 0.53
Close to a big river -0.031 (0.221) 0.97 -0.068 (0.245) 0.93
number of clinics 0.023 (0.240) 1.02 0.057 (0.243) 1.06
minority 0.276 (0.414) 1.32 0.530 (0.402) 1.7
province dummies
√ √
baseline hazard
µ2 (1989-1991) 0.345 (0.253) 1.41 0.241 (0.285) 1.27
µ3 (1991-1993) 0.545 (0.246) ** 1.72 0.609 (0.263) ** 1.84
µ4 (1993-1997) -1.444 (0.445) *** 0.24 -1.395 (0.493) *** 0.25
µ5 (1997-2000) -0.852 (0.335) ** 0.43 -0.777 (0.388) ** 0.46
µ6 (2000-2006) -0.959 (0.360) *** 0.38 -1.169 (0.444) *** 0.31
unobserved heterogeneity
vd -1.727 (0.232) *** 0.18 -3.091 (0.234) *** 0.05
vt -4.737 (0.709) *** 0.01 -3.573 (0.649) *** 0.03
likelihood function value 4955.593 4200.868
number of observations 2546 2076
Note: The duration of schooling is defined as the maximum years of schooling observed in the data; the duration of
migration is defined as the time span between year 1985 and father’s first observed migration. The baseline dummy
for father’s education is illiterate level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***,**,* show the statistic
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level separately.
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Table 3.5: Multivariate Duration Model (period specific treatment effects)
(1) (2)
Treatment effects all sample subsample with observations in 1989
δ(compulsory school) -0.116 (0.195) -0.103 (0.206)
δ(beyond compulsory school) 0.246 (0.312) 0.189 (0.317)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the estimates.
ing periods. The point estimation shows fathers’ migration increases children’s attendance
in compulsory school by around 11%, while decreases high school attendance by over 20%.
However, none of these effects are significantly different from zero. This result reaffirms the
insignificant constant treatment coefficient, that we can’t find father’s migration has signifi-
cant effect on children’s lifetime education attainment.
3.6 Conclusions and discussions
This paper studies the causal effect of intensive labour migration in rural China on child’s
education attainment through father’s migration during the last one and a half decade. By
making use of the panel data of school-aged children and their parents’ migration labour mar-
ket participation, two empirical approaches are attempted. Fixed effect IV method (FEIV), by
removing the unobserved fixed effects of a child, and instrumenting the fathers’ migration
decision by rain fall shocks, is able to capture the effect of incidence of father’s migration on
the incidence of a child dropping out from school. However, due to the nonconsecutive panel
data structure, this approach suffers from many drawbacks. Instead, a duration model, par-
ticularly the multivariate mixed proportional hazard duration model (MMPH), is estimated
to identify the impact of father’s migration history on a child’s education attainment, while
taking account of the natural dynamic process of schooling. Our estimation results show,
even though there is a considerable worry about the negative impact of parents’ absence due
to long-distance labour migration on child’s human capital development, we find father’s
migration has no significant effect on children’s lifetime education attainment.
This result seems contradictory to other studies which focus on the negative psychological
and behaviour outcomes of the migrants’ children who are left behind. One explanation could
be that the positive effect of father’s remittances offsets the negative effect of father’s being
absent from home. However, since the information on remittance is not specifically asked in
this survey, it is not very feasible to test this argument with this data set. Another reason could
be that due to the limited number of cases, we exclude children whose mothers have ever
been away from home doing migration work during children’s schooling age. Considering
mothers’ critical role in children’s development, especially in daily life care, not being able to
study the impact of mother’s migration constitutes the main limitation of this paper. Recent
survey shows that females’ participation in migration labour market is as competitive as the
males’ in scale. The effect of mother’s migration on child’s education becomes a even more
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prominent issue to examine. This no doubt is a topic that we should study in the future
research.
The main contribution of this paper is that this is the first paper which applies multivari-
ate hazard duration model on migration and education problem. The choice of this model
has strong applicability in studying education problem in China, as the two main publicly ac-
cessible household panel data set from China are both collected from nonconsecutive waves.
One of the data set is CHNS that is used in this paper, while the other one “The Gansu Survey
of Children and Families” which focuses on rural children’s welfare outcomes, including ed-
ucation, health and psycho-social development, is also collected from nonconsecutive waves:
2000, 2004, 2007 and 2009. As the timing of individual choice is not clear in nonconsecutive
longitudinal data, estimating the effect of the incidence of one event on the incidence of an-
other event by panel data models may very likely capture the spurious effect due purely to
the timing. In this sense, duration model is superior to the fixed effects model.
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